

Session S38 Labour Force

LABOUR FORCE TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000-2025) AND INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER MOVEMENTS. INITIAL OUTLOOK.

(first draft)

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1. Summary and introduction

1.1 Several questions, both theoretical and factual, are presently being raised concerning the interaction between demographic trends and the labour force. If interest is restricted to the geographical area comprising the 15 EU countries over a period of one generation (i.e. 25 years), what will be the likely scale and impact of foreseeable demographic changes? Firstly, will the decrease in population be very marked, will it affect all countries and will it impact on the size of the labour force? In other words, should provision be made for a substantial labour shortfall, and in this case, what will its size be in the various countries and when will it happen?

Secondly, in view of this risk, will large size immigration be necessary? To what extent are current migratory flows adequate (or inadequate or excessive) to make up for the trend towards a stagnation in the size of the labour force where it is evident? The answer to these questions depends partly on demography, but also to a large extent on behavioural factors which influence the participation levels of different labour-force components in the labour market. It is therefore important to assess the relative weight of these factors in order to highlight trends, divergence or convergence, which will imply different employment and migration policies for individual countries.

1.2 Will international migratory movements play an important part of labour-market adjustments in the context of economic globalisation? In absolute terms, migrants only represent 2.3% of the world's population and in the period 1965 - 1996, the number of migrants increased at an annual rate of 2.5% (Zlotnik, 1998). The latest SOPEMI figures for western Europe show the beginning of a slight reversal in the trend from 1997 following a clear decrease in regular inward flows during the previous years. However, the figure has been negative for the first time for a very long time in Germany, the main country of immigration during the last decade. For the moment, nothing suggests that a new phase of accelerating and intensified migratory movements is beginning. Thus, Stalker (2000) considers that economic globalisation, characterised by growing trade in goods and services and by increased capital flows, ought to generate a substantial increase in international migratory movements. According to other researchers, this trend is not being confirmed (Tapinos 1998, p14) "because the various, contradictory effects of interaction between

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migration and globalisation prevent us from identifying a developmental trend which is beyond question”.

1.3 Overall, as regards the total population, an increase of 10 million people from 376 million to 386 million has been logged for the 15-state Europe as a whole according to Eurostat’s median scenarios (cf. Table 2 §2) between 2000 and 2025, which is a very low but nonetheless positive average annual growth of 0.10%. For its part, the labour force will decrease from 175.82 million to 172.96 million, that is, a fall of 2.86 million or 1.6 % over 25 years. This quasi-stagnation over a quarter of a century obviously includes very contrasting national situations (cf. §3 Graph1 and Table 4). The figures shown do not support the alarmist tendency expressed in comments raised by the report titled “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to a Declining and Ageing Population?” (UN 2000). There are three bases for this divergence: 1. several scenarios in the UN report examine objectives linked to population ageing and retirement financing which are not dealt with here¹, 2. only scenario IV concerns the *potential* labour force, i.e. the age group from 15-65 (it is therefore a demographic ratio which does not take account of modifications in labour-force participation rates) 3. the horizon for projections is set at 2050 while this study is restricted to 2025, although demographic changes will obviously be most noticeable after this date. If, on the other hand, scenario I with the median UN variant is selected, the “*working age*” group falls by 2% between 2000 and 2025, although the hypothesis of an average migratory net flow of 300,000 migrants per year is accepted. These figures therefore agree with the Eurostat median scenario which, with a migratory net flow of +/- 600,000 migrants, means that the size of the labour force will remain more or less stable.

1.4 Forecasting the trends of the labour force in EU 15 provides an interesting overview, but it has the disadvantage of concealing the highly contrasting situations between countries. The general trend towards demographic behaviour convergence in western Europe, which began a long time ago, has in no way led to homogenisation of national Member State populations characteristics. These differences remain considerable both as regards demographic and economic parameters. Thus, the TFR in Spain is 1.19 whereas in Ireland it is 1.89. In the case of male E_0 , the range is from 77.3 years in Sweden to 72.0 years in Portugal. These indicators lead to quite different population structure ratios, the countries involved in the ageing process proceeding at different times and rates. Even greater differences are seen in terms of participation in the labour market, particularly as regards women. The following two extreme situations bear this out: in 1995, the labour force participation rate (between 15 and 75 years) was 36.7% in Italy and 67.1% in Sweden. This naturally implies that some EU countries will experience no difficulty ensuring continuing growth in the size of their labour force over the next 25 years, whereas others will be faced with stagnation and for a few of them a slight fall. The weight of this constraint will probably create very different assessments of the need for, importance of and scale of recourse to migratory flows among the countries.

1.5 The more general problem of mobilising the labour force in Europe currently fits in with a preoccupation with financing retirement pensions. Labour force participation rates are particularly low in some countries and one of the major aims of the EU Summit in Lisbon was to suggest means of achieving a 70% labour force participation rate in 2010. The range of policies within this context is fairly wide, from family policy measures which ease the re-entry of mothers into the labour market, to provisions aimed at reducing the financial

¹on this subject, see “Expert group Meeting on Population Response to Population Ageing and Population Decline” (UN/POP/PRA/2000)

inducements to early retirement among men over 50. These programmes aimed at young people, older workers and women cover a social, political and economic field in comparison with which adjustments to migration policy appear to be of secondary importance.

Two conclusions emerge from this synthetic approach. Firstly, it will be difficult to achieve a joint Community policy on migration in the medium term due to the contrasting demographic situations and major differences in labour force participation in the countries concerned. In view of the very heterogeneous national characteristics in terms of labour supply, many difficulties will hamper the reaching of a consensus on a new migration policy for the 15 countries. Secondly, the migration hypotheses chosen in Eurostat's median scenario used in this work are very close to the average trend for migratory flows recorded over the past 10 years. As a result, it seems that holding on this trend will be enough, as any substantial revision of migratory policies seems to have no useful effect.

2. Total population trend

It may be useful as a first step to present the data supplied by the main non-governmental organisations, as this is a comparative analysis of the populations of each of the 15 Member States. It does not, moreover, deviate much from the data compiled by national statistics institutes. By way of a guide, the observed data collected by Eurostat in 2000 has been compared with the baseline projection calculations drawn up on the basis of the population in 1995. Even so, this relatively short 5-year period shows that the differences are minimal: a slight over-estimation of 0.05% is recorded for the EU as a whole. The two extreme cases concern France, with a projection over-estimation of 0.77 %, and Italy with an under-estimation of 0.16%. Eurostat offers 3 demographic development scenarios: low, baseline and high. The baseline scenario, basically projecting current trends and which is close to the projections made by the official institutes in each of the countries concerned², has been used here.

Table 2 shows that over the 25-year period, the EU 15 population increases by 10 million, representing an average annual growth rate of 0.10%. Only Italy, (whose population falls from 2000) and Spain (from 2012) have very slightly negative figures.

² **TFR (2000-2025):** Austria (1.31-1.47), Belgium (1.54-1.75), Denmark (1.77-1.80), Finland (1.73-1.70), France (1.73-1.80), Germany (1.40-1.50), Greece (1.34-1.54), Ireland (1.89-1.82), Italy (1.22-1.45), Luxembourg (1.72-1.80), Netherlands (1.71-1.78), Portugal (1.53-1.70), Spain (1.19-1.45), Sweden (1.50-1.74) and the United Kingdom (1.72-1.80).

E₀Males (2000-2025): Austria (74.98-77.86), Belgium (74.82-79.23), Denmark (74.19-77.91), Finland (73.92-78.09), France (74.80-78.82), Germany (74.74-78.70), Greece (75.91-79.69), Ireland (74.02-77.78), Italy (75.50-79.56), Luxembourg (74.39-79.38), Netherlands (75.49-78.75), Portugal (72.04-76.13), Spain (74.89-77.55), Sweden (77.33-79.54), United Kingdom (75.21-78.87).

E₀Females (2000-2025): Austria (81.17-83.52), Belgium (80.94-84.38), Denmark (78.97-81.61), Finland (81.10-84.03), France (82.83-85.88), Germany (80.82-83.94), Greece (80.96-83.97), Ireland (79.42-82.78), Italy (81.95-84.96), Luxembourg (80.81-84.16), Netherlands (80.86-83.63), Portugal (79.19-82.57), Spain (82.10-84.52), Sweden (82.02-83.94), United Kingdom (80.03-83.61).

The UN projection, however, gives lower figures. It shows an overall drop of 5 million for EU 15 with only Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom experiencing moderate population growth.

Table 1: Population 2000 – Different sources

	Population on 1/1/2000 UNITED NATIONS ⁽¹⁾	Population on 1/1/2000 INED ⁽²⁾	Population on 1/1/2000 EUROSTAT ⁽³⁾	Population projections 2000 EUROSTAT ⁽⁴⁾
Austria	8,080,000	8,102,557	8,091,800	8,089,187
Belgium	10,249,000	10,239,557	10,239,000	10,223,128
Denmark	5,320,000	5,330,020	5,330,000	5,332,247
Finland	5,172,000	5,171,302	5,171,300	5,172,569
France	59,238,000	59,225,683	58,746,500	59,198,595
Germany	82,017,000	82,164,720	82,164,700	82,138,397
Greece	10,610,000	10,545,678	10,545,700	10,542,404
Ireland	3,803,000	3,776,577	3,775,100	3,775,974
Italy	57,530,000	57,679,955	57,680,000	57,588,170
Luxembourg	437,000	435,700	435,700	434,254
Netherlands	15,864,000	15,863,950	15,864,000	15,859,184
Portugal	10,016,000	9,997,550	9,997,600	10,002,463
Spain	39,910,000	39,441,679	39,441,700	39,432,336
Sweden	8,842,000	8,861,426	8,861,400	8,861,628
United Kingdom	59,415,000	59,623,406	59,623,400	59,520,998
EU-15	376,503,000	376,459,760	375,967,900	376,171,534

Sources: (1) United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospect: The 2000 Revision, Highlights*

(2) ODE

(3) Eurostat, Statistics in brief, *Population and social conditions*, 10/2000, “Initial results of 1999 demographic data collection in Europe”.

(4) Calculations

Baseline fertility scenarios foreshadow a slight increase in fertility. This is much more pronounced than those in the UN median hypothesis which tends to correspond to the Eurostat “low” scenario. The rise in life expectancy forecasts is likewise more optimistic than in the Eurostat scenarios.

A comment which requires further development will be referred to briefly in this context: the 4th column in Table 2 totals the net migratory balance in 2025 (622,000 migrants) for each of the countries in question. These flows should be taken into account in calculating the annual population variation worked out for the projections for the 15 countries in question. This figure does not represent the migratory contribution from outside the EU. It therefore relates to flows between European countries and, within the overall calculation of the European population, these should be categorised as internal migration. It is therefore necessary to take account only of extra-EU migrants flows when estimating the variation in the total population of this regional unit.

3. The size of the labour force in the EU 15 in 2025

The population development scenario tabled here combines Eurostat’s baseline demographic hypothesis with a median scenario involving a slight growth in labour force participation in each of the 15 countries. The data is broken down by country, gender and one-year age categories for each of the 25 years.

Tableau 2: Population 2025

	Population on 1/1/2025 UNITED NATIONS⁽¹⁾	Population projections for 2025 EUROSTAT	Average annual population growth rate (in %)	Net migration in 2025
Austria	7,605,000	8,159,020	0.03	20,000
Belgium	10,205,000	10,529,973	0.12	15,000
Denmark	5,359,000	5,603,020	0.20	10,000
Finland	5,138,000	5,317,472	0.11	5,000
France	62,753,000	63,336,194	0.27	50,000
Germany	78,897,000	82,817,741	0.03	200,000
Greece	10,149,000	10,761,301	0.08	25,000
Ireland	4,745,000	4,533,312	0.73	5,000
Italy	52,364,000	55,069,404	-0.18	80,000
Luxembourg	576,000	514,840	0.68	2,000
Netherlands	16,571,000	17,519,422	0.40	35,000
Portugal	9,831,000	10,602,554	0.23	25,000
Spain	37,395,000	39,093,032	-0.04	60,000
Sweden	8,518,000	9,213,430	0.16	20,000
United Kingdom	61,243,000	62,795,388	0.21	70,000
EU-15	371,349,000	385,866,103	0.10	622,000

Sources: (1) United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospect: The 2000 Revision, Highlights*; pp28-33.


The choice of this combination of a demographic scenario and a baseline labour force participation scenario may appear too “conservative”, but forms a sufficiently reliable general basis from which different hypotheses can be drawn and the effects of the different economic and social policy options highlighted. Few research has been carried out relatively recently focusing on labour supply projections in European countries. Feld (2000) therefore chose 2 scenarios based on previous Eurostat data which trace the trajectory of the labour force trends up to 2020. In the “high demography and low labour force participation” scenario, only 3 countries experience a decrease in their populations at different times: Italy from the first year, Belgium in 2004 and Germany in 2017, whereas the majority of other countries record growth of over 5%. In contrast, in the “low demography and high labour force participation” scenario, population growth of between 12% and 16% is noted in all countries (with much lower figures for Germany, Belgium and Italy).

The relationships between fertility below the replacement level, long-term labour supply and international immigration have given rise to projections up to 2050 for 16 industrialised countries with several combinations of TFR, migratory balance and working population level parameter values (cf. McDonald and Kippen, 2001). One of their scenarios assumes fertility levels as remaining constant, along with migratory flows which stay at their current levels, although with a general growth in labour force participation reaching Sweden’s level in 30 years. According to these hypotheses, all the countries dealt with in Mac Donald and Kippen’s projection will record a growth in their labour force in 2025. In 2050, however, situations will admittedly be more contrasting.

This problem was explored recently at the “*Expert Group Meeting on Policy Response to Population Ageing and Population Decline*” (UN, 2000). A number of thought-provoking aspects become apparent. Thus, Coleman (2000) examines the wide range of alternatives to an increase in immigration (such as pensions, access to retirement, work productivity, family policy and changes in fertility). Lesthaeghe (2000) makes a clear distinction between two horizons; the first up to 2025 where the implementation of appropriate economic policies will partially solve the problem of population decline, and the second between 2025 and 2050 where the sharp constraints of demography will win out and fundamentally impact on the major trends for the future of European populations. Tapinos (2000) demonstrates the impact of demographic changes on the labour market and social security systems.

The data presented in Graph 1, compiled from a range of sources using a common methodology for all countries, immediately provides a range of essential indications (de Jong and Broekman, 2000). With the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Italy on the other, all the other countries fit into a rather narrow overall trend featuring a + 5% to -5% variation in the labour force in 2025 compared with 2000. Overall, the labour force grows positively until at least 2012 and 2014. The impact of demography and the participation rate naturally exerts a different influence on the trend which emerges for each of these countries.

Graph 1: Labour force projections for the 15 EU countries, 2000-2025 (2000=100)



The year in which the labour force falls back to the level reached in 2000 also provides a useful indicator of the urgency of the constraints emerging from the timetable on the adjustments imposed by a possible decrease in the labour supply (cf. Table 3). It should, however, be noted that an unprecedented period over the past decades when the labour force enjoyed very high regular growth rates is now coming to an end. In the case of the base year 2000 used for the projections, the size of the labour force in each of the EU 15 countries reaches an unprecedented level.

It should be stressed that only 3 countries (Italy, Germany and Spain) make up almost 5 million of the decrease in the size of the EU 15 labour force, a total reduction of 2,860,000 individuals. The data presented in Graph 2 in the annex makes for a clear identification of the categories of countries. The northern countries with quite a large female labour force are those where the total labour force grows as a whole. The southern countries with the greatest fall, however, are those which fail to mobilise female labour. Table 5 below distinguishes between 3 groups, i.e. the first where the female labour share of the total is over 45%, the second where this share is between 44% and 40% and the third where it falls to approximately 38%.

The need thus arises to identify the relative impacts of a range of factors in labour force variation over the next 25 years.

Table 3: Year when the labour force falls back to its 2000 level

COUNTRY	YEAR
Austria	2024
Belgium	2019
Denmark	After 2025
Finland	2014
France	After 2025
Germany	2021
Greece	2023
Ireland	After 2025
Italy	2014
Luxembourg	After 2025
Netherlands	After 2025
Portugal	After 2025
Spain	2018
Sweden	2022
United Kingdom	After 2025
EU- 15	2023

4. The factors affecting labour force variation

Two types of factors determine the size of the labour force. A comparison of their relative impacts depending on country and period highlight the ability of various societies to combine demographic and economic determinants. Firstly, the labour force depends as we have seen on fertility, life expectancy and migratory flows. On the other hand, it is also the result of the level of labour market participation by various population groups, such as young people, adult workers, older workers and women. And lastly it depends on institutional factors such as compulsory school or retirement age.

Only the effect of the 2 main determining factors (demography and participation in the labour market) is presented here, without going into more accurate details

It should first be stressed that the average annual increase of 0.7% in the 15-state EU labour force between 1985 and 2000 was wholly the result of population growth - participation levels merely had either no effect or a negative effect in several cases. This trend is reversing completely, as the demographic effect is negative almost everywhere in the scenario proposed here³. Table 4 shows how far and in which countries the behaviour effect will sufficiently compensate the negative demographic effect to ensure growth, those countries where compensation will be adequate to maintain the status quo, and those where compensation will clearly be insufficient to prevent a decline in the labour force.

The main question consequently turns on an examination of the value of hypotheses which assume a reversal of the trend towards a reduction in participation levels. A number of points emerge. For example, the recent fall in the labour force participation rate is due to factors which have probably already had all the effect they will over the past 10 years, such as the fall in participation by young people between 15 and 24 years of age, and the marked decline in participation by men and women from 55 to 64 years - some 41.7% in 1999. (OECD, 2000 p. 221). Early retirement programmes aimed at preventing unemployment among older workers affected by major restructuring in industry and services have probably reached their limits. The increase in the general level of education will probably also positively influence participation rates in the oldest categories in the next generations. In the EU, 46% of the 55-64 age category with basic education, for example, were in the labour forces in 1997, while the percentage was 63% for those with secondary education and 67.5% for those with a degree. The difference was even more marked in the case of women: only 22.5% of women with basic education were in the labour forces compared with 52% of university graduates (Employment in Europe, 1999). The level of employment was relatively low and the European Union set ambitious objectives at the Lisbon summit. The Employment Programme, for example, is aiming for an average labour force participation rate of 70% in 2010 and 78% in 2040 for all countries (Fotakis, 2000).

Table 4 : Demographic and behavioural effects in labour force variation

	Labour force		Variation in the labour force		Demographic effect	Behavioural effect
	2000	2025	Absolute figures	%		
Austria	3,976,460	3,904,993	-71,467	-1.80	-10.32	8.52
Belgium	4,345,953	4,159,787	-186,166	-4.28	-9.63	5.34
Denmark	2,890,754	2,908,517	17,763	0.61	-3.27	3.88
Finland	2,501,670	2,366,524	-135,145	-5.40	-10.15	4.74
France	27,263,090	27,861,902	598,812	2.20	-4.18	6.38
Germany	40,058,039	38,276,876	-1 781,163	-4.45	-10.10	5.65
Greece	4,684,952	4,639,665	-45,286	-0.97	-4.80	3.84
Ireland	1,680,197	2,038,489	358,292	21.32	15.83	5.49
Italy	23,717,571	21,587,539	-2,130,031	-8.98	-16.87	7.89
Luxembourg	182,143	205,997	23,854	13.10	5.03	8.06
Netherlands	7,757,414	8,084,807	327,393	4.22	-3.86	8.08
Portugal	4,995,500	5,221,617	226,116	4.53	0.96	3.57
Spain	17,359,071	16,336,449	-1,022,622	-5.89	-10.12	4.23
Sweden	4,436,228	4,385,370	-50,857	-1.15	-1.17	0.03
United Kingdom	29,978,615	30,985,138	1,006,522	3.36	-0.69	4.05
EUR-15	175,827,656	172,963,670	-2,863,987	-1.63	-7.15	5.53

³ (Luxembourg is an exception but the migrant contribution is fundamental to the labour supply in this country and Ireland)

5. The structure of the future labour force

The structure of the labour force by age and gender in these 15 countries will obviously change at the close of this 25-year period. Although a baseline scenario prolonging current trends has been adopted, no dramatic changes in the distribution of the labour force by gender are likely. Countries where the female participation rate is already high no longer have an available reserve of female labour and have probably reached their upper limit. The average distribution of the labour force for the entire EU 15 is 56% for men and 44% for women. Countries in southern Europe have much lower proportions than the European average. These same countries are actually experiencing a negative trend in the size of their labour forces. Efforts to increase the participation of women in the labour market have been minimal. The countries in question, in fact, suffer from several disadvantages which will handicap them in the coming years: they have both very low population growth with TFR among the lowest in the world, they have particularly low labour force participation rates in all ages categories, as well as a relatively low participation rate of women in labour force.

In respect of the ageing of the labour-force, the situation is dramatically different between those countries in the last stage of their demographic transition and those with a more recent significant fall in the birth rate. The -40/+40 active population ratio is stable in Sweden and Finland, but falls by half in Italy and Spain. This phenomenon is unavoidable, and demographic factors cannot change anything in this respect. Neither fertility nor life expectancy over these 25 years can modify these ratios. And migratory flows, as has been pointed out, can have only minor effects.

Table 5: Variation in the composition of the labour force according to gender and age

	Male and female labour force (in %)			Ratio -40/+40	
		2000	2025	2000	2025
Austria	Men	56.0	53.4	1.51	0.99
	Women	44.0	46.6		
Belgium	Men	57.0	55.2	1.35	1.07
	Women	43.0	44.9		
Denmark	Men	54.3	53.7	1.22	1.06
	Women	45.7	46.3		
Finland	Men	51.9	52.1	1.00	1.00
	Women	48.1	47.9		
France	Men	54.1	53.0	1.22	1.05
	Women	45.9	47.0		
Germany	Men	56.5	55.2	1.20	0.91
	Women	43.5	44.8		
Greece	Men	61.6	61.3	1.29	0.81
	Women	38.4	38.8		
Ireland	Men	60.8	60.8	1.65	1.12
	Women	39.2	39.2		
Italy	Men	61.4	60.9	1.40	0.83
	Women	38.6	39.1		
Luxembourg	Men	62.3	59.9	1.42	1.36
	Women	37.7	40.1		
Netherlands	Men	57.0	55.2	1.44	1.21
	Women	43.0	44.8		
Portugal	Men	54.6	53.6	1.26	0.79
	Women	45.4	46.4		
Spain	Men	60.7	60.8	1.58	0.79
	Women	39.3	39.2		
Sweden	Men	52.3	52.7	0.92	0.92
	Women	47.7	47.3		
United Kingdom	Men	55.0	53.9	1.28	0.99
	Women	45.0	46.1		
E-U 15	Men	56.9	55.9	1.29	0.94
	Women	43.1	44.1		

6. Immigration and the labour force

What is the part played by migratory flows in the trends of the labour force in western Europe? The data in Table 6 provides some indications but mainly highlights both methodological and political problems. The migrant labour force overall in 2025 stood at 320,000 workers. As an annual flow, this is in no way comparable with the total variation in absolute figures for the labour force in each country. As such, this is partly the result of the absorption of the migratory flow over the previous 25 years. Furthermore, several simplifications inherent in the baseline scenario should be developed in greater depth. Firstly, in the hypotheses selected, migratory flows in respect of age composition are identical to the population in the host country. Secondly, migrant labour force participation rates are the same as those of nationals. Finally, the net migration flow may be a result of immigration and emigration movements of very differing sizes. This would mean that the same number of working migrants may reflect migratory movements differing considerably in scale, depending on the size of the inward and outward movements, employment levels and the structure of the flows by age and gender.

A different type of consideration related to the diversity of the individual situations in each country concerning the labour supply during the next 25 years should also be stressed. Three comments illustrate this diversity.

Firstly, from a geographical point of view, the situations in neighbouring countries will be very different. Spain, for example, has a shortfall of 1 million workers while the Portuguese figure will rise by 225,000. Germany will be short by 1,780,000 while the French figure rises by +/- 600,000. The Belgian shortfall is 186,000 and the Netherlands rise by 327,000.

Secondly, from a historical point of view, some countries will begin to decline 10 or even 20 years before others (cf. Graph1).



Thirdly, from an economic and social point of view, the measures implemented to raise participation rates, such as encouraging continued activity among older workers and increasing the women supply in the labour market have very different results depending on the country concerned.









Table 6: total migrant labour force, 2000 and 2025

Country	Labour force	
	2000	2025
Austria	5,408	11,373
Belgium	4,720	6,944
Denmark	6,541	5,941
Finland	2,797	2,545
France	24,347	25,793
Germany	152,338	105,683
Greece	10,087	11,890
Ireland	9,400	2,693
Italy	21,770	36,385
Luxembourg	1,403	986
Netherlands	18,257	19,976
Portugal	5,980	12,420
Spain	14,303	28,044
Sweden	7,489	10,171
United Kingdom	50,302	39,098
EU- 15	335,143	319,942

APPENDIX

Graph 2 : Total population, total (and Male & Female) labor force 2000-2025





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