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“Political responses to immigration pressures in the European Union”

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Political Responses to Immigrations Pressures in the European Union

0 Introduction

This paper will analyze the demographic situation of the EU with respect to population-related changes and shifts in the international order that are likely to exert pressures on Europe, and the efforts of the EU to come to terms with the member states in order to react appropriately as a political body.

Despite some frictions and remaining differences among its members, the European Union (EU) is on the way to forge itself into a political body. The economy, that is the common market, was a forerunner to this arrangement which takes on an ever more solid shape. There is no doubt that the formation of a single actor out of 15 member states with more expected to come on board, within the next decade, will raise even more problems and evoke even more backlashes than did coming to terms on market place issues previously. According to long respective histories each member state wants to follow its own tradition and continue to act as a nation state. So the idea of a stepwise abandonment of sovereign rights and of surrendering them to a supra-national bureaucracy provokes quarrels and debates within the states and between them.

Increasingly our common conviction is gaining ground in the EU-15 - that there are some problems which can only be solved by all member states as an aggregate – that is cooperatively. This is true foremost for problems which have their origins outside the borders of the EU but that exerting constant pressures upon them: migratory movements are among the pre-eminent phenomena which require control from all parts. The situation at the outer borders of the EU has become a field of administrative supervision, monitoring and policing as expressed in the Schengen-Convention. But it is not enough to watch over borders: the situation of the outer world has an impact on this so-called "fortress of prosperity" beleaguered by those who are worse

off. So a comprehensive political response is required and, to begin with there is an urgent need for common legal grounds concerning the migration issue. Until now, it has been up to the member states to find regulations on how to open or close the doors to specified groups of foreigners. Although this issue figures regularly on the agenda of the great conferences, the EU has succeeded in shaping a common legal contract to regulate immigration.

As the need for coordinated legislated decision-making becomes ever more evident the more an outline of this multi-faceted issue seems to be called for.

The EU is facing problems of a different nature which have one thing in common: a strong relationship between demographic trends: first of all its own population trends toward shrinkage and aging, and secondly, population trends in the "outside" world showing an opposite demographic picture to that of Western Europe: there the populations are growing and will complete their ultimate size only at the end of the 21st century. So the EU has to react to its own demographic situation and, at the same time, to the processes going on in the less developed world. These reactions will be flexible and even controversial over a certain time. It is doubtful if the occasional reactions will ever be transformed into a common policy aiming at a control of migratory movements of different kinds, and maintaining peace in social spheres such as the labor market, internal security, and the communal life.

1. The demographic situation of the European Union

The world still exhibits sharply contrasting picture regarding living standards and life chances. This economical and social split of the globe has its demographic counterpart, and, therefore, social and economic issues of these modern settings can be analysed in demographic terms; the problems the modern world has to tackle will bring it in close contact with population policy, at least to the realization that social and political problems of the modern world are inextricably intertwined with demographic change.

This is a change in the opposite direction from what we are used to watching in the developing continents: the European populations are shrinking and aging.¹ It is a matter of time until these societies will begin to feel being in a state of crisis, at the latest

- when population aging is conducive to a rising strain on pensions and health systems,
- when dwindling youth cohorts imperil the renewal of the active population, and
- when modern societies realize that simple immigration is in a sense of 'opening the door' no remedy in view of shortages in an intricate labour market.

1.1 Demographic Change: natural decrease and increasing longevity

Demographic changes will be the defining feature in the EU, particularly in its central European and southern Mediterranean states. In the early 70's, the highly industrialized countries entered a new stage dominated by technologically advanced methods of production. This led to the rise of a sophisticated labour force whose occupational skills were much more prepared for steering processes and organizational efficiency. They are the new factors of productivity to which the older "chimney industrialism" has given way. New forms of the division of labour, of education and formation and an ever greater part of women in higher professional positions changed the life cycle of the young generation, i.e. the time budget between work and leisure, and consumption patterns. These features have generated a corresponding post-industrial demographic structure which reflects the new life styles and behavioural patterns, such as more individualism, more hedonism, greater efforts to find a working place of the new kind and a loosening bonds with partners and relatives.² This "avalanche-like" change has brought forth a new demographic situation by the way of a behav-

¹ David Coleman (Ed.), *Europe's population in the 1990s*. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1996; EUROSTAT (Ed.), *Demographic Statistics*. Luxemburg 1999; Daniel Noin (Ed.), *The changing population of Europe*. Oxford (Blackwell) 1993.

² Josef Schmid, *The Background of Recent Fertility Trends in the Member States of the Council of Europe*. Population Studies, No. 15, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1984; Josef Schmid, *The Background of Fertility Behaviour in Europe - New Social and Psychological Aspects*. In: R. L. Cliquet/G. Dooghe/J. de Jong-Gierveld/ F. van Poppel (Eds.), *Population and Family in the Low Countries VI*. (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (N.I.D.I.) and The Population and Family Study Centre (C.B.G.S.), Vol. 18, The Hague/Brüssel, 1989, p. 1-16; Ansley J. Coale

journal response in the fields of procreation, family formation and passing a longer life course. This recent demographic change has been entitled "second demographic transition" whose main tendencies have not come to a halt nor have they shown any signs of altering any of its tendencies:

- (1) a long-run *decline in fertility* had summed up to a constant fertility level below generational replacement. In the post-war era a rise in the birth rate had generated the "baby-boom", the 70's alternately experienced a sharp decline during a time span of only ten years, between 1965 and 1975. the Total Fertility Rate had fallen in Germany from 2.5 in 1964 down to 1.4 in 1973. Today, the southern member states of the EU have had a TFR of 1.2 for years. That means a reproductive level of more than one third below replacement.
- (2) EU-15 population enjoy a great *longevity* with 74 years for men and 80 years for women. The high survival rates in the old-age groups, combined with a deficient fertility level, this represents an accelerated version of demographic aging. As soon as the baby-boom generation is about to enter retirement – its full entry is anticipated for the year 2030 – government finances will come under excessive pressure. Even now, European governments are forced to make decisions between higher contribution levels to the social security system or curbing the size of benefits.
- (3) With regard to the age groups it can be confirmed throughout the EU that the share of elderly people expressed as a percentage of the working population (old-age dependency ratio) is already high and will double during the period 2000 through 2050. The factors of demographic aging such as low fertility levels and rising expectation of life (at birth) will most distinctly shape and characterize the age structure in the coming decades. (Table 2)³

and Susan Watkins (Eds.), the decline of fertility in Europe. Princeton (Princeton University Press) 1986.

³ Josef Schmid, Population Ageing: Dynamics, and Social and Economic Implications at Family, Community and Societal Levels. Referat auf dem Meeting der UN/ECE (Geneva-CES/PAU/1998/6; GE 98-32457), Budapest, 7.-9. Dezember 1998.

1.2 Migration

EU-member states have their own migratory history during which the main attitudes toward migration as such were formed. They exert influence on policy until today and hamper a coming to common terms at an EU-level. One could observe a constant influx of labour migrants notwithstanding the business cycles in the receiving countries because they had transformed into welfare states with the usual high level of wages, tax and contributions to social security. As a consequence, this engendered a hunger of industries for a cheaper labour force at their disposal – and the first signs of a split labour market. This trend continues throughout the EU, only hampered occasionally by objections from labour union's side.⁴

But this steady trend was at times interrupted by waves of immigration in the course of international events or regional turmoil touching European countries. The wave of "decolonisation" brought to all western European countries masses of "expatriots" and other kinds of "instant citizens"; the fall of the Iron Curtain again propelled international migration and an immigration pressure primarily exerted on the former western Germany. Since this historic point of global relevance the following chronological categories of migration had to be faced by western Europe:

- An on-going *labour migration*, now contained as "contract labour": an official regulation and control of foreign labour force in order to avoid or, at least, to reduce employment.
- *Family reunion* as the fetching of close relatives left behind in the home country. It raises controversies between humanists on the one side and realists aiming at integration into the receiving society on the other. An excessively generous regime in that area would negatively impact German society from it if it is applied to children after their obligatory school-age or to marriage mates without proficiency in the receiving country's language. Obvious acculturation lags in the second and third generation of immigrants are primarily due to a family's rigid preservation of style and customs of the country of origin.

⁴ Josef Schmid, Population Development Models as Criteria for Migration Policies? In: F. Heckmann/W. Bosswick (eds), Migration Policies: A Comparative Perspective. European Forum for Migration Studies (efms) Bamberg 1994, S. 201-210; Friedrich Heckmann, Is There a Migration Policy in Germany? In: In: F. Heckmann/W. Bosswick (eds), Migration Policies: A Comparative Perspective, op. cit., S. 149-164.

- *Asylum* or asylum seeking became a growth movement, the borders became increasingly permeable during the last decade. For countries granting asylum as an individual right which must be legally verified, asylum-seeking became a mean to disguise the motivation to immigrate. The cases of asylum fluctuate with the situation in regions outside of the EU-borders, the ease with which to trespass them and the administrative and political directives of a receiving country regarding the treatment of asylum cases. Germany had to amend its asylum legislation in view of nearly half a million applicants in 1992. It denies admittance to those who came through an already "democratic prosecution-free" neighbouring country and cut down the number of cases to about 100.000 in 2000.
- *Refugees*: The status of a refugee is laid down in the Geneva Convention. It states the conditions which qualify you as a refugee and the restrictions on sending an applicant back to his country. Refugees have grown in number as the international post-war order broke down, former great power disintegrated and as formerly dormant ethnic and religious conflicts re-emerged. After the Yugoslav Socialist Republic disintegrated into many pieces Europe experienced the first war since 1945 and generated masses of refugees who were to some degree accepted in EU-countries.
- *Illegal immigration* played an ever greater role among the migratory movements toward the West, since the gap between wealthier and poorer EU on legal grounds have attenuated. This has created a branch of the organized crime, called "trafficking" and seems to be a blossoming one. Some estimates range from 400,000 to 1 million people are being smuggled into the EU each year.⁵

⁵ John Salt, Susanne Schmid, Trafficking in Migrants – A Preliminary Review, Migration Research Unit (MRU), Department of Geography, University College London/UCL, April 1998 (presented at the „IOM-Workshop on Trafficking“, Warsaw 8.-9. June 1998).

2. Toward a New International Population Order

During the 21st century, billions of people are expected to be added to the world's population of 6.13 billion (in 2001). The growth will occur in the developing countries and that means a huge contrast to the modern world whose populations have entered the phase of demographic stagnation. The less developed regions are continuing to increase markedly in size.

2.1 World population growth and migration

The annual growth of the world population of about 75 million is limited to the developing countries. By mid-century the populations of the developing continents are projected to grow by roughly three billion and this will raise the population of these regions to be 87 percent of the world population. The most recent UN-projections for the year 2050 range from 7.3 billion to 10.7 billion, so the medium variant, widely considered probable is around 8.9 billion.⁶ The population growth to be expected is due to a combination of

- an already very large population base including women in childbearing ages in Asia, Africa and Latin America,
- a still uncommonly high annual growth rate (though in decline), and
- a built-in growth momentum in the age structures with a high proportion of younger age groups and a value structure favouring large families.

These three factors of growth combined are apt to outweigh the effects of an ongoing fertility decline in the developing world. Even pandemics will be, to some extent, balanced out by steady improvements in mortality and longevity. Looking back into the past century, we find a world life expectancy 1950 of approximately 46 years. Today, in 2001, it is 67, 65 for males and 69 for females, a gain of 21 years.

⁶ United Nations (Ed.), *World population prospects. The 2000 Revision*, New York 2001; cf. Keven F. McCarthy, *World Population Shifts – Boom or Doom?* (Population Matters – A RAND Program of Policy- Relevant Research Communication), Santa Monica, CA, 2001.

Such is the solid demographic momentum of growth the world will face during the 21st century; it is an inescapable destiny. Although it may be somewhat alleviated by a stronger practice of family planning, by no means can it be avoided.

A brief look at the anticipated population growth in the 21st century on a national level, reveals the following:

India accounts for about 20 per cent of the world's current annual increase of 75 million. It is followed by China which in spite of its stern one-child-policy contributes about 25 percent, alone on grounds of its population size of 1,3 billion. Because of India's higher growth rate and a similar population size of more than 1 billion, it is projected that it will reach China's population size and overtake it by mid-century. Both powers will account for a population of 1.5 billion each by then.

The fastest growing populations of immediate relevance for the EU are found in Africa. Over the past 50 years, Africa's population has more than tripled in size and reached recently 818 million. Particularly in tropical Africa the population experienced an amazing growth. Kenya, for instance, had a population of 6 million in 1950; today has 30 million people and is projected to have 37 million by 2050. This extraordinary growth of African populations has several contributing causes (-) a steady decline of mortality through medical transfer from abroad, (-) high fertility as a means to find access to resources and status for women, and size like the spacing pattern of birth in the course of a problematical modernization.

The African continent in 2000 had a population of 818 and is projected to be 1.8 billion in 2050, - a tremendous number even when setbacks in the struggle against premature death or the AIDS epidemic are taken into account.

Following are the major population dynamics in the world population:

- the shrinking and aging pattern of Western populations,
- the growing population at different levels of acceleration in the developing continents: ranging from the fastest growing Africa, the growing population giants of central south-Asia
- the slowing fertility rates and correspondingly reduced growth and
- The beginning aging in Eastern-Asia.

The demographic split between the West and the poorer developing continents in the southern hemisphere has been well-known for decades. But it now enters the period of another demographic push, the transitional growth consisting of a surplus of births over steadily declining death rates previously discussed in relation to the population growth in the South. The demographic situation of the world and its diverging trends and critical differentials have given birth to the most influential and leading tendencies of the world such as globalisation, urbanisation and migration. This feature is so salient and the role of population trends with globalisation.⁷

It will show its clear contours (-) when the demographic weight of nations will entail a political and strategic power, whereas the West watches its own proportion of the world population sink to about 10 per cent and has to look out for compensatory measures to maintain any leadership and (-) when international agreements stimulated by these changes overlay increasingly collide with national legislation.

2.2 EU-projections in a wider context

The regional shift in world population is among the prerequisite fact the EU has to realize. As a stagnating entity it is surrounded by populations with run-away growth. Post-war Europe accounted for 22 per cent of the world population and Africa 8 per cent. Today both regions show an equal size of about 12 per cent. Fifty years later, Africa's population is projected to be three times that one of Europe. India's population is two and a half times as large as the EU-15 of 372 million.

A look at populations which belong to different demographic and cultural spheres and that located in relatively close proximity to each other may give cause for reflection. In the post-world war II era, the population of Spain was three times larger than Morocco's; in about 2050 Morocco's population is projected to be 50 per cent larger than Spain's. A similar picture emerges when comparing France and Algeria or Germany and Turkey.⁸

⁷ Joseph Chamie, Demographic Issues of the 21st Century: The New International Population Order. In: Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft, Vol. 25, Nr. 3-4/2000, pp. 365-73; for more instruction, see Geoffrey McNicoll, Population Weights in the International Order. In: Population and Development Review, Vol. 25, Nr. 3, Sept 1999, pp. 411-42.

⁸ The EU expressed its awareness about the contrasting life worlds separated only by the narrows at Gibraltar in a conference organized by the Council of Europe: Mediterranean Conference on

The EU as a whole has a declining population. As projected by EUROSTAT, it will lose 9.2 million people by 2050 - that is provided - the annual immigration of one million continues. Without this positive net migration, the EU's 372 million would go down to about 311 million (Table 1). The most populated member states show a natural decrease which annually outweighed and often surmounted by net migration (Table 3).

As to the fertility levels the EU-member states show a divide between those with the lowest level in history, namely the southern Mediterranean states like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, followed by the central European states like Germany (TFR 1,35) and Austria being on the verge of decline. Sometimes their situation is seen in common with Switzerland so that one comes to speak of a "Germanic cluster" which is characterized by low fertility and by a high influx of immigrants on grounds of a humanitarian generosity there. In the past decade 80 per cent of asylum seekers and refugees having reached Western Europe headed for these countries: They are a prototype example of how a negative demographic equation of excess deaths over births is regularly restored and overcompensated by net migration.

EU-member states in the North and the West have a relatively high fertility level such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden (some years back), the United Kingdom and France. A comparison with the lowest-fertility-settings reveals that the northern and western countries with a TFR between 1.7 and 1.9 or 2.0 had much more invested in (-)day care for children, (-)flexible time-budgets for women in labour force, (-) better compatibility of occupational engagement with motherhood, and (-) the preventing young families from being pushed into the social Hinterland (background).

Provided other things remain unchanged, the coming decades will bring another downward reduction of generational replacement. Birth decline means fewer mothers in the next generation – a process which, in sequence, is conducive to "population implosion". The apparent reduction of the youth cohorts between 2000 and 2050 (Table 2.1) may be partially compensated by more people in old age as far as the demographic balance sheet is concerned but not with regard to a biosocial and economic reproduction. Population projections exist for all EU-member states through

2050 and, of course, depend on basic assumptions and premises. Because of the annually added net migration the EU's demographic future seems somewhat less. But the largest populations like the German and the Italian, despite immigration show, a considerable loss of people while a shift toward the old-age groups. To clearly comprehend this effect, it is much more revealing to look at the development of the youth cohorts (Table 2.1): While the whole population of the EU is decreasing by 9.2 million through 2050, the age groups of 0 to 20 years of age will drop by 16 million, that is 18.1 percent. The larger countries in 50 years are, are losing youth to an incredible extent: Germany (-23.1 percent), Spain (-25,6 percent), Italy (-26.4 percent), and U.K. (-18.5 percent).

2.3 "Replacement migration" – A study to destroy illusions

In the spring of 2000, the UN-Population Division published a study: "Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing population?"⁹

This by now famous study deals with populations of important regions, like the EU and some EU-member states like France, Germany, Italy, and U.K. They have in common a reproductive regime below replacement level and the built-in tendency toward a demographic implosion and aging (see Table 2.3). The study raised the question whether "replacement migration" could bring population decline and aging bring to a halt. The impression the study makes is a purely quantitative and even mechanical one but it offers insights enough to discuss more thoroughly this purported option for modern countries. The questions raised in the study focussed on the net number of migrants required for reaching a series of objectives until 2050:

- how to keep constant the size of total population?
- how to keep constant the active population between 15 and 64, and
- how to keep constant the old-age dependency ratio expressed in the relation of those 15-64 years to those 65 years and older.

A *Scenario III* computes the migration required to maintain the size of the total population around 1995 in the absence of migration. In order to keep the EU's total popu-

lation of 372 million constant, it would be necessary to bring in 949,000 migrants annually. By 2050 474 million migrants would have entered the EU under this scenario.

A *Scenario IV* assumes the migration required to maintain the size of the working-age population (15-64 years) at the level it reached about 1995 again in absence of migration again. For the EU, this would mean to maintain a size of 249 million of people in their active age would require an influx of 1,588 million per year and a total number of 79.3 million migrants over the projection period.

A *Scenario V* deals with the migration required to maintain the ratio of the active population (15-64 years) to the old-age population (65 years and older) at the current level and set aside immigration. This scenario is strictly academic, because the number of migrants necessary in this case is tremendous and lies beyond any realistic or practical political implementation. In the EU "the potential support ratio" lies at 4.3 persons in working-age for each person aged 65 or older. In order to keeping this ratio constant for half a century, the EU would need an average of 12.7 million per year and a total of 701 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050. This would mean an immigration population twice that population of the EU, only to prevent the population from further aging. In this Scenario V "the tail wags its dog" but the absurdity it demonstrates has an instructive value.

Summing up the following can be said: The assumptions are by no means realistic, such as (-) a zero migration throughout the time period of half a century covered by the projection and (-) a replacement only by unqualified quantities of people whereas modern aging societies need an immigration appropriate to its social and technological standards. But this study opened a discussion on the future of the EU and its greatest potential populations under demographic aspects which previously were simply swept under the carpet.

There are also important conclusions to be drawn from the study which the EU has to take into account for its own directives on immigration and demographic renewal:

- (1) Replacement migration for the three mentioned goals requires large numbers of migrants which only developing countries could deliver over the next decades. Scenario III (the maintenance of the total size) has no strategic and viable value

⁹ Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN-Secretariat, 21 March 2000

and scenario V (the stabilization of the old-age dependency ratio) is out of reach, then the idea (behind scenario IV) of preserving a population's economic performance, achievement and efficiency remains to be realized seriously.

- (2) The population of the EU has to take its aging as a destiny, i.e. a constant issue of political concern. At about 2025, the EU will count 113,5 million residents aged 60 or older, i.e. one third of the total population and a doubling of what it is today. Modern societies should consider it as an evolutionary outcome and not as an affliction because there is no enduring remedy for that.
- (3) Replacement migration on pure quantitative grounds is not an option for post-industrial, knowledge-based societies. They need a constant flow of highly qualified younger age-groups entering the labour force, that is a sufficient renewal of the human capital. A question which leads back to the UN-study remains and reads as follows: Is there a point from which onward qualitative compensatory measures will come to an end and a creeping lack of manpower brings industrial branches to a halt? It would be a point of crisis where all measures within reach, i.e. qualification of the labour force, immigration and raising the fertility level must be combined for securing the survival of an occidental culture.

3. The EU in Search for an Immigration Policy

3.1 The career of the migration issue in the political evolution of the EU

Since the 1980's, the EU is in search for a common ground for decisions and regulations concerning the trespassing of borders and forms of admission to a member state's territory. The *Schengen Convention (1985)* abolished internal border controls between the signatory states. This new freedom of movement entailed a reinforcement of external controls to prevent illegal migration and internationally organized crime. For that purpose, a joint computer database (the Schengen Information System/SIS) has been installed to keep out unauthorized persons. It was the beginning of an Union-specific administration, more policing behind the ancient borders and a

harmonization of visa policies, which accompanied the creation of a single market within the EU.

During the 1990's, the migration issue figures ever more in conferences, treaties and recommendations and has been established as a field of common concern, as in the *Treaty of Maastricht on the EU (1991)*, the *Recommendation 1148 on Europe and Migration Policies (1992)*, the *Draft Charter on the Rights and Duties of Immigrants in the European Community (1993)*. Only the *Treaty of Amsterdam (1996)* contained a Europeanization of an immigration policy covering themes like border control, freedom of movement - also for "third state nationals" - and the procedure toward "de-facto-refugees" who are threatened by non-governmental groups and are not under the protection of the Geneva Convention.¹⁰

In the *Tampere Conclusions (1999)* the call for a common EU asylum and an immigration policy was raised for the first time. There has been confirmed "*the need for approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals, based on a shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union, as well as the situation in the countries of origin*".¹¹

3.2 Toward an overall framework

If the EU speaks of a framework whose conceptualisation needs a coming to terms with 15 member states (and soon even more), so to expect a well-integrated and plain framework for handling such an intricate issue would be a false hope. An EU immigration policy has to incorporate three greater of migration types: (a) a humanitarian type, (b) family reunion, and (c) economic migration. The three migration types have their own competences, responsibilities, and follow own laws:

- (a) immigration on humanitarian grounds roots in religious and philosophical considerations for whom Europe has a long tradition. All member states signed the *Convention of Geneva (1951)* and the *European convention for the Protection of*

¹⁰ See chap. 1.2 of this paper.

¹¹ Presidency conclusions to the European Council in Tampere (15-16 October 1999) paragraph 20; quoted in: Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission of

Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms (1950). As a result all member states harbour a certain number of *refugees* and, by virtue of a particular asylum legislation, *asylum-seekers*. Their admission reached its peak after the dismantling of the 'Iron Curtain' and, by the way, an unbearable number. Only the principle of the "safe third country" which denies admission to those who had passed on their way a prosecution-free country could reduce the number of applicants. It is common wisdom that generosity in this matter will attract ever more people from other regions. In the most cases it has been revealed that they are looking for better life conditions ("economically minded refugees") and only a tiny minority (5-10 per cent) is prosecuted in a classical sense. So are many occupying places of those who are really in need. A common asylum system regulating procedures and forms of protection would "help to provide basic solutions to the problems faced by the fragmented national policies today (asylum shopping)".¹² To prevent a fraudulent use of asylum like applications at different places, a *Dublin Convention (1997)* forestalls this abuse. But this has raised the number of asylum seekers in Switzerland, a non-signatory state.

- (b) Family reunion is considered a human right which has to be granted according to respective laws. It refers to family members who are allowed to join migrants legally resident in the host country. A proposal for a Directive to co-ordinate national legislation in this matter is under discussion in the Council.¹³

The cases of family reunion have substantially increased. In Germany for instance, the number of roughly 100.000 per year is about to become equal to the annual number of asylum-seekers. The attempt, however, to generalize family reunion in a regulatory frame valid for all member states has provoked controversies over some details of the subject which will prove out to be the essential ones: (1) What should be meant by "family"? – The European family consists of parents and 1.4 children on the average. Grandparents usually form households

the Council and the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy. Brussels, 22.11.2000 (COM (2000)757 final), p. 5.

¹² Commission of the European Communities, Asylum and immigration debate, Press release, Brussels, 22 November 2000; see also Message of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the Union", Brussels 22/11/2000 (COM/2000/0755 final).

¹³ Commission of the European Communities. Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family reunification. Brussels 1.12.1999 (COM/1999/638 final).

by their own. In other parts of the world family encompasses tenfold the European number of persons. Therefore, it must be limits to family reunification or the residents stemming from oriental cultures multiply. (2) What kind of family reunion means a setback to the integration efforts? – Children older than school age will have difficulties to learn the language of the receiving country and will hardly abandon the subculture of country-fellows. The same is true of the brides fetched from the country of origin. As mothers they cannot speak to their children in the host country's language and will impede their acculturation. (3) In the debates among the member states, there emerged the idea of extending the persons envisaged for family union also to family members or relatives, living in a subsidiary situation. This would heavily charge the member states with the greatest proportion of third-state nationals, i.e. Germany whose foreign population consists by half of persons coming from third states such as Turkey. Portugal, on the contrary, has less than one percent of its foreign population belonging to the third states group.

So the distribution of the different groups of foreigners is relevant for the effects of general regulations and the willingness of member states to subordinate themselves to such regulations.

- (c) While asylum and family reunion can be kept in a strict legal framework, the economic migration needs flexibility and adaptability to markets: markets for goods and services as well as labour markets. Regulations refer to the access to the labour market of the different types of migrants, such as asylum-seekers and third-state nationals. Problems and complaints concerning "discrimination" have to be cleared up.

As to the economic situation of the EU, labour market will surely change after having introduced a single currency in a single market. One hopes for better conditions to economic growth and job creation. The unemployment rate stood at 8.4 per cent in 2000 and counted about 14 million jobless. At the same time, numbers of jobs in the most advanced sectors, especially in information technology, remain unfilled. Generally spoken, the labour market is marked by a "mismatch" generating a long-term structural unemployment. According to Joint

Employment Reports¹⁴ the member states make efforts to raise the employment rate. In 1999 it reached 62.2 per cent. The employment rates of residents through migration depends on the professional formation and the extent of integration. In Germany, the unemployment rate of migrants is twice the size of that of the indigenous nationals. One third of families of migrants is under subsidiary protection. There are two opposing explanations for that: the one party, mostly in international organisations like the ILO, assumes "ethnic discrimination in the labour market" in some member states; the other one witnesses more school drop-outs among juvenile foreigners, language difficulties (not only among newcomers) and the typical failures in acculturation and assimilation into the school system of the receiving country, and other integrative deficits amazingly widespread even in the second generation.¹⁵

Postindustrial societies show a rising sophistication of the occupational structure and, therefore, polarise the labour market between skilled and unskilled workers, - a tendency toward a strong upgrading and downgrading of working positions. Foreign labour is the usual supplier of working force in agriculture, construction, manufacture, domestic services and seasonal work in tourism. Only recently, modern societies ask for highly skilled workers. If this growing demand cannot be met by nationals they are invited to come from outward. But the labour market under immigration conditions becomes a field of ethnic conflict and rivalry in which legal foreign residents, endogenous workers, illegal migrants and employers' interest for cheap labour intermingle.¹⁶

It is a strange experience of people in the Western sphere that so many efforts to undertake a restrictive immigration has brought about no convincing results. When in the early 1970s, in course of the "oil crisis" the West-European countries made their "recruitment stop" to control labour migration, the influx changed the channels and turned to the humanitarian track or illegal immigration. The latter is increasingly delivered by human trafficking: a branch of international

¹⁴ Cf. The Joint Employment Report 2000; COM/2000/551 (final)

¹⁵ George Borjas, *Economic Theory and internal migration*. In: *International Migration Review* (1989), Nr. 3; Willem Molle, *The Economics of European Integration*. Aldershot 1994; Verónica Tomei, *Europäische Migrationspolitik zwischen Kooperationszwang und Souveränitätsansprüchen*. Bonn 1997 (in German).

¹⁶ Susanne Schmid, *Theorie ethnischer Konflikte (On theories of ethnic conflicts)*, Bamberg (European Forum for Migration Studies/efms) 1999 (in German).

crime, whereas the black labour market itself is dominated by nationals in every EU member state.

4. The EU between interior necessities and outer pressures

Aside from internal necessity of keeping an economy and social security system functioning, the EU has to watch over the world around. It sustains with it a constant interaction. External relations serve

- to maintain the highest standards of living and welfare – as the population of welfare states show an ever growing proportion of elderly people, i.e. a state of steep aging; so the EU needs successful trade and commercial exchange with the world market in order to afford standards and progress in future;
- to secure the high quality of a human capital which proves out to be the main resource of productivity and innovation particularly when the age structure reveals dwindling youth cohorts caused by below replacement fertility for nearly three decades; a shortage of labour will be cleared by global migration.
- to control the outer borders of the EU ("territory of the Schengen Convention") to prevent an excessive influx of migrants from less developed countries on the opposite demographic range with large, young age groups.

In view of these situations both of the inner fabric of Western populations and much of the remaining world on the move, the EU finds itself in an embarrassing dilemma: it has to renew its age structure but can not fill the gaps with young people from European non-member states ("third states") because they are in the same deficient demographic situation. But young people needed in growing numbers and coming from Asian or African countries raise many doubts about their adaptability to professional requirements of western labour markets. A constant flow of young people from foreign continents meeting the need for skilled labour is not the solution and would provoke reactions from countries which cannot afford losing their 'brains'. In sum, people who are economically needed are not available in a quantity desired, and, on the other hand, masses of people adopted every year only to "rectangulate" the age structure cannot be integrated into labour markets, notwithstanding into a communal or political life, without major backlash.

The strain toward an overall framework for an EU immigration policy is liable to a *paradox*: the protection of national borders and labour markets is normally in the core of a nation-state's responsibility and politics. But with the establishment of the common Market, there must be rendered some parts of national sovereignty in order to stabilize the situation in the member states. To hinder a dependence on "the weakest link in the chain" or a variation in immigration regulations which make some member states more attractive for immigrants than others, a "harmonization" has to take place: *"a harmonization of these issues will also push itself forward."*¹⁷ Or put otherwise: the nation-state has partially to abandon sovereignty for preserving its identity in view of third-country nationals desiring entry.

If the EU will succeed in controlling immigration for that purpose remains to be seen: humanitarians and rational choice economists will have disputes over (-) the intake ranging from one million per year to five million, and over the fundamental question (-) if the intake is necessary, wanted or only to concede.¹⁸ Supra-nationally minded federalists will quarrel with national sovereignists for legal competence and modes of integration. A test of nerves is concealed in a dense and generous welfare system when an endogenous population observes an ever growing number of newcomers having benefits from it. The western myths of equality and of pluralism are suddenly seen as signs of an authoritarian moralism or "a democracy from above" dealing unfairly with" those who struggled to construct the collective bargains represented by the welfare state".¹⁹ It is questionable whether such thoughts point out to a xenophobia or are the logical public sentiments of prime users of a high standard welfare system under stress and on the verge of curtailing expenses. An immigration into the EU differs, for that reason, from immigration into any other parts in the world. It needs a wide acceptance by the endogenous population which is hard to get in times of instability and change to an unknown future.

¹⁷ Grete Brochmann, Immigration Control, the Welfare State and Xenophobia. In: Migration (18) 1993, p. 9.

¹⁸ Jonas Widgren, Director of ICMPD, Vienna, Statement at the Conference of the Chairpersons of Committees responsible for immigration/asylum of the Parliaments of EU Member States and the European Parliament. Stockholm 22 February 2001.

¹⁹ Barbara S. Heisler, Martin Heisler, Transnational migration and the modern demographic state (...), op. cit. in: Grete Brochmann, p. 18. For a wider view; cf. David Coleman, Origins of multi-cultural societies and problems of their management under democracy in: IUSSP, Proceedings of the International Population Conference, Beijing, China, 11-17 October 1997, Vol 3, pp. 1456-96.

Much ingenuity shows the *Tampere Framework for a common EU Asylum and Migration Policy* when it plans a "partnership with countries of origin". The migrants should not be cut off their provenance, for one reason, and the sending countries are given advice how to reduce push factors and to initiate reforms. Migration has become a factor of development: the West hopes for further progress through moderate and controlled immigration. In the southern hemisphere accounting for 90 per cent of the mankind about the middle of the century the population must be kept within their borders. Development is in all parts of the world social and economic evolution of a community on the inherited territory. In the EU, the maintenance of social standards and life styles should be the measure for immigration.

Notes and Reference

see the bottom of the respective pages

Tables:

**Table 1: EU-15 and Member States:
 Total Populations and Projections 2000-2050**

	2000	2050	Difference abs.	Difference
EU 15	376,960.67	367,729.23	-9,231.44	-2.4%
Belgium	10,252.29	10,427.78	175.49	1.7%
Denmark	5,320.53	5,541.62	221.09	4.2%
Germany	83,123.50	77,089.18	-6,034.32	-7.3%
Greece	10,642.75	11,242.43	599.68	5.6%
Spain	39,544.50	36,736.41	-2,808.09	-7.1%
France	59,178.83	62,062.99	2,884.16	4.9%
Ireland	3,624.56	3,817.96	193.40	5.3%
Italy	57,454.87	49,286.91	-8,167.96	-14.2%
Luxemb.	434.52	562.639	128.12	29.5%
Netherld.	15,868.16	17,563.88	1,695.72	10.7%
Austria	8,144.04	8,240.70	96.65	1.2%
Portugal	9,992.96	10,681.08	688.13	6.9%
Finland	5,178.37	5,078.30	-100.07	-1.9%
Sweden	8,931.55	10,082.27	1,150.71	12.9%
U.K.	59,269.24	59,315.08	45.85	0.1%

Source: European Commission, Eurostat 2000

**Table 2: EU-15 and Member States: Age Groups and Projections 2000-2050
 (in absolute numbers)**

Table 2.1: Age 0 to 20

2.1 Age 0 to 20

	2000	2050	Difference abs.	Difference
EU 15	87,042.34	71,254.36	-15,787.98	-18.1%
Belgium	2,425.47	2,189.22	-236.25	-9.7%
Denmark	1,264.76	1,196.20	-68.55	-5.4%
Germany	17,918.85	13,773.69	-4,145.17	-23.1%
Greece	2,390.81	2,255.80	-135.01	-5.6%
Spain	8,663.39	6,448.33	-2,215.06	-25.6%
France	15,007.50	12,903.05	-2,104.45	-14.0%
Ireland	1,123.04	804.901	-318.14	-28.3%
Italy	11,511.04	8,475.10	-3,035.93	-26.4%
Luxemb.	107.847	122.416	14.57	13.5%
Netherld.	3,867.61	3,745.74	-121.86	-3.2%
Austria	1,878.73	1,570.25	-308.48	-16.4%
Portugal	2,361.38	2,193.06	-168.33	-7.1%
Finland	1,287.89	1,068.72	-219.17	-17.0%
Sweden	2,207.79	2,255.94	48.15	2.2%
U.K.	15,026.25	12,251.95	-2,774.30	-18.5%

Source: European Commission, Eurostat 2000

Table 2.2: Age 20 to 60

2.2 Age 20 to 60

	2000	2050	Difference abs.	Difference
EU 15	208,812.95	172,824.27	-35,988.68	-17.2%
Belgium	5,588.41	4,950.41	-638.00	-11.4%
Denmark	3,010.94	2,760.16	-250.78	-8.3%
Germany	46,439.45	36,736.16	-9,703.29	-20.9%
Greece	5,813.45	5,243.82	-569.63	-9.8%
Spain	22,383.63	16,596.50	-5,787.12	-25.9%
France	32,032.53	28,775.77	-3,256.75	-10.2%
Ireland	1,937.84	1,783.62	-154.21	-8.0%
Italy	32,295.69	22,484.85	-9,810.85	-30.4%
Luxemb.	243.208	279.057	35.85	14.7%
Netherld.	9,112.43	8,515.95	-596.48	-6.5%
Austria	4,625.69	3,987.76	-637.93	-13.8%
Portugal	5,575.51	5,127.24	-448.28	-8.0%
Finland	2,872.86	2,433.84	-439.02	-15.3%
Sweden	4,766.24	4,919.05	152.81	3.2%
U.K.	32,115.09	28,230.08	-3,885.01	-12.1%

Source: European Commission, Eurostat 2000

Table 2.3: Age 60+**2.3 Age 60+**

	2000	2050	Difference abs.	Difference
EU 15	81,105.38	123,650.60	42,545.22	52.5%
Belgium	2,238.41	3,288.15	1,049.74	46.9%
Denmark	1,044.84	1,585.26	540.42	51.7%
Germany	18,765.20	26,579.33	7,814.13	41.6%
Greece	2,438.49	3,742.81	1,304.32	53.5%
Spain	8,497.48	13,691.58	5,194.10	61.1%
France	12,138.81	20,384.17	8,245.36	67.9%
Ireland	563.684	1,229.44	665.75	118.1%
Italy	13,648.14	18,326.96	4,678.82	34.3%
Luxemb.	83.465	161.166	77.70	93.1%
Netherld.	2,888.12	5,302.19	2,414.07	83.6%
Austria	1,639.62	2,682.69	1,043.06	63.6%
Portugal	2,056.06	3,360.79	1,304.73	63.5%
Finland	1,017.63	1,575.75	558.12	54.8%
Sweden	1,957.53	2,907.28	949.75	48.5%
U.K.	12,127.90	18,833.06	6,705.16	55.3%

Source: European Commission, Eurostat 2000

Table 3: EU-15: Net Migration and Immigration of Foreigners 1985-1998

	Net Migration	Immigration of Foreigners
1985	163,916	796,604
1986	284,478	885,686
1987	188,120	881,492
1988	635,779	1.070,327
1989	1.016,724	1.290,442
1990	1.008,251	1.456,365
1991	1.078,441	1.509,993
1992	1.350,132	1.775,359
1993	1.062,116	1.542,666
1994	782,855	1.319,406
1995	805,363	1.336,617
1996	734,596	1.328,517
1997	512,208	1.195,069
1998	378,687	-

Source: European Commission, Eurostat 2000