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P32.4 - An Empirical Approach for Child Labour in Brazil

ABSTRACT:

Using Bivariate Probit Models this study intends to measure and analyze the influence of some variables over the child's decision of attends school or work. The econometric model take into account variables as: net familiar per capita income, mother's education, geographic position, color, Sex, head's position in the occupation, and others.

The peculiarity of this model consists in divide the work of children, from 5 to 15 years old, into waged and non-waged activities, what permits a more accurate analysis of the variables' influence over these two kinds of work. The main conclusions of this study may be summed up as follows: the first one is that the some individual, familiar and household characteristics (variables) have different and significant effects over child's waged and non-waged work; the second one is that non-waged activities are more frequent among the poorest families, while waged activities occur uniformly among all income deciles. Therefore, the political solution to combat child labor shall pass through different ways depending on the activity that is carried out by these children (waged or not).

AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH FOR CHILD LABOR IN BRAZIL

Jeronimo Oliveira Muniz¹

INTRODUCTION

There are a lot of reasons that can urge a child to labor market, but generally the most common is the presence of low household incomes, which forces children to work to sustain themselves or, in less serious cases, to increase the life quality of their families. According to the altruistic model suggested by Basu & Van (1998), a household will not push children to labor market if their income is sufficiently high. In other words, for every household there is a critical wage, W_i , such that the household will push its children to work if and only if, the adult wages prevailing in the market is less than W_i . This assumption is called "*Luxury Axiom*" and represents the main idea of the altruistic models.

The first objective of this essay is to verify the validity of the "*Luxury Axiom*" to Brazilian case, besides defining and quantifying the influence of some determinants over child labor in Brazilian families. In other words, the purpose is to answer the question: What determines that a child supplies his or her labor in the labor market? A second objective is to raise precise information about the nature and the extension of child labor in Brazil, to permit the removal and rehabilitation of these working children from the labor market. The availability of trustful data is essential to define priorities, to determine which groups deserve prior attention, to draw realistic combat programs and to evaluate the progress of such initiatives. Finding out what social groups or geographical areas child workers come from, and working with families at risk can prevent new children from being recruited for exploitative work.

It is necessary to figure out the actual situation of child labor to understand the magnitude of the problem that we are dealing with. Therefore, the paper is organized in four sections as follows: **The first** quickly discuss the main causes of child labor in Brazil taking into account recent literature about the subject. **The second** shows the econometric methodology used to investigate the determinants of child labor, and introduces the data basis. **The third section** analyses the obtained results and checks the veracity of the "*Luxury Axiom*" to prove if household income really is the main cause of children's entry into the labor market. Finally, **the forth section** concludes the paper.

This investigation was realized using recent cross-sectional data from PNAD (National Research by Household Sample- IBGE) 1998, which besides having a large sample size, covers the whole country (except the rural areas of the North region), and also offers a lot of information concerning the studied cases.

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1. WHY CHILDREN WORK?

The recognition of poverty as a major cause of the child labor problem is not new, but a growing body of information and experience has revealed another dimension. Child labor is also about the exploitation of poverty, social exclusion, inequality and injustice.



Graphic 1 clarifies the relation between income, school attendance and work. It may be observed that the propensity of study increases for higher income levels, while the proportion of working children has an opposite behavior, especially for those who executed non-waged tasks in the previous week. It is also important to say that the positive variation in school attendance is smaller than the decrease in work attendance. Moreover, it is also relevant to observe that only in the sixtieth decile waged and non-waged activity rates touch themselves, what means that until the sixtieth decile the total work decreases mainly due to non-waged works. Therefore, these data also support the poverty hypothesis showing that the rates of school attendance increase and the rates of child work decrease when moving from the lowest to the highest income decile.

However, according to UNICEF (1997b), there are a lot of factors besides poverty that are connected to child labor. Income distribution, fertility, education, bad nutrition, woman status, as well as the economy structure and the framework of macroeconomic policies are strongly related to the insertion of a child in the labor market.

BHALOTRA & HEADY (2000) for example, investigating the determinants of child labor in rural household from Ghana and Pakistan concluded that, in addition to the number of siblings, factors as age, mother's education, region, ethnic, religion, availability of public transports and electricity are variables that show some importance to define the number of hours that children work.

ZYLBERSTAJN, PAGOTTO & PASTORE (1985) conducted a study in Brazil to show which are the forces that drive children, teens, and women into the labor market. The authors found that the poorest families use the work of children and teenagers in order to survive, mainly because of three reasons: father's handicap, age and health of the son. When they did this study, there were "...27% of families where the head of the household did not work due to sickness or job accident, living in total or partial handicapped conditions. In this group of families, there are 37% whose income is exclusively formed by the precarious work of minors." In this case, the option of these children was not between working or not, but between living or starving. Despite this "surviving question", usually others factors are indicated as responsible for children labor: the unemployment of members in the household, the rupture of the family core, with the woman becoming head in the absence of the man, and the invalidity of the household head.

BARROS & SANTOS (1991) and RESENDE (1998) also investigated and analyzed related factors, directly or not, with the insertion of minors in the Brazilian labor market. Individual, regional, intra household and labor market characteristics were analyzed in this study. The authors found that the participation rate of children in the Brazilian labor market is directly and strongly related with the household poverty level.

Although, in another study BARROS, MENDONÇA & VELAZCO (1994) concluded that poverty is not responsible for the entry of children into the Brazilian labor market. If poverty was the main cause of child labor, then a larger participation rate should be expected in areas and periods of bigger poverty. Notwithstanding, the evidence found by the authors does not confirm this idea.

Recently, LEME & WAJNMAN (2000) studied the link between school and work and confirmed that in the decision of just studying, the most important variables are parents education and household income, followed by the number of kids in the family and the child's gender. LEME & WAJNMAN also concluded, as well as FILHO et al. (2000), that these variables have great influence over the decision of just studying, but in opposite direction.

Finally, in a last example FREIJE e LOPEZ-CALVA (2000) used Mexican and Venezuelan data to examine the forces related to child labor, and to study the association between poverty and children activities. The authors concluded the following: (1) the composition and the kind of household are important determinants of child labor and education; (2) family income level matters but labor market conditions do not so policy measures aimed at affecting the price of child labor may be ineffective; and (3) child labor is not a transitory condition and therefore it has significant impact over the future educational upward mobility of working children.

2. METHODOLOGY

The main objective of this paper is to verify if the empirical regularities and the behavior of working children observed in others studies could be seen in Brazilian case. To do this, econometrics methods to aim which are the variables affecting the decision of children to work will be applied following BASU (1999) and FREIJE & LOPEZ-CALVA (2000). Taking into account the Federal Law determination, this study considers as children all persons from 5 to 15 years old. It was considered as 'working children' all persons who were engaged in any economic activity in the last week, waged or not.

This study intends to identify the main determinants of child labor in Brazil, besides testing the "luxury axiom", and to investigate the per capita income influence in the hypothesis of insertion (or not) of children in the labor market. This paper evaluates how the different factors listed below influence both child labor and schooling.

Using *PROBIT* models, this paper proposes to estimate two regression functions. The first one will give the probability of children, from 5 to 15 years, enter the labor market, and the second one, the probability of going to school taking into account some individual and familiar characteristics. The model may be synthesized as follows:

 $Y_T = f(X_i) + \lambda, \lambda \sim N(0,1)$

$$Y_E = f(X_i) + \xi, \xi \sim N(0,1):$$

 $Y_T = 1$ if the child works or $Y_T = 0$ if the child does not work, $Y_E = 1$ if the child goes to school or $Y_E = 0$ if he or she doesn't go, X_i is a vector of exogenous variables (education, household per capita income from of all fonts, excluding the own child's income, head's occupational position, parents' education, color, and some relevant individual and household characteristics), and finally ξ and λ are the stochastic terms not correlated with the regressors.

Nevertheless, *Probit* models do not catch the existent relation between working and studying in the decisional process. They assume that school and the labor supply decision are independent, which is an untenable assumption. More recent approaches try to deal with the interrelated nature of these events.

The *BIVARIATE PROBIT* model assumes that school attendance and child work decisions are separate but interrelated. This interrelation takes place through a correlated error structure so that, after controlling explanatory variables, the two outcomes are related to each other. More formally, the bivariate model is:

 $\begin{aligned} y_{i,T} &= f\left(X_{i,T}\right) + \lambda & \text{where: } y_T &= 1 \text{ if child works, and } 0 \text{ otherwise} \\ y_{i,E} &= f\left(X_{i,E}\right) + \xi \text{:} & \text{where: } y_E &= 1 \text{ if child attends school, and } 0 \text{ otherwise} \end{aligned}$

 $\mathbf{E}\left[\lambda\right] = \mathbf{E}\left[\xi\right] = \mathbf{0}$

 $Var [\lambda] = Var [\xi] = 1$

Cov $[\lambda,\xi] = \rho$

After assuming the residuals normally distributed, the joint probability is:

 $P_{i,\,k} = P\;(Y_{i,T} = y_{i,T};\,Y_{i,\,E} = y_{i,\,E}) = \theta\;(f\;(X_{i,\,T}),\,f\;(X_{i,\,E}),\,\rho)$

where $X_{i, j}$, j =T,E, are two vectors of explanatory variables and $\theta(.)$ is the joint normal cumulative distribution. This model has the advantage of being flexible enough to have separate equations, and therefore different explanatory variables, for each choice. On the other hand it has the drawback of assuming the same correlation structure for all individuals (i.e., the same rho, ρ , for everybody). It is feasible to assume that the correlation between school and work, after controlling for other factors, has the same sign for almost everybody but it is less convincing to say that it also has the same magnitude.

To estimate the equations were considered persons between 5 and 15 years, what is equivalent to a sample of 78.808 cases. Based on the literature revision, and on the found descriptive statistics (in addition to a little bit of intuition), seven econometric models were specified: four using *Probit* models and three using *Bivariate Probit* specifications. More formally, Probit models may be defined as:

ESCOLA

FREQ = IDADE + IDADE2 + SEXO + COR + EDUC + EDUCAMAE + PESS7ANO +AREARU +MAECHEFI + LUZ + TOTMOR + RFPC + DUMMIES UF + DUMMIES METROPOLITANAS *TRABALHO*

TRABALHA=IDADE+ IDADE2+ SEXO+ COR+ EDUC+ EDUCAMAE+ PESS7ANO+ AREARU + MAECHEFI + CPEM + TOTMOR + RFPC + DUMMIES UF + DUMMIES METROPOLITANAS

TRABALHO REMUNERADO

TRABREM= IDADE+ IDADE2+ SEXO+ COR+ EDUC + EDUCAMAE+ PESS7ANO+ AREARU + MAECHEFI + CPEM + TOTMOR + RFPC + DUMMIES UF + DUMMIES METROPOLITANAS

TRABALHO NÃO REMUNERADO

TRABFREE= IDADE + IDADE2+ SEXO+ COR+ EDUC+ EDUCAMAE+ PESS7ANO+ AREARU + MAECHEFI + CPEM + TOTMOR + RFPC + DUMMIES UF + DUMMIES METROPOLITANAS

OBS: Variable's description is in *Appendix 3*.

At this point, to permit a clear analysis later, the distinction between non-waged and household tasks shall be done. According to PNAD, these two kinds of work can be understood as follow:

Non-waged worker and household member – Any person that was working without remuneration, at least one hour per week, helping members from the household who were occupying positions as: employee in the production of commodities (including agriculture, vegetal or mineral extraction, hunting, fishing and others), self-employed or employer;

Other non-waged worker - Person that was working without remuneration, at least one hour per week, as apprentice, temporary, or helping religious and non-profit institutions, and cooperatives;

Domestic worker - Persons that were engaged in domestic works, waged in money or benefits, in one or more households;

The "rho", ρ , was estimated by establishing the following comparisons in the Bivariate Probit model:

- School X Work;
- School X Waged work;
- School X Non-waged work;

3. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS

Probit and Bivariate Probit estimations seem to have a good fit, though predictability tests have to be carried out. The estimated parameters are in Appendix 4.

Results are in coefficients so that their sign express the direction of the change in probability to a given change in the explanatory variable, and the absolute value measures the magnitude of the variable's influence.

Personal attributes as age, gender and education had significant effects to explain child work and schooling decisions. Age demonstrated a negative relation with the probability to study and to carry out non-waged works, but on the other hand, it had positive effects over remunerated works. It is also possible to observe that this positive effect prevails when these two kinds of work are analyzed together. All these results point to a simple natural fact: the older the child, the less likely to go to school and the more likely to start working, as expected.

The gender of the kid is consistently significant: male children are more likely to work than their female counterparts. Besides being less prone to work than boys, specially in non-remunerated activities, it was evidenced that girls are more likely than boys to attend school. The fact of girls being more inclined to school than to work may be a tip to justify why women's education has recently presented better levels than men's education in Brazil. Education shows positive and significant influence over school and waged work decisions. Nevertheless, over "all works" this influence was negative, what confirms the importance of low educational levels to determine the child's participation in non-waged activities. This figure suggests the existence of a *trade off* between school and work, and in case of remunerated activities, higher education is like a synonym for larger wages, what retards the child's entry in the labor market. In non-waged activities this delay does not occur because there is no salary, so more years in school do not mean larger financial returns. Hence, if the option (when an option is given) is to work without remuneration, would be worthlessness to continue attending school.

The color of the child had less evident effects, probably because Whites, Yellows and Indians (groups with social and cultural characteristics completely different) were put together in just one omitted category. The sign of the coefficient shows that being black or mulatto reduces the probability of going to school and work. This is a pure color effect because the coefficient was estimated controlling by household income and other variables.

On the other hand, the variable EDUCAMAE reflects the fact that the higher the education of the head, the more likely is the child to go to school and the less likely to go to work. This result indicates the preference for education among educated household heads as well as their capacity to afford educational expenditures, as long as head's education is a good predictor of household income. Better-educated parents may have a stronger aversion to child labor, implying a higher disutility. Alternatively, educated parents are more likely to take jobs outside home, increasing the need for children to contribute to household production including work on the household/ enterprise.

Household composition also showed significant impact on all models. The number of members living together in the same household had negative relation to school enrollment and positive relation on all kinds of work, what confirms that a large household size is usually associated with low school enrollment of its children and a high labor force participation rate. Moreover, larger households tend to push children to work for generate an income for themselves. The presence of children below 7 years old also had a negative impact on child labor. In other words, the presence of youngsters does not propel children to go to the job market, but prevents them to go to school in order, perhaps, to take care of their younger siblings, and this is especially the case with older girls who often substitute their mothers in child rearing and housework.

Households ruled by women are less likely to send their children to school, and more likely to send them to waged work.

Another household variable that shows strong significance in schooling decision was the presence of electrical light. The households with this kind of illumination had a probability larger than 10% of having their children attending any teaching institution. In working decision, these

variable, LUZ, was substituted by head's occupational position (CPEM), which permitted to verify that the probability of children to work without remuneration is strongly influenced by the fact of the head being employer or "independent" worker, or rather children whose parents are farm or enterprise owners tend to be surely absorbed in such tasks, especially because these children can be easily exploited. Hence, intuitively it is possible to say that the variable CPEM goes against the altruistic hypothesis suggested by Basu & Van (1998), so that here parents seem to be more preoccupied in put their children to work, what the low relevance of education to work and the high learning by doing content in work. In some cases, it is argued that non-waged work is a kind of training to guarantee that the child will be apt to assume the family business, but this fact seems to be true in few cases.

The familiar per capita income gave sufficient evidence to sustain the "luxury axiom". The coefficients found confirm that larger incomes decrease the probability of working and increase the probability of attending school. It is important to emphasize that as income increases, the probability of work without remuneration becomes shorter than the probability of executes waged activities.

Finally, some regional variables were included to try to control and to measure the effect of social norms such as "stigma" against child labor. The weight of local customs and traditions are important factors that can push children into the workplace. Children are sometimes expected to play their social role or follow their parents' footsteps in a particular trade. Turning to encountered results was found that in general, State and metropolitan regions' dummies point to a negative probability of attends school in relation to Roraima, which was the State with the largest incidence of children in school. Furthermore, Roraima² also has the shorter specific rate of working children, and for this reason the probability of such children work in other States is relatively larger, since that these persons do not live in metropolitan regions.

It was also observed that to live in rural areas reduces the probability of study and executes waged works. Otherwise, in rural areas the probability of perform non-waged activities is 95% superior! These are instigative results because may be insinuating that, in rural areas, children work not to generate direct income, but to help their parents in household's tasks. Alternatively, it is possible to say that, out of urban areas, the *trade off* happens between school and <u>non-waged</u> economic activities. In other words, this means that, for groups living in rural areas, the formal education is not considered yet so important as the education received at work (also known as

² Roraima's dummy variable was omitted due to a small number of working children. Nevertheless, this number was probably underestimated, especially because PNAD does not take into account the residents from rural areas.

learning by doing). Besides helping in familiar household tasks, it is possible that the absence of close schools reinforces this trend.

Summing up, the statistical test for the correlation of the errors in the bivariate probit model shows that "rho" is indeed different from zero, which implies that the decision could be made simultaneously or, in brief, the causal relation between work and school is not clear. In other words, the result of "rho" given by the specified model does not permit to say that the child is not attending school due to work, as well as does not permit to say that the child does not work because is studying. In the decision model "School x Work" for example, rho is around - 0,16, what means that the non-explained component (residual) related to the fact of a child does not attend classes, is 16% linked to the non-explained component of the working decision. However, separating activities in waged and non-waged works the effect of rho becomes clearer. In non-waged works, the residual had an influence (correlation) on school attendance equal to 3,6%, while in waged activities this influence had a weigh equivalent to 25% over the decision of not going to school. In brief, it is possible to assert that the *trade off* between work and study is much larger in waged tasks than in non-waged.

4. CONCLUSION

The risen numbers show that the situation of child labor in Brazil is still critical, in spite of being slowly alleviated in the passing years. It was verified that the number of working children is diminishing and, in counterpart, the proportion of youngsters in school is increasing, probably due to the enlargement of teaching institutions and to the improvement of accessibility conditions of those living in rural areas, where the incidence of child labor is higher.

In Brazil, besides Region's variables, Age, Gender, Household size, Head's position, Familiar per capita income, Studied years and Mother's education were also confirmed as significant to explain child's work and education. Moreover, the information found also adds two important aspects to the decisional process of child's time allocation. The first is that independent variables have distinct effects over waged and non-waged works, and thus the total influence depends on the prevailing effect. The second aspect sustains that non-waged activities occur more frequently among the poorest social groups, while remunerated works occur uniformly in all income deciles, such as indicates Graphic 1 and the coefficients found. Luxury Axiom seems to be true in the case of non-waged works, but it is less obvious for remunerated activities. However, it should be remembered that independently of income and of rural residence condition, parents occupying posts as employers or self-employed are more likely to avail themselves of non-waged child labor.

According to the obtained "rho" values, in spite of non-waged works befall in larger proportions among persons between 5 and 15 years, it does not compete with school attendance, as strongly happen with waged works. Behind this idea, emerges the economic intuition that the *trade off* between work and school is more important for remunerated works. Moreover, if the short-run benefits of waged activities outweigh the long-term benefits of education, the child will leave school, or else, also existing the possibility of work and study at the same time. For this reason, the notion and the understanding of opportunity cost is central for the *trade off*.

Thus, to avoid that the opportunity cost drop the child out of school, it is necessary to invest in education, transforming the school in an attractive option for the child and for their parents. In this sense, measures as teacher training/ orientation, curriculum reform and adaptation, psychosocial support to the child and to the family, free meals, and mainly financial help to the poorest households are some incentives to keep children out of working and instead go to school, and furthermore are among the necessary conditions to guarantee that schools will be preferred instead of work. A growing number of programmes, combining subsides, financial and other incentives, and education, have helped families reduce the workload of their children and increase their participation in education. In Brazil, Bolsa Escola is a programme that provides education grants based on the monthly minimum wage and enables families to send their children to school. A formal commitment by families serves as a social contract to ensure the full engagement of their children in the learning process. Summing up, an efficient solution against child labor seems to be the provision of relevant and affordable education, followed up by financial resources to permit rehabilitation and reinsertion of these children into society. Through these kinds of measures it is possible to attenuate the inter-generational poverty transfer and, over all, reduces child exploitation. Notwithstanding, measures that support or compensate parents for the loss of income once the child is removed from work are helpful, but can be costly and difficulty to sustain. They need to form part of larger development programmes, as employment and income-generation activities for the parents of child laborers, with a goal of reducing the families dependence on their children's contribution to household income.

One of the contributions provided by this paper was to show that the determinants of waged and non-waged works are different. In the case of non-waged rural work, the political solution passes trough the familiar income increase (*luxury axiom*) and trough the availability of close and quality schools.

Finally, it shall be remembered that if on the one hand the descriptive statistics and the econometric results were incapable of indicate direct solutions for child labor, on the other hand these numbers were efficient to signal occurrence areas, factors, individual and familiar characteristics involved in child work and/or schooling decisions. Trough the study of child labor determinants it is expected to achieve an appropriate picture of the families more likely to send their children to work and thus, facilitate the combat and propriate the synergy of efforts among agencies, institutions, movements, organizations and entities fighting against child labor.

In a last methodological point, it was concluded that *Bivariate Probit* estimations were important to evaluate the *trade off* between work and school, but on the other hand the estimated parameters in *bivariate* and *probit* models do not show huge differences, what mean that the models can be estimated in the simplest version.

"Information alone does not change attitudes or practices, but the process of raising awareness does build commitment to change and the greater the participation of communities in the research, the more authentic and effective advocacy campaigns or media strategies will be."³

³ UNICEF. Strategies for Eliminating Child Labor: prevention, removal and rehabilitation, [online]. 1997. p. 7.

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	Did you work or had any work in last week?			Labor force rate from those that were studying		Schooling rate from that were	Schooling rate from those that were working	
		No	Yes	TOTAL	No	Yes	No	Yes
Attends school or	No	8,9%	1,8%	10,7%	16,8%	10,2%	90,0%	83,5%
creche	Yes	80,2%	9,1%	89,3%				
	TOTAL	89.1%	10.9%	100.0%			1	
	Did you work or had any non-waged work in the last week?			Labor force rate from those that were studying		Schooling rate from that were	Schooling rate from those that were working	
		No	Yes	TOTAL	No	Yes	No	Yes
Attends school or	No	9,8%	0,9%	10,7%	8,4%	7,1%	89,4%	87,5%
creche	Yes	83,0%	6,3%	89,3%				
	TOTAL	92.8%	7.2%	100.0%				
	Did you work or had any waged work in the last week?		Labor fo from th wer	orce rate hose that e studying	Schooling rate from that were	those working		
		No	Yes	TOTAL	No	Yes	No	Yes
Attends school or	No	9,9%	0,9%	10,8%	8,3%	3,1%	89,7%	75,7%
creche	Yes	86,5%	2,8%	89,3%				
	TOTAL	TOTAL 96.4% 3.7% 100.0%						

<u>APPENDIX 1</u>

Number of cases: 36.057.968

	Did you work or had any work in the last week?					
Did you work or		No	Yes	TOTAL		
any non-waged work	No	89,2%	3,6%	92,8%		
	Yes	0,0%	7,2%	7,2%		
the last week?	TOTAL	89,2%	10,8%	100,0%		
	Did you work or had any work in					
	Did you w	ork or h	ad any v	vork in		
	Did you w	ork or h last we	ad any v eek?	work in		
Did you work or	Did you w	ork or h <u>last we</u> No	ad any v <u>eek?</u> Yes	vork in TOTAL		
Did you work or	Did you w No	ork or h <u>last we</u> No 89,2%	ad any v eek? Yes 7,2%	vork in TOTAL 96,4%		
Did you work or any waged work in	Did you w No Yes	ork or h <u>last we</u> No 89,2% 0,0%	ad any v eek? Yes 7,2% 3,6%	vork in TOTAL 96,4% 3,6%		

Number of cases: 36.065.891

<u>APPENDIX 2</u>

Familiar per capita income: decil's superior	Attends school or creche		r Attends school or creche week		Worked or had a waged work in the last week		Worked or had a non- work in the last week	
limit	Ν	%	Ν	%	Ν	%	Ν	%
20	2.738.377	81,1%	641.865	19,0%	143.564	4,3%	498.301	14,8%
33	3.039.507	82,6%	667.285	18,1%	162.206	4,4%	505.079	13,7%
49	2.947.769	83,7%	547.813	15,5%	152.031	4,3%	395.782	11,2%
65	3.057.372	87,5%	453.443	13,0%	172.164	4,9%	281.279	8,0%
87	3.253.843	88,6%	388.584	10,6%	157.663	4,3%	230.921	6,3%
114	3.070.501	89,9%	286.336	8,4%	133.065	3,9%	153.271	4,5%
152	3.244.954	91,8%	272.419	7,7%	121.529	3,4%	150.890	4,3%
221	3.319.239	94,2%	235.463	6,7%	109.527	3,1%	125.936	3,6%
378	3.358.828	95,2%	186.116	5,3%	86.778	2,5%	99.338	2,8%
13.100	3.456.577	98,0%	126.856	3,6%	53.053	1,5%	73.803	2,1%
Total of persons	35.274.9	945	35.282.	868	35.282.	868	35.282.	868

35.274.945 between 5 and 15

years

APPENDIX 3

VARIABLES USED IN THE PROBIT AND BIVARIATE PROBIT MODELS

Description	Name
1 if worked, had a work, or was involved in any kind of activity turned to self-consumption in the last week	TRABALHA
1 if worked or had a waged work in the last week	TRABREM
1 if worked or had a non-waged work in the last week	TRABFREE
1 if child attends school	FREQ
1 if child is male	SEXO
Age of child	IDADE
Age Squared	IDADE2
1 if black or mulatto	COR
Child's education (years of school completed by the	EDUC
child)	
Mother's education	EDUCAMAE
1 if child's age is below 7 years	PESS7ANO
1 if household is in a rural area	AREARU
1 if head of household is the mother	MAECHEFI
Household size (number of members currently	TOTMOR
resident in the household)	
1 if household has electrical light	LUZ
1 if head is employer or "independent" worker	CPEM
Net household income (per capita)	RFPC
Regional Dummies assuming value 1 if the person	DES; DRS; DMS; DMT; DRO; DAC; DAM;
resides in the considered state ⁴	DPA; DAP; DTO; DMA; DPIAU_; DCE;
Dummies assuming value 1 if the person resides in a metropolitan area	DRN; DPARAIBA; DPE; DAL; DSE; DBA; DMG; DRJ; DSP; DSC; DGO; DPR; DDF; DPEMETRO; DPAMETRO; DMGMETRO; DCEMETRO; DBAMETRO; DRJMETRO; DSPMETRO; DPRMETRO; DRSMETRO

⁴ Variables DRR and DFMETRO were omited to avoid multicolinearity.

APPENDIX 4

PROBIT MODEL - SCHOOL

DDF

DPEMETRO |

DPAMETRO |

DCEMETRO |

DRJMETRO

DMGMETRO

Probit est	timates	Numb Walc	per of obs l chi2(47)	= =	30877367 3501419.35		
Log likeli	ihood = -74497	773.1		Pseu	ido R2	=	0.2595
FDFO	Coof	Robust	-	Dalal		nf	Thtornall
IDADE	1.003322	.001377	728.631	0.000	1.00062	3	1.006021
IDADE2	0527261	.0000628	-840.228	0.000	05284	9	0526031
SEXO	0510461	.0007279	-70.132	0.000	052472	6	0496195
COR	0189151	.0008285	-22.829	0.000	02053	9	0172912
EDUC	.1832625	.0003408	537.719	0.000	.182594	5	.1839305
EDUCAMAE	.0726652	.0001426	509.513	0.000	.072385	7	.0729447
TOTMOR	0372839	.0001781	-209.355	0.000	03763	3	0369349
PESS7ANO	4409171	.0017486	-252.150	0.000	444344	4	4374898
MAECHEFI	1031946	.0009877	-104.477	0.000	105130	6	1012587
LUZ	.11748	.0013223	88.847	0.000	.114888	4	.1200716
RFPC	.000818	5.56e-06	147.045	0.000	.000807	1	.0008289
AREARU	1797564	.0009752	-184.329	0.000	181667	8	1778451
DES	6607951	.0123541	-53.488	0.000	685008	6	6365816
DRS	561848	.0122602	-45.827	0.000	585877	5	5378184
DMS	5628233	.0124692	-45.137	0.000	587262	4	5383841
DMT	5363748	.0124231	-43.176	0.000	560723	6	512026
DRO	5472827	.0129614	-42.224	0.000	572686	6	5218789
DAC	6045742	.0138994	-43.497	0.000	631816	4	5773319
DPR	5131171	.0122485	-41.892	0.000	537123	7	4891106
DAM	3797908	.0125093	-30.361	0.000	404308	6	355273
DPA	2780349	.0124018	-22.419	0.000	30234	2	2537279
DAP	1687637	.0140206	-12.037	0.000	196243	6	1412839
DTO	2035662	.0126897	-16.042	0.000	228437	6	1786949
DMA	0572437	.0122694	-4.666	0.000	081291	3	033196
DPIAU_	.0642282	.0124176	5.172	0.000	.039890	1	.0885664
DCE	.1810586	.0123221	14.694	0.000	.156907	7	.2052094
DRN	1786848	.012429	-14.376	0.000	203045	1	1543245
DPARAIBA	0281305	.0124113	-2.267	0.023	052456	3	0038048

-29.955 0.000

38.500 0.000

15.661 0.000 -3.906 0.000

-26.586 0.000 -56.080 0.000

-63.789 0.000

-52.782 0.000

 15.661
 0.000
 .0841156

 -3.906
 0.000
 -.0157466

 -98.127
 0.000
 -.3626582

 -52.650
 0.000
 -.1917808

DAC	6045/42	.0138994	-43.49/	0.000	
DPR	5131171	.0122485	-41.892	0.000	
DAM	3797908	.0125093	-30.361	0.000	
DPA	2780349	.0124018	-22.419	0.000	
DAP	1687637	.0140206	-12.037	0.000	
DTO	2035662	.0126897	-16.042	0.000	
DMA	0572437	.0122694	-4.666	0.000	
IAU_	.0642282	.0124176	5.172	0.000	
DCE	.1810586	.0123221	14.694	0.000	
DRN	1786848	.012429	-14.376	0.000	
AIBA	0281305	.0124113	-2.267	0.023	
DPE	3397801	.0122775	-27.675	0.000	
DAL	4255047	.0123364	-34.492	0.000	
DSE	0384553	.0127368	-3.019	0.003	
DBA	0821654	.0122146	-6.727	0.000	
DMG	3325961	.012194	-27.275	0.000	
DRJ	2662546	.0124708	-21.350	0.000	
DSP	3854496	.0121941	-31.610	0.000	
DSC	3573763	.012329	-28.987	0.000	
DGO	4233975	.0123002	-34.422	0.000	
	2002101	0106061	00 055	0 0 0 0	

-.3803171 .0126961

.1386234 .0036006

.0961481 .0061392 -.0104852 .0026845 -.3555564 .0036234

-.0927782 .0034897

_cons | -2.904794 .0143285 -202.728 0.000

DBAMETRO | -.1848977 .0035119

DSPMETRO | -.0990422 .0017661 DPRMETRO | -.1987953 .0031164

DRSMETRO | -.1529589 .0028979

-.3638436 -.3157166

-.4013258 -.0134916

-.0582253

-.3086962

-.2418123

-.3615496

-.3332119

-.3992896

-.3554331

.1456805

.1081807

-.0052237 -.3484546

-.1780146

-.0859384

-.0955807

-.1926872

-2.87671

-.4496835

-.063419

-.356496

-.2906969

-.4093496

-.3815407

-.4475053

-.4052011

.1315663

.0841156

-.099618

-.1586387 -.1472791

-.1025036

-.2049034

-2.932877

-.1061055

PROBIT MODEL - WORK

Probit est Log likeli	ihood = -64775	58.6	Numbe Wald Prob Pseud	er of obs = chi2(47) = > chi2 = do R2 =	28134832 5.146e+08 0.0000 0.3273	
	Coef	Robust			[95% Conf	Intervall
	+					
IDADE	.1766026	.0016938	104.266	0.000	.1732829	.1799223
IDADE2	.0021239	.0000732	28.997	0.000	.0019803	.0022674
SEXO	.4960971	.0008282	599.030	0.000	.4944739	.4977203
COR	0399959	.0009073	-44.084	0.000	0417742	0382177
EDUC	0095045	.0002815	-33.766	0.000	0100562	0089528
EDUCAMAE	0458989	.00014	-327.841	0.000	0461733	0456245
TOTMOR	.0259354	.0001972	131.502	0.000	.0255488	.0263219
PESS/ANO		.0032467	-69.203	0.000	2310476	2183207
CDEM	4919745	.0012125	90.190 595 501	0.000	.1100927	.1214450
REDC		2 85e-06	-119 387	0.000	- 0003453	- 0003342
AREARII	731449	000929	787 342	0.000	7296282	7332699
DRO	5.227492	.0116386	449.151	0.000	5,204681	5,250304
DAM	5.034701	.0107997	466.191	0.000	5.013534	5.055868
DAC	5.37664	.0132598	405.483	0.000	5.350651	5.402628
DPR	5.680965	.0098221	578.387	0.000	5.661714	5.700216
DPA	5.985627	.0099956	598.828	0.000	5.966036	6.005218
DAP	5.237893	.0132372	395.695	0.000	5.211949	5.263838
DTO	5.899724	.0103541	569.797	0.000	5.87943	5.920017
DMA	5.912153	.0098265	601.653	0.000	5.892893	5.931412
DPIAU_	5.504271	.0100059	550.101	0.000	5.48466	5.523882
DCE	5.561991	.0098547	564.401	0.000	5.542676	5.581306
DRN	5.19452	.0102948	504.579	0.000	5.174343	5.214697
DPARAIBA	5.576766	.0099341	561.373	0.000	5.557295	5.596236
DPE	5.769949	.0098143	587.910	0.000	5.750713	5.789185
DAL	5.205988	.0101979	510.498	0.000	5.186001	5.225975
DSE	5.421449	.0105063	516.017	0.000	5.400857	5.442041
DBA	5.549997	.0097731	567.882	0.000	5.530842	5.569152
DMG	5.499433 E 670525	.0097704	502.005 560 052	0.000	5.40U203 5 650010	5.510503 E 600120
DES DE.T	1 <u>4 911454</u>	0104458	470 183	0.000	4 890981	4 931928
	5 209608	0097737	533 025	0.000	5 190452	5 228764
DSC	5.726121	.0098367	582.116	0.000	5.706842	5.745401
DRS	5.833527	.0098256	593.708	0.000	5.814269	5.852785
DMS	5.615702	.0101974	550.702	0.000	5.595716	5.635689
DMT	5.817259	.0100707	577.642	0.000	5.797521	5.836997
DGO	5.539589	.0099334	557.671	0.000	5.52012	5.559058
DDF	4.92905	.0112406	438.503	0.000	4.907019	4.951081
DMGMETRO	4332363	.0038594	-112.254	0.000	4408006	4256719
DPAMETRO	7746915	.0074462	-104.038	0.000	7892858	7600971
DCEMETRO	131221	.0038951	-33.689	0.000	1388553	1235867
DPEMETRO	3486113	.0041099	-84.822	0.000	3566666	340556
DBAMETRO	2507903	.0042425	-59.114	0.000	2591055	2424752
DRJMETRO	1007745	.0050999	-19.760	0.000	1107701	0907789
DSPMETRO	.0429666	.002222	19.336	0.000	.0386114	.0473217
DPRMETRO	3821472	.0044259	-86.343	0.000	3908219	3/34/26
DRSMETRO		.003/463	-99.305	0.000	3/9367	3046819
_cons	-9.040144	•	•	•	•	•

PROBIT MODEL - NON-WAGED WORK

Probit est Log likel:	timates ihood = -48596	50.8	Numbe Wald Prob Pseud	er of obs = chi2(46) = > chi2 = do R2 =	28134832 2944091.24 0.0000 0.3538	
TRABFREE	 Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
TDADE	+	.001973	253.835	0.000	. 4969495	.5046835
TDADE2	0151962	.0000853	-178.074	0.000	0153635	015029
SEXO	4546237	.000954	476.531	0.000	.4527539	.4564936
COR	0313783	.0010495	-29.897	0.000	0334354	0293213
EDUC	0217671	.0003196	-68.107	0.000	0223935	0211407
EDUCAMAE	0314501	.0001646	-191.074	0.000	0317727	0311275
TOTMOR	.0127127	.0002238	56.802	0.000	.0122741	.0131514
PESS7ANO	0317319	.0035654	-8.900	0.000	03872	0247438
MAECHEFI	0734362	.0015731	-46.682	0.000	0765195	070353
CPEM	.7102378	.0009902	717.243	0.000	.708297	.7121787
RFPC	0003193	3.16e-06	-101.129	0.000	0003254	0003131
AREARU	.9574377	.001073	892.339	0.000	.9553348	.9595407
DRO	4.838429	.0146307	330.703	0.000	4.809753	4.867105
DAM	4.852734	.0127336	381.096	0.000	4.827776	4.877691
DAC	5.120216					
DPR	5.450254	.0114231	477.126	0.000	5.427865	5.472643
DPA	5.711326	.0116254	491.282	0.000	5.688541	5.734111
DAP	5.247585	.0147612	355.498	0.000	5.218653	5.276516
DTO	5.066738	.0123158	411.400	0.000	5.0426	5.090877
DMA	5.631366	.0113669	495.416	0.000	5.609088	5.653645
DPIAU_	5.261711	.0115586	455.219	0.000	5.239057	5.284366
DCE	5.252259	.0114358	459.284	0.000	5.229845	5.274673
DRN	4.91196	.0119044	412.616	0.000	4.888628	4.935292
DPARAIBA	5.3881	.0115181	467.793	0.000	5.365524	5.410675
DPE	5.50859	.0114235	482.214	0.000	5.4862	5.530979
DAL	5.074257	.0117072	433.430	0.000	5.051311	5.097203
DSE	5.17961	.0121676	425.689	0.000	5.155762	5.203458
DBA	5.258761	.011346	463.490	0.000	5.236524	5.280999
DMG	5.181826	.0113733	455.612	0.000	5.159535	5.204118
DES	5.365888	.01163	461.383	0.000	5.343094	5.388682
DRJ	4.18503	.0133191	314.213	0.000	4.158925	4.211135
DSP	4.821361	.0114652	420.520	0.000	4.79889	4.843832
DSC	5.477672	.0114654	477.756	0.000	5.4552	5.500144
DRS	5.615976	.0114365	491.058	0.000	5.593561	5.638391
DMS	5.301913	.0118837	446.150	0.000	5.278622	5.325205
DMT	5.483243	.011699	468.693	0.000	5.460313	5.506172
DGO	5.028229	.0116444	431.817	0.000	5.005406	5.051051
DDF	4.786657	.0131704	363.440	0.000	4.760843	4.81247
DMGMETRO		.0053024	-/6./85	0.000	41/5382	396/532
DPAMETRO		.0093832	-/6.358	0.000	/348/14	6980899
DCEMETRO	.0430493	.0045413	9.48U	0.000	.0341485	.0519501
DREWEIKO	2490227	.004/556	-52.364	0.000	2583436	2397019
DRAME TRO		.00558/6	-30.U80 17 211	0.000	223/02/	ZUI8597
DRUMETRO	.4∪25386 1220060	.008503	4/.341	0.000	. 3050/29	.4192042
DEPMETRO	.1332269	.0030991	42.989	0.000	.1271528	.1393009
DEKWEI.KO	0080051	.0009/1	-100.130	0.000	/11008	0043421
CODG	4/43/00 _11 09257	0157767	-703 099	0.000	403//4/ -11 12349	-11 06165
				0.000		00103

PROBIT MODEL – WAGED WORK

Probit estimates				Numb Wald	per of obs = l chi2(47) =	28134832 1.690e+08
Log likeli	ihood = -301	16316		Prot	rado R2 =	0.2537
	 	Robust				
TRABREM	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	₽> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
IDADE	.0403094	.0029946	13.461	0.000	.03444	.0461787
IDADE2	.0094482	.000123	76.830	0.000	.0092072	.0096893
SEXO	.3538606	.0011513	307.345	0.000	.351604	.3561172
COR	0158224	.0012633	-12.525	0.000	0182984	0133464
EDUC	.0144367	.0003665	39.386	0.000	.0137183	.0151551
EDUCAMAE	050465	.0001933	-261.088	0.000	0508438	0500861
TOTMOR	.0325543	.0002725	119.457	0.000	.0320202	.0330884
PESS7ANO	3895832	.0104916	-37.133	0.000	4101463	36902
MAECHEFI	.243084	.0014553	167.029	0.000	.2402316	.2459364
CPEM	1114341	.0012452	-89.494	0.000	1138745	1089936
RFPC	0001732	3.61e-06	-47.938	0.000	0001802	0001661
AREARU	1765559	.0015146	-116.568	0.000	1795245	1735873
DRO	4.635246	.019564	236.927	0.000	4.596902	4.673591
DAM	4.351562	.0189649	229.454	0.000	4.314391	4.388732
DAC	4.659762	.0215114	216.618	0.000	4.6176	4.701924
DPR	4.75714	.0182527	260.627	0.000	4.721365	4.792915
DPA	5.074559	.0183469	276.590	0.000	5.0386	5.110519
DAP	4.143255	.0229611	180.447	0.000	4.098252	4.188257
DTO	5.632407	.0186422	302.133	0.000	5.595869	5.668945
DMA	4.774017	.0182008	262.298	0.000	4.738344	4.809689
DPIAU_	4.605359	.01846	249.478	0.000	4.569178	4.641539
DCE	4.869527	.0181589	268.162	0.000	4.833936	4.905118
DRN	4.693167	.0188216	249.350	0.000	4.656277	4.730056
DPARAIBA	4.554498	.0184519	246.830	0.000	4.518333	4.590664
DPE	4.839661	.0183365	263.935	0.000	4.803722	4.8756
DAL	4.381919	.0187941	233.154	0.000	4.345083	4.418754
DSE	4.706424	.0190007	247.698	0.000	4.669183	4.743664
DBA	4.813614	.0182285	264.070	0.000	4.777887	4.849341
DMG	4.832234	.0180831	267.223	0.000	4.796792	4.867677
DES	4.89781	.018421	265.882	0.000	4.861705	4.933914
DRJ	4.680742	.0185104	252.871	0.000	4.644462	4.717021
DSP	4.655618	.0180674	257.681	0.000	4.620207	4.69103
DSC	4.780842	.018096	264.194	0.000	4.745374	4.816309
DRS	4.746318	.0181124	262.048	0.000	4.710819	4.781818
DMS	4.873126	.018418	264.585	0.000	4.837027	4.909224
DMT	5.000995	.0183686	272.258	0.000	4.964993	5.036997
DGO	5.005192	.0181577	275.651	0.000	4.969603	5.04078
DDF	4.175769	.0196582	212.418	0.000	4.137239	4.214298
DMGMETRO	374576	.0046137	-81.188	0.000	3836187	3655333
DPAMETRO	565584	.00922	-61.343	0.000	5836549	547513
DCEMETRO	3221042	.0053215	-60.529	0.000	3325341	3116742
DPEMETRO	2730102	.0056844	-48.028	0.000	2841514	261869
DBAMETRO	2502943	.0051269	-48.820	0.000	2603429	2402458
DRJMETRO	5011051	.0056168	-89.216	0.000	5121137	4900964
DSPMETRO	1143277	.0026251	-43.551	0.000	1194728	1091826
DPRMETRO	.0252042	.0051673	4.878	0.000	.0150764	.0353319
DRSMETRO	.0203286	.004911	4.139	0.000	.0107032	.029954
_cons	-8.6088		•			

BIVARIATE PROBIT MODEL – SCHOOL X WORK

(1) [athrho] cons = 0.0

chi2(1) =48230.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit Log likelihood = -13058081				Numb Wald Prob	er of obs = chi2(94) = > chi2 =	28104860 8814495.98 0.0000
	 	Robust				
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	₽> z	[95% Conf	. Interval]
FREQ	 					
IDADE	1.041687	.0014663	710.403	0.000	1.038813	1.044561
IDADE2	0545521	.000067	-813.913	0.000	0546835	0544207
SEXO	0502578	.0007722	-65.086	0.000	0517712	0487443
COR	0213662	.0008801	-24.277	0.000	0230912	0196412
EDUC	.1864473	.0003672	507.715	0.000	.1857276	.1871671
EDUCAMAE	.0741378	.000152	487.671	0.000	.0738399	.0744358
TOTMOR	0405707	.0001945	-208.600	0.000	0409519	0401895
PESS7ANO	4181307	.001845	-226.633	0.000	4217468	4145146
MAECHEFI	0985929	.00116	-84.992	0.000	1008665	0963193
LUZ	.1073031	.0013929	77.038	0.000	.1045732	.1100331
RFPC	.0007868	5.63e-06	139.808	0.000	.0007758	.0007978
AREARU	1958587	.0010281	-190.514	0.000	1978737	1938438
DRO	4897456	.0132136	-37.064	0.000	5156438	4638473
DAM	3371872	.0127677	-26.409	0.000	3622113	312163
DAC	6576034	.0140978	-46.646	0.000	6852346	6299722
DPR	4345465	.0124628	-34.867	0.000	4589731	4101198
DPA	2103663	.0126243	-16.664	0.000	2351095	1856231
DAP	.029628	.014538	2.038	0.042	.0011341	.0581219
DTO	1913668	.0129327	-14.797	0.000	2167144	1660192
DMA	.0209888	.0124881	1.681	0.093	0034874	.0454649
DPIAU_	.108546	.0126504	8.580	0.000	.0837517	.1333404
DCE	.2268475	.0125359	18.096	0.000	.2022776	.2514174
DRN	1310154	.0126769	-10.335	0.000	1558616	1061692
DPARAIBA	.0530716	.01265	4.195	0.000	.0282781	.077865
DPE	2385496	.0125018	-19.081	0.000	2630527	2140465
DAL	3768732	.01256	-30.006	0.000	4014903	3522561
DSE	.0719731	.0130149	5.530	0.000	.0464644	.0974817
DBA	0273128	.0124265	-2.198	0.028	0516683	0029574
DMG	2558656	.0124046	-20.627	0.000	2801783	231553
DES	6056483	.0125705	-48.180	0.000	630286	5810106
DRJ	1392326	.0127418	-10.927	0.000	164206	1142591
DSP	3240416	.012403	-26.126	0.000	348351	2997321
DSC	3014304	.012546	-24.026	0.000	3260201	2768407
DRS	5059036	.0124741	-40.556	0.000	5303525	4814547
DMS	4894033	.0126879	-38.573	0.000	514271	4645355
DMT	4772399	.0126525	-37.719	0.000	5020383	4524415
DGO	3729256	.0125203	-29.786	0.000	397465	3483862
DDF	325235	.0129627	-25.090	0.000	3506414	2998287
DMGMETRO	0263082	.0028821	-9.128	0.000	031957	0206593
DPAMETRO	.054624	.0066566	8.206	0.000	.0415772	.0676707
DCEMETRO	2790513	.0039318	-70.973	0.000	2867575	2713451
DPEMETRO	.1024952	.0039341	26.053	0.000	.0947845	.1102059
DBAMETRO	1163388	.0038457	-30.252	0.000	1238761	1088014
DRJMETRO	1115221	.0038297	-29.120	0.000	1190282	104016
DSPMETRO	10731	.0018677	-57.457	0.000	1109705	1036495
DPRMETRO	2268329	.0032641	-69.494	0.000	2332304	2204355
DRSMETRO	1486067	.0030833	-48.197	0.000	1546499	1425635
_cons	-3.122384	.0147802	-211.254	0.000	-3.151353	-3.093415

	+					
TRABALHA						
IDADE	.1701603	.0016948	100.401	0.000	.1668385	.173482
IDADE2	.0024035	.0000733	32.792	0.000	.0022599	.0025472
SEXO	.4975421	.0008283	600.651	0.000	.4959186	.4991656
COR	0367435	.0009071	-40.505	0.000	0385215	0349656
EDUC	0092801	.00028	-33.139	0.000	0098289	0087312
EDUCAMAE	0460199	.00014	-328.750	0.000	0462943	0457456
TOTMOR	.0261458	.0001967	132.918	0.000	.0257602	.0265313
PESS7ANO	2325374	.0032645	-71.233	0.000	2389357	2261392
MAECHEFI	.1165763	.0012118	96.200	0.000	.1142012	.1189514
CPEM	.4932914	.0008254	597.663	0.000	.4916737	.4949091
RFPC	0003398	2.85e-06	-119.396	0.000	0003453	0003342
AREARU	.7359156	.0009286	792.537	0.000	.7340957	.7377355
DRO	1519996	.0112575	-13.502	0.000	1740638	1299354
DPR	.2926302	.0093694	31.233	0.000	.2742666	.3109939
DAM	3303765	.0103537	-31.909	0.000	3506694	3100836
DRR	-6.028854	.0100716	-598.602	0.000	-6.048594	-6.009114
	6064084	0095471	63 517	0 000	5876964	6251205
	- 1367143	0129075	-10 592	0 000	- 1620125	- 1114161
	5202519	0099336	52 373	0 000	5007824	5397213
	5253716	0093254	56 337	0 000	5070941	5436491
	1185813	0095144	12 463	0.000	0999334	1372291
DI INO_	1777901	0093871	18 940	0.000	1593916	1961886
DEN	-1920751	0097595	-19 681	0.000	- 2112033	- 1729468
גסדגסגסס	1903/02	009/955	20 064	0.000	1717/69	2080335
DFARAIBA	28/1/71	0094005	10 955	0.000	3657633	.2009333
	1025262	.0093790	10.955	0.000	2014044	1625000
DAL	1020303	.0090070	2 000	0.000	2014044	1035002
DSE	1600461	.010031	10 106	0.000	1500075	1070647
DBA	1122467	.0092954	10.100	0.000	.1506275	.10/204/
DMG	0016020	.0093055	12.170	0.000	.0950073	.1314041
DES	.2916238	.0095551	30.520	0.000	.2/28962	.3103513
		.00999997	-47.927	0.000	490050/	4590005
DSP		.0093357	-10.423	0.000	1902699	1530947
DSC		.0094126	35.998	0.000	.3203825	.35/2/91
DRS	.4553261	.0093851	48.510	0.000	.4369317	.4/3/205
DMS		.0097539	23.922	0.000	.2142197	.2524544
DMT	.4319535	.0096235	44.885	0.000	.4130917	.4508153
DGO	.1581313	.0094751	16.689	0.000	.1395604	.1767022
DDF'	439217	.0107955	-40.685	0.000	4603759	4180581
DMGMETRO	428041	.0038611	-110.860	0.000	4356086	4204734
DPAME'TRO	7683947	.0074001	-103.835	0.000	7828987	7538907
DCEMETRO	1310841	.0038861	-33.731	0.000	1387007	1234675
DPEMETRO	347926	.0041073	-84.710	0.000	3559762	3398759
DBAMETRO	2519975	.0042224	-59.681	0.000	2602733	2437217
DRJMETRO	0903046	.0050907	-17.739	0.000	1002821	080327
DSPMETRO	.0423257	.0022185	19.078	0.000	.0379775	.0466739
DPRMETRO	3713866	.0044317	-83.802	0.000	3800726	3627007
DRSMETRO	3707654	.0037425	-99.070	0.000	3781005	3634304
_cons	-4.227471	.0132197	-319.787	0.000	-4.253381	-4.201561
/athrho	1595781	.0007266	-219.615	0.000	1610023	158154
rho	1582372	.0007084			1596254	1568484
Wald test	of rho=0:		chi2(1)	= 48230.5	Pr > ch	i2 = 0.0000

BIVARIATE PROBIT MODEL – SCHOOL X WAGED WORK

(1) [athrho]_cons = 0.0

chi2(1) =76295.46 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit				Num Wal	ber of obs = d chi2(94) =	28104860 5379947.88
Log likeli	1 - 95844	465.6		Pro	b > chi2 =	0.0000
	 	Robust.				
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	₽> z	[95% Conf.	. Interval]
	+ 					
~ IDADE	1.042972	.0014663	711.278	0.000	1.040098	1.045846
IDADE2	0546235	.000067	-814.713	0.000	0547549	0544921
SEXO	0518443	.0007719	-67.169	0.000	0533571	0503315
COR	0212138	.0008795	-24.121	0.000	0229376	0194901
EDUC	.1859317	.0003671	506.532	0.000	.1852122	.1866511
EDUCAMAE	.0740456	.000152	487.144	0.000	.0737477	.0743435
TOTMOR	0407804	.0001943	-209.858	0.000	0411613	0403995
PESS7ANO	4188144	.0018453	-226.959	0.000	4224312	4151977
MAECHEFI	0979148	.0011595	-84.446	0.000	1001873	0956422
LUZ	.1260296	.0013901	90.664	0.000	.1233051	.128754
RFPC	.0007846	5.63e-06	139.297	0.000	.0007736	.0007957
AREARU	1906201	.0010267	-185.663	0.000	1926324	1886078
DRO	4869884	.0132098	-36.866	0.000	5128791	4610977
DAM	3358826	.0127666	-26.309	0.000	3609047	3108606
DAC	6529882	.0140939	-46.331	0.000	6806117	6253647
DPR	4362555	.0124613	-35.009	0.000	4606792	4118318
DPA	205405	.0126233	-16.272	0.000	2301462	1806638
DAP	.0309363	.0145521	2.126	0.034	.0024147	.0594579
DTO	1918212	.0129293	-14.836	0.000	2171621	1664802
DMA	.0195868	.0124857	1.569	0.117	0048847	.0440583
DPIAU_	.1134864	.0126511	8.970	0.000	.0886906	.1382821
DCE	.234768	.0125364	18.727	0.000	.2101972	.2593389
DRN	1257127	.0126788	-9.915	0.000	1505627	1008627
DPARAIBA	.0530179	.0126477	4.192	0.000	.0282289	.077807
DPE	2375234	.0125006	-19.001	0.000	2620241	2130226
DAL	3778731	.01256	-30.086	0.000	4024902	353256
DSE	.0704938	.0130166	5.416	0.000	.0449818	.0960058
DBA		.0124253	-1.949	0.051	0485731	.0001331
DMG		.0124037	-20.635	0.000	28020/3	2310455
DES		.0125698	-48.330	0.000	0321349	5828621
DRU		.012/432	-10.020	0.000	1029039	1130115
DSP	3200527	.012402	-20.290	0.000	3503001	3U1/453
	- 5094324	0120439	-24.272	0.000	- 53390555	- 1919999
	3094324	012687	-38 422	0.000	-5123192	4625872
	4074552	0126484	-37 648	0.000	- 5009717	- 1513000
		0125193	-30.090	0.000	- 4012444	- 3521695
DGO	- 3219791	0129624	-24 839	0.000	- 3473849	- 2965732
DMGMETRO	- 0245601	0028852	-8 512	0.000	- 030215	- 0189051
DPAMETRO	.0526149	.0066552	7,906	0.000	.0395708	.0656589
DCEMETRO	- 282309	.0039367	-71,711	0.000	- 2900248	- 2745931
DPEMETRO	.1013026	.0039311	25.770	0.000	.0935979	.1090073
DBAMETRO	1198062	.0038442	-31.166	0.000	1273407	1122718
DRJMETRO	1115673	.0038387	-29.064	0.000	1190909	1040436
DSPMETRO	1078996	.0018683	-57.752	0.000	1115614	1042378
DPRMETRO	2251047	.003261	-69.030	0.000	2314961	2187133
DRSMETRO	1463405	.0030743	-47.601	0.000	1523661	140315
_cons	-3.142437	.014776	-212.672	0.000	-3.171398	-3.113477

+	+					
TRABREM						
IDADE	.012088	.0029818	4.054	0.000	.0062438	.0179322
IDADE2	.0106265	.0001226	86.694	0.000	.0103862	.0108667
SEXO	.3557844	.0011494	309.547	0.000	.3535317	.3580371
COR	0101855	.0012625	-8.067	0.000	0126601	007711
EDUC	0151979	0003613	42 063	0 000	0144898	0159061
EDUCAMAE	- 0512143	0001929	-265 505	0.000	- 0515924	- 0508362
	0327038	0002704	1203.303	0.000	0201727	.0300302
DECCANO	10001/1	0105020	20.932	0.000	.0321737	2000721
PESS/ANO		.0105628	-30.724 162 04E	0.000	430550	3090721
MAECHEFI	1007724	.0014519	103.245	0.000	.2341034	.2390540
CPEM	1097734	.0012399	-88.538	0.000	1122035	10/3434
RFPC	0001/34	3.630-06	-4/.802	0.000	0001805	0001663
AREARU	1712201	.001501	-114.071	0.000	174162	1682782
DRO	0546931	.0140414	-3.895	0.000	0822138	0271725
DPR	.0490864	.011992	4.093	0.000	.0255825	.0725903
DAM	3137013	.0130221	-24.090	0.000	3392241	2881785
DRR	-5.892447	.0127499	-462.155	0.000	-5.917436	-5.867458
DPA	.3857014	.0121534	31.736	0.000	.3618812	.4095216
DAP	527279	.0184042	-28.650	0.000	5633507	4912074
DTO	.9512086	.0124178	76.600	0.000	.9268701	.9755471
DMA	.0883253	.0120203	7.348	0.000	.064766	.1118846
DPIAU_	0843974	.0123913	-6.811	0.000	1086839	0601109
DCE	.179996	.012028	14.965	0.000	.1564214	.2035705
DRN	- 0146102	0123933	-1.179	0.238	- 0389006	0096803
DPARATBA	142153	.0123988	-11.465	0.000	1664543	1178517
DPE	1362332	0120657	11 291	0 000	1125848	1598816
	-3141912	0126194	-24 897	0.000	- 3389249	- 2894575
		0120104	1 50/	0.000	- 00/7/88	0/615/3
	1242755	.0129657	10 470	0.111	004/400	1/75102
DBA	10242755	.0110393	10.479	0.000	.1010317	.14/5195
DMG	1024754	.0118328	10.433	0.000	.100262	.1400458
DES	.1934/54	.0121962	15.804	0.000	.1095/12	.21/3/95
DRJ	0311/08	.0123961	-2.515	0.012	0554667	0068/48
DSP	0349493	.0118292	-2.954	0.003	0581342	0117644
DSC	.069848	.0120781	5.783	0.000	.0461754	.0935205
DRS	.0447619	.0120661	3.710	0.000	.0211128	.068411
DMS	.1517859	.0124415	12.200	0.000	.127401	.1761707
DMT	.2901488	.0123102	23.570	0.000	.2660213	.3142763
DGO	.3129042	.011981	26.117	0.000	.2894218	.3363865
DDF	5059286	.014025	-36.073	0.000	5334172	47844
DMGMETRO	35852	.0046078	-77.808	0.000	3675511	3494889
DPAMETRO	5495587	.009132	-60.180	0.000	567457	5316603
DCEMETRO	3282535	.0052763	-62.212	0.000	3385949	317912
DPEMETRO	2616301	.0056668	-46.169	0.000	2727369	2505234
DBAMETRO	2493245	.0050741	-49.137	0.000	2592695	2393795
DRJMETRO	4808492	.005607	-85.758	0.000	4918388	4698596
DSPMETRO	1162068	.002621	-44.336	0.000	1213439	1110697
DPRMETRO	.0495897	.0051654	9 600	0.000	.0394657	.0597137
DRGMETRO	0401619	0049144	8 172	0.000	0305298	0497939
CONG		0212268	-176 959	0.000	-3 797871	-3 714664
_COUR	-3.750200	.0212200	-170.939	0.000	-3.191011	-3.714004
/athrho	2611419	.0009454	-276.216	0.000	2629949	2592889
 rho	2553633	.0008838			2570946	2536303
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 76295.5 Pr > chi2 = 0.0				i2 = 0.0000		

BIVARIATE PROBIT MODEL – SCHOOL X NON-WAGED WORK

(1) [athrho]_cons = 0.0

chi2(1) = 1788.53 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit				Numb Wald	er of obs = chi2(94) =	28104860 7096354.73
Log likeli	1 - 1146	53409		Prob	> chi2 =	0.0000
		Robust				
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95% Conf.	. Interval]
FREQ						
IDADE	1.043749	.0014678	711.085	0.000	1.040872	1.046626
IDADE2	054653	.0000671	-814.552	0.000	0547845	0545215
SEXO	0514985	.0007727	-66.649	0.000	053013	0499841
COR	0213994	.0008798	-24.322	0.000	0231238	0196749
EDUC	.1856668	.0003682	504.233	0.000	.1849451	.1863885
EDUCAMAE	.0739928	.0001523	485.917	0.000	.0736944	.0742913
TOTMOR	0404864	.0001943	-208.348	0.000	0408672	0401055
PESS7ANO	4184753	.0018459	-226.699	0.000	4220932	4148573
MAECHEFI	0974084	.0011608	-83.915	0.000	0996835	0951333
LUZ	.1155197	.0013942	82.856	0.000	.112787	.1182523
RFPC	.000791	5.65e-06	139.950	0.000	.00078	.0008021
AREARU	1926511	.001028	-187.406	0.000	1946659	1906363
DRO	4927282	.0132186	-37.275	0.000	5186362	4668202
DAM	3355978	.0127682	-26.284	0.000	360623	3105726
DAC	6510735	.0141076	-46.150	0.000	678724	6234231
DPR	4364423	.0124625	-35.020	0.000	4608684	4120162
DPA	2057043	.0126244	-16.294	0.000	2304476	1809609
DAP	.0298074	.0145345	2.051	0.040	.0013202	.0582945
DTO	1871801	.012938	-14.467	0.000	2125382	161822
DMA	.0211582	.0124873	1.694	0.090	0033164	.0456328
DPIAU_	.1096762	.0126525	8.668	0.000	.0848779	.1344746
DCE	.2333467	.0125378	18.611	0.000	.208773	.2579203
DRN	1327898	.0126762	-10.476	0.000	1576347	1079449
DPARAIBA	.0558/35	.0126499	4.41/	0.000	.0310802	.0806668
DPE	23/9139	.012502	-19.030	0.000	26241/4	2134105
DAL	3800/41	.UI250	-30.201 E 4E1	0.000	4046912	355457
ן שפת	.0709402	.0130145	2.451	0.000	.0434401	.0904502
	- 2581885	.0124205	-20.814	0.040	- 2825007	- 2338763
DMG	- 6000005	0125693	-48 458	0.000	- 633726	- 5844551
	- 1413763	0127407	-11 096	0.000	- 1663475	- 116405
ן סאנש קצת	- 3230294	0124028	-26 045	0.000	- 3473384	- 2987203
DSC	3025556	.0125452	-24,117	0.000	3271437	- 2779675
DRS	508986	.0124727	-40.808	0.000	533432	4845401
DMS	- 4909523	.0126888	-38,692	0.000	5158218	4660827
DMT	- 4793925	.0126521	-37.890	0.000	5041902	4545947
DGO	3732392	.0125204	-29.810	0.000	3977787	3486996
DDF	3255717	.0129653	-25.111	0.000	3509832	3001602
DMGMETRO	0225726	.0028831	-7.829	0.000	0282234	0169219
DPAMETRO	.050012	.0066625	7.507	0.000	.0369538	.0630701
DCEMETRO	2824386	.0039379	-71.724	0.000	2901567	2747205
DPEMETRO	.1036646	.0039386	26.320	0.000	.0959451	.1113841
DBAMETRO	1185234	.0038525	-30.765	0.000	1260742	1109727
DRJMETRO	1088263	.0038275	-28.433	0.000	1163281	1013245
DSPMETRO	1103691	.0018711	-58.986	0.000	1140364	1067018
DPRMETRO	2235875	.0032647	-68.486	0.000	2299863	2171888
DRSMETRO	1453015	.0030797	-47.180	0.000	1513377	1392653
_cons	-3.138159	.0147824	-212.290	0.000	-3.167132	-3.109186

	+					
TRABFREE						
IDADE	.5012877	.0019748	253.848	0.000	.4974173	.5051582
IDADE2	0152079	.0000854	-178.038	0.000	0153753	0150405
SEXO	.4546501	.0009544	476.377	0.000	.4527795	.4565206
COR	0298308	.0010504	-28.400	0.000	0318895	0277722
EDUC	0220011	.0003194	-68.876	0.000	0226271	021375
EDUCAMAE	0312528	.0001646	-189.859	0.000	0315754	0309301
TOTMOR	.0128457	.0002238	57.400	0.000	.0124071	.0132843
PESS7ANO	0319009	.0035697	-8.937	0.000	0388973	0249044
MAECHEFI	0739385	.0015744	-46.963	0.000	0770243	0708527
CPEM	.7098281	.0009908	716.452	0.000	.7078863	.71177
RFPC	00032	3.16e-06	-101.348	0.000	0003261	0003138
AREARU	.9598114	.0010739	893.761	0.000	.9577066	.9619162
DRO	2791005	.014631	-19.076	0.000	3077768	2504242
DPR	.3264138	.0114289	28.560	0.000	.3040136	.348814
DAM	259144	.0127417	-20.338	0.000	2841172	2341707
DRR	-5.432909	.012368	-439.270	0.000	-5.45715	-5.408668
DPA	.5937162	.0116303	51.049	0.000	.5709212	.6165111
DAP	.1283941	.0147612	8.698	0.000	.0994627	.1573254
DTO	0534549	.0123205	-4.339	0.000	0776027	0293072
DMA	.5095921	.011372	44.811	0.000	.4873034	.5318808
DPIAU	.1405087	.0115635	12.151	0.000	.1178448	.1631727
DCE	.1311528	.0114406	11.464	0.000	.1087297	.153576
DRN	2093817	.0119103	-17.580	0.000	2327255	1860379
DPARATBA	2663493	.0115232	23.114	0.000	.2437643	2889343
DPE	.3875062	.0114283	33.907	0.000	.365107	.4099053
DAL	0469616	.0117114	-4.010	0.000	0699156	0240077
DSE	.059055	.0121715	4.852	0.000	.0351993	.0829106
DBA	1397862	.0113513	12.315	0.000	.1175381	1620342
DMG	.0608909	.0113786	5.351	0.000	.0385892	.0831925
DES	2441545	0116354	20 984	0 000	2213495	2669594
DRJ	9357831	.013324	-70.233	0.000	9618976	9096686
DSP	2989153	.0114702	-26.060	0.000	3213966	2764341
DSC	3560628	.0114708	31.041	0.000	.3335806	.3785451
DRS	5000018	.0114414	43.701	0.000	. 4775771	.5224264
DMS	1940746	0118865	16 327	0 000	1707774	2173718
DMT	3646024	.0117049	31,150	0.000	.3416612	.3875437
DGO	0938761	0116525	-8 056	0 000	- 1167145	- 0710377
DDF	3216114	.013163	-24,433	0.000	3474103	2958124
DMGMETRO	- 4059026	005304	-76 528	0 000	- 4162982	- 395507
DPAMETRO	-7168598	0093731	-76 480	0 000	- 7352308	- 6984889
DCEMETRO	0438701	0045403	9 662	0 000	0349713	0527689
DPEMETRO	- 2492341	0047558	-52 406	0 000	- 2585554	- 2399128
DBAMETRO	- 2194311	0055841	-38 409	0 000	- 2254209	- 2035318
DRITMETRO	4045911	0085018	47 589	0 000	3879279	4212544
DSPMETRO	1338727	0030978	43 216	0 000	1278012	1399442
DERMETRO		006975	-99 363	0.000	- 7067316	- 67939
DRSMETRO	- 4770479	0047933	-99 524	0 000	- 4864426	- 4676532
CODE	-5 978213	0157846	-378 736	0.000	-6 009151	-5 947276
	+	.0157040				
/athrho	0362785	.0008578	-42.291	0.000	0379599	0345972
rho	0362626	.0008567			0379416	0345834
Wald test	of rho=0:		chi2(1)	= 1788.53	Pr > ch	i2 = 0.0000