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**MEN AND WOMEN AT THE TOP: GENDER AND
FAMILY/REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR**

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1 - Introduction

This study is part of a research on the transformation of women's condition and on its consequences on gender relations and on family and reproductive behaviour in developed countries (Pinnelli 1995, 1999, 2000).

We shall deal with the question of the compatibility of work and the family, which has generally been posed up until now with reference to women. Demographic and sociological research has often highlighted the difficulty experienced by women in working outside the home and at the same time having a family and children, and the difficulty experienced by working women with children in pursuing a career. Only rarely and recently has this type of study been extended to men, as it is no longer taken for granted that men pursuing a career are flanked by a woman devoted exclusively to the family. Indeed, things are changing: gender equity is supported by international organizations; worldwide women's years, with their accompanying documents and recommendations, have made governments and organizations aware of the problem; women's right to education, work and a career is no longer doubted in the developed world. And women's educational qualifications are effectively growing, and have overtaken those of men in many countries; women are now massively present in the labour market, and also occupy high-profile positions.

This transformation cannot be without consequences on family life and the fertility of men and women. Many aspects - the frequency of unions, the type of union preferred, and division of roles between partners, the frequency of separations and new marriages, whether or not to have children, the number of children and the timing of their arrival - are certainly influenced by women's progress in society and the reduction of gender differences.

2 - Characteristics of the study

The only way of telling whether any differences exist in demographic behaviour between the two genders and thus whether a career still has a different cost for men and women is by comparing men and women at equal stages in their careers.

Empirical assessment is based on secondary analysis of an international survey of great interest, in which the men and women interviewed are selected in virtue of having a career, thus excluding all the other positions still occupied by women in large numbers (housewives, medium- or low-profile workers) and concentrating directly on the comparison of women and men at top levels in the political and business worlds.

If we were to interview a random sample of the population, we would find not very many women at the top and a lot of men, as a consequence of the greater difficulties besetting women in the path to professional success, and we would therefore conclude that many women have had to or preferred to sacrifice their career to their family. In our case, however, the situation is the opposite: the women interviewed have won their careers, just like the men interviewed, to whom are of equal status in terms of both success and working commitment. What we wish to see is whether the necessary resources and costs are different for the two genders.

The survey was conducted in 1995 by an international research group in 27 industrialized countries and concerns women and men who have reached the top in the political and business worlds (Vianello et al. 2000).

The point of departure for the formation of the sample was the selection of the women. Once the most important companies in the business world had been identified, along with the most prestigious political sectors in each country, various levels of power were identified and women were selected for within these sectors: in particular, the group was selected from the topmost level down, via intermediate levels in those cases for which it was not possible to find women right at the top. The study sought to identify at least 15 women in each sector. In many cases what emerged was not a sample but the entire universe of women belonging to that sector.

Once the women had been identified, men were chosen from within the same organizations (or similar organizations) and occupying the same position. The study sought to select one man for every woman already selected. A limit was also placed on age: the men had to be the same age as the women, give or take 5 years at the most. The groups of men interviewed therefore constituted neither the universe nor a representative sample of male leaders, and we shall henceforth refer to them as samples only for practical purposes, and not in the statistical sense.

A questionnaire of over 100 questions was submitted to the selected group. The objective of the questionnaire was to analyse means of access to power, means of exercising it, networks and career patterns, relationship between career and family, current professional situations and attitudes concerning the relationship between women and power.

The part of the questionnaire analysed by us for this study is that regarding family of origin, current family situations and the relationship between career and the family.

3 – The questions

We raised a few questions: in order to have got to the top, have these women enjoyed conditions on average more favourable than those of their male colleagues in terms of resources of their families of origin? If this is the case, then equality at work is not the result of equal opportunities between the sexes, and women have needed greater resources than men in order to overcome their discrimination.

Given that they are equal to men in the workplace, have the women interviewed set up egalitarian partnerships and families, in which the responsibility of housework and childcare is shared; have they managed to shake off one half of the traditionally female roles?

Has it been possible for these women to form a union and have a family life equal to that of the men, or have they been obliged to sacrifice their partnership and family life to their careers? Or have they even had to - or preferred to - sacrifice a couple relationship, ending up on their own? Do women and men therefore have different preferences or constraints in the frequency and length of the partnering histories, in the choice between cohabitation and marriage, and in the decision to have one or more children?

It is the aim of this study to find out the answers to these questions.

4 – Theories and hypotheses

The main theory taken as a point of reference to study gender differences in partnership and family behaviour between women and men leader is that of the 'new home economics', ie that of economic rationality and opportunity costs (Becker 1981): if the woman possesses resources, she becomes, due to her own economic security, less dependent on the traditional models of behavior regarding life as a couple and the formation of a family, and the opportunity costs associated with domestic tasks and the bringing up of children therefore go up. As some studies have shown, women with their own resources are less interested in marriage (Smock et al. 1997), they limit their family obligations either by remaining childless or by limiting the number of children they produce (Vianello et al. 2000; Knudsen 1995), and they divorce more frequently (Lesthaeghe et al. 1994).

The theory of gender differences is derived from this theory: more equal couples will demonstrate less traditional traits of partnership and family behaviour, as shown by Ekert-Jaffé et al. (1995): according to the study conducted by those authors the reduction of gender differences between partners (as measured by the wage gap controlling for other variables) favours the choice of cohabitation as opposed to the choice of marriage. Unlike women, men are not hindered in their careers by having a stable union and children, because the possession of greater resources makes it possible to afford a family life which is compatible with their own requirements: for example, men with resources can afford a wife who doesn't work, while social and cultural norms make it less easy for women with resources to have an analogous option. Indeed, according to Butz and Ward

(1979), the higher the income of the man in couples in which the women does not work, the higher the fertility. On the other hand, when the woman's income increases, in couples in which the woman is employed outside the home, fertility drops. The resources available therefore play a different role depending on the gender to which they pertain: Lesthaeghe et al. (1994) find that young women endowed with greater human capital are more likely than others to cohabit, divorce and limit their fertility, while none of these characteristics make any difference in the case of men. Higher-earning men are more likely to transform cohabitation into marriage and less likely to separate, while the same conditions do not have any influence on the outcome of cohabitation in the case of women (Smock et al. 1997). This may mean both that the decision to marry is based on the resources of the man, because those of the woman are regarded as 'optional', and that women with resources are less interested in transforming cohabitation into marriage (Pinnelli 1999).

A second theoretical line may be defined as structural. Within it can be identified two main arguments. The first regards the marriage market (Mc Donald 1995; Heer et al. 1981): indeed, traditional models of behaviour in the matching of couples predict that the men will be older, better educated and in a higher position from a professional point of view than their partners. Traditional model in the matching of couples is rendered increasingly difficult by the increase in women's level of education (in many countries women are now better educated on average than men) and by their increased entry into the world of work and into higher positions. For women who are more educated and occupy higher levels in the labour market, it may be difficult to find a suitable partner on the 'marriage market' if the expectation is to find one in an equal or superior condition, and this may explain their lower rate of nuptiality. If the matchmaking rules do not change, it might become particularly difficult for women at the top to find men with these characteristics, obliged as they are to choose from a much more restricted pool than that from which men may choose (women choose from the higher part of the social pyramid, which is narrower, while men choose from the lower part, which is broader). Moreover, while the woman's earning capacity may make her a more attractive partner, this is in conflict with her reproductive capacity and sometimes preferred to it, and it therefore tends to limit fertility. Finally, the woman's greater capacity to negotiate with her partner regarding the division of roles and the care of any children could make it more difficult for her to find a partner prepared for greater domestic and parental commitment.

The second and equally important argument in the structural theory is related to the change over time in the structure of the female population by education and occupation, and concerns the fact that the increase in women's level of education and their integration at a high level in the world of work leads to a delay in the formation of the family and in the birth of children which is, so to speak, mechanical (Di Giulio et al. 1999). For women this delay may mean renunciation for various reasons, including biological ones: the biological age-limit for reproduction is much more restrictive for women than for men, given that a woman's fertility starts to decrease after the age of thirty and much more rapidly from thirty-five onwards, ages which are becoming increasingly common for the birth of the first child (Menken et al. 1986; WHO 1991). It may not be possible to make up for an initial delay later on. In addition to this biological cause, fertility could also diminish as an effect of other interests increasingly competing with the desire to have a family as career involvement grows over time: indeed, the results of Di Giulio et al. (1999) show that the more attached women are to their careers, the more they tend to delay their fertility.

A third theoretical line which has emerged is that of the ideational shifts, that is the long-term trend toward greater individual autonomy in ethical, religious and political domains (Lesthaeghe 1998). The development of movements of emancipation in the area of gender relations are an important part of these ideational changes. Lesthaeghe and Moors (1994) have shown, in the case of four European countries, that there is an idea-related component in the decision to cohabit, divorce and limit one's own fertility, and that the resources available play a different role in the case of each gender. Young women endowed with more human capital are more likely to cohabit, divorce and limit their own fertility, while this does not make any difference for men. We may expect working

women to be selected from an idea-related point of view, and therefore less likely to take on traditional female roles (wife, mother, 'carer').

A fourth theoretical line for the interpretation of gender differences in family and reproductive behaviour considers the importance of the institutions: the laws regulating the rights of the two genders both in society and in the family and the institutional support given to the family for functions of care (Pinnelli 1995; Mc Lanahan et al. 1995). Research has shown that constraints vary in force in countries with different institutional frameworks, and in particular that the postponement and greater instability of unions or renunciation of unions and fertility caused by the extension of women's education are more attenuated or even non-existent in countries with more favourable contexts (Blossfeld 1995; Pinnelli 1999). The comparison of geographical areas with different institutional set-ups satisfies the need to examine the influence of different geographical-institutional contexts on the family behaviour of women and men (Pinnelli 1999).

In conclusion, we may expect that partnering and the formation of a family are more problematic for women at the top than for men at the top, and that this translates into less women in unions, opting more frequently for non-traditional types of unions (cohabitation), greater instability of unions, more families without children and less children on average for women than for men. Women at the top might obviously be at an advantage with respect to women working in inferior conditions, as they have more economic resources for buying housework and childcare services on the market. However, it is not the object of this study to make comparisons between women.

In the first place we shall conduct a descriptive analysis of gender differences in the resources available in childhood, in family and reproductive behaviour and in the division of roles, then we shall make use of logistic models in order to demonstrate the hypotheses advanced on family and reproductive behaviour, controlling the effect of confounding variables.

5 - The family of origin

Gender differences begin in the respondents' family of origin (Tab. 1): women are slightly more likely to be the first- or second-born (79.7% of cases as opposed to 75.5%), and they are slightly less likely to come from families with more than two children (39.6% of cases as opposed to 41.5%), though in this case the difference is not statistically significant. They have thus possibly enjoyed a slight advantage compared to the men. This advantage is reinforced by the family's material, social and cultural resources. Indeed, previous analyses concerning these subjects show that women have benefited from a privileged situation more often than men, both economically and from the point of view of their parents' prestige and power (Vianello et al. 2000). Moreover, the mothers of female interviewees have worked outside the home slightly more often and in more prestigious employment, thus encouraging the socialization of their daughters towards work and a career. Finally, the women are more likely to come from more "egalitarian" families, if so we may define those families in which the parents have more or less the same academic qualifications and are both in paid work, and this disposes their daughters in turn to form more egalitarian families, compared to current models of couple matching. Women at the top thus originate from more favourable family contexts than men at the top, both from an economic and social point of view and from that of their cultural outlook. In such a framework it is comprehensible that parents should have had no qualms about investing in their female children.

6 - Forming and dissolving unions

It was possible to reconstruct the partnering history of all respondents by asking the following questions:

"Have you ever been:

-married;

-separated;

-divorced;
-widowed;
-a cohabitant?"

"Are you currently in a stable relationship (marriage, cohabitation) or not?"

These questions gave rise to 6 dichotomic variables (the two modalities of which therefore indicate: having experienced the event under consideration - or not) which we used to calculate the frequencies subsequently commented upon (Tab. 2).

As was hypothesized, even though the women interviewed had enjoyed a situation of privilege compared to the men as regards the resources of their family of origin, they do not appear to have a more advantageous situation as regards relations in a couple and the setting up of a family of their own: on the contrary, their situation is more difficult. Indeed, the partnering histories of those interviewed and their partner's characteristics reveal important gender differences to women's disadvantage. Only 7.6% of the men interviewed have never married, compared to 17.7% of the women. And despite the fact that the percentage of women who have married at least once in their lifetime is less than that of men, the percentage of divorced women is, on the other hand, much higher (23.8% vs. 16%). The same thing happens (though the difference is smaller) with separated women (10.3% vs. 7% of men), and for widows (4.6% compared to 2.5% of men: this as a result of the fact that men are usually older than women in couples and that they have a shorter life expectancy). Moreover, women are more likely to opt for more non-committal types of unions than men: 30.3% of women have had at least one cohabitation in the course of their lifetimes, compared to 23.9% of men. That women experience more difficulty in the couple relationship is made even clearer by the fact that, at the time of the interview, only 75.4% were in a stable relationship, compared to 93.9% of men.

We synthesized this information on the respondents' unions in a new variable with three modalities, providing information both on their current situation and on their partnering history. The first modality concerns all those not currently in a union: of these, those who have never been in a stable union constitute only 4% of the total number of respondents, while those not currently in a union but previously married or cohabiting make up 11% of the total. Of those currently in a union (ie most), we must distinguish between two cases: 66.1% of the total of respondents have only married once, are currently living with their spouse and have never had stable unions with other partners, whether or not they experienced a period of cohabitation with their partner prior to marriage (we shall sometimes, for the sake of brevity, refer to them as the "first marriage" group). The others, 18.6%, are currently in a union (and are therefore either married or cohabiting) but have had various experiences: they may be cohabiting for the first time and not have been in any other unions, but they may also have remarried or embarked upon a new cohabitation when the previous union has been interrupted by a divorce or a separation.

If we look at the gender differences as regards this new variable, we obtain confirmation of women's greater difficulty in having stable relationships; 24.3% of women are not currently in a stable union or have never been in one, compared to 5.8% of men, and 20% are currently in a union preceded by other relationships in the past, compared to 17.1% of men, while 55.7% have married only once, currently live with their spouse and have had no other "stable" partners in their lives, compared to 77.1% of men.

The gender differences become more marked when we look at the way in which couples are matched. If we look at the educational qualifications of those interviewed and their current partners (Tab. 3), 8% of men and 3.4% of women have a partner whose studies culminated in a middle-school diploma, 30% of men and 16.2% of women have a partner with a high-school diploma, while 21% of men and 31.4% of women have a partner with a degree, and 7.3% of men and 18.1% of women have a partner with a PhD. Women are therefore more likely to have partners with high educational qualifications, conforming to the traditional model of couple matching. This is also confirmed if we look at the qualification gap between the respondent and their partner: nearly half of women (48%) have the same qualifications as their partner, 26.1% have lower qualifications,

20% have slightly higher qualifications than their partner and 6% have higher still. Men, on the other hand, are more likely to have less educated partners: 34.9% have the same qualifications as their partner, 38.4% have the next highest level of qualifications, 13.6% have even higher qualifications and only 13.2% (about half the corresponding percentage for women) are less qualified than their partner.

As far as employment is concerned (Tab. 4), there are, predictably, more men than women with partners performing unpaid work in the home, that is to say performing the role of "housewife" (34.3% of men vs. only 2% of women). Most of the women's partners (61.5% of the total) are employees (compared to 46.6% of the men's partners), 7% are unemployed (vs. 3.9% of the men's partners), 13.1% own and work in their own businesses and 16.4% are self-employed (vs. 4.7% and 10.5% respectively, of the men's partners). Occupational prestige is also higher for women's partners than for men's partners. There are also differences in working hours and the performance of supervisory functions by the partner: 35.5% of men's working partners have a part-time job, and 49.2% perform work involving supervisory functions, while only 10.7% of women's working partners have a part-time job and as many as 76.3% perform supervisory functions. This information therefore also demonstrates the preference for the traditional couple-matching model, and helps to explain the smaller percentage of women in couples compared to men, also in terms of the difficulty of finding a partner with the desired characteristics on the marriage market.

The partners of women at the top have a great deal of respect for their companions' work (84.8% of those women interviewed state that their partner has a positive or very positive attitude towards their work), to an even greater extent than that to which the work of the men interviewed is respected by their partners (72.1% of those men interviewed state that their partner has a positive or very positive attitude towards their work).

7 - Children

As suggested by the literature on the subject, and as we hypothesized, women at the top have a lower fertility than their colleagues (Tab. 5). 27.8% of the women interviewed are childless, and 17.2% have only one child, compared to 8.2% and 12.4% respectively among their male colleagues. Moreover, the women are more likely to have less numerous families than the men: 32.1% have two children, 13.8% have three children and 9.2% have four or more children, compared to 43.2%, 22.8% and 13.4% respectively among the men.

Of the respondents with children, the women's children are older and are more likely to have left the parental home (35.6% compared to 10.6% in the case of the children of male respondents). This is despite the fact that the female respondents are younger than their colleagues, and is a result of the differing gender distribution of life course events: men have children at a later age, they stop having them later and they have more of them, so on average they have younger children than their female colleagues. So even where the educational and professional career is similar, the family history is different, as the woman is subject to greater biological limitations than the man.

8 - Childcare and housework

The hypothesis that the conflict between work and maternity also exists for women leaders is confirmed by the data on childcare and housework (Tab. 5). Children are more of a burden to their mothers than to their fathers, and they interfere with their mother's work considerably more than with their father's: when they were young and at home after school they interfered with the work of the women interviewed "often" in 23% of cases, "sometimes" in 47.5% of cases and "never or hardly ever" in 29.4% of cases. Interference perceived by men was less frequent: 19% of men stated that they often interfered, 44.5% sometimes, and 36.4% never or hardly ever.

Childcare also weighs more heavily on the mother than on the father in the case of political and business leaders: most of the men interviewed (56.6%) state that their partners looked after

children of pre-school age, while only 3.8% of the women can say the same for their companions. But 19.6% of the women state that they looked after the children personally (compared to 4.7% of men), 10.6% entrusted them to the care of other family members (compared to 4.8% of men), 39.2% left them in public or private crèches (compared to 18.8% of men) and 8% entrusted them to a babysitter (compared to 2.1% of men). Finally, 18.8% of women compared to 12.9% of men opted for a mixture of those solutions, or for different ones. Despite equality in the workplace, then, gender differences in childcare remain strong.

This is confirmed by the division of housework between the two partners. This was measured by asking the question:

"How much of the housework do you do in your home?"

The possible answers were:

1 - none;

2 - less than half (of what there is to do);

3 - about half;

4 - more than half;

5 - all or nearly all.

The answers to this question confirm women's greater involvement in domestic life compared to men (Tab. 5). Most of the men - 88.4% of the total, do less than half of all the housework that there is to do, or none at all, while 7.9% do about half, and only 3.7% do more than half or nearly all. On the other hand, 48.9% of women do less than half of what there is to do, 19.9% about half, and 31.2% more than half, or all/nearly all.

The gender asymmetry is therefore very strong in the area of housework and childcare, even for women at the top, despite the fact that their greater resources probably enable them to purchase external help. They too are subject to what has been found of working women in general: work does not exonerate women from family tasks, and they are mainly responsible for childcare and housework (Nieva 1985; Fogarty et al. 1971; Bloom Stanfield 1996). The burden of unpaid work continues to have a crucial effect on the identity of working women, despite their integration into the workforce at higher levels (Connell 1987).

9 - Gender as determinant of union formation and dissolution and childbearing

The findings hitherto presented seem to confirm the hypotheses suggested in theoretical works. If we examine political and business leaders, we see that women are more often alone and have more discontinuous partnering histories, they are more likely to be childless and they have fewer children than men. We shall return later to the interpretations: at this point it is our aim to test the strength of this finding with a multivariate statistical analysis which enables us to take account of other variables which might influence the behaviour described.

It is true that both union-formation and fertility have undergone profound transformation in the period in which the professional and family careers of those interviewed have developed.

Marital unions are increasingly substituted by informal unions, and both the former and, to an even greater extent, the latter are more likely to end, with the formation of new unions and families. This transformation is rendering the life histories of the population much more varied and less linear than before. The developed countries are not homogeneous: the diversification of family forms and their instability are phenomena principally concerning West and North Europe and North America; the countries of South Europe have only been slightly affected by this transformation. The countries of Central-Eastern Europe still have traditional, albeit somewhat unstable, family forms (Pinnelli 2000).

Fertility, on the other hand, has undergone a complex evolution; in the first half of the 60s, a baby boom affected most developed countries, bringing fertility up from 2 to almost 3 children per woman. The boom was followed by a strong, constant decline in the following decade, the baby bust, which brought developed countries into remarkable convergence regarding the average

number of children: below generation-substitution level, ie less than two children per woman. Fertility then stabilized in some countries, picked up again in others and fell yet more in others. The lowest levels are now to be found in the South, and in the former Communist countries of Europe; the highest, in North-West Europe and North America: a reversal of the geography of the 50s and 60s.

The family histories of those interviewed took place in all three of these phases. We must therefore take account of the generation to which they belong and country of residence, in order to control two variables which have had a strong influence on family and reproductive behaviour.

We shall also take account of those resources of the family of origin which have already favoured the woman's career: this could be a factor capable of attenuating the problems preventing them from having a family life comparable to that of men, in addition to the discrimination which women generally suffer in access to a career. We shall also take account of the type of leadership, working on the hypothesis that the business world offers careers less compatible with women's family life than that of politics.

We already know that women leaders have more complicated partnering histories than their colleagues, and that they are less likely to share their lives with a partner. Our analysis of fertility will have to take account of this notable difference in life patterns between the two sexes, if we are to distinguish consequences of family behaviour what are simply the results of preferences and constraints as regards having children.

We have therefore chosen the following variables (explanatory or control) for the family and reproductive behaviour of those interviewed:

1) gender (female as category of reference);

2) cohort of birth: three classes are considered:

a) respondents born in/after 1950, who were aged up to 45 in 1995 (year of reference of interview), who have yet to conclude their reproductive histories and have not, in many cases, stabilized their own family life;

b) those born between 1940 and 1949, who were aged between 46 and 55 at the time of the interview and entered into the reproductive and family phase between the second half of the 60s and the second half of the 70s, the period of the baby-bust, demographically speaking, who have ended their reproductive lives (as far as the women are concerned);

c) those born before 1940 and aged over 56 at the time of the interview, who have more children than the others because they were in full reproductive phase at the time of the baby-boom (first half of the 60s in most of the countries in which the survey took place) and took advantage of the favourable economic conjuncture at the time of the late 50s and early 60s in order to start a stable union: these are the categories of reference in order to compare the cohorts to the group which probably have more traditional partnership behaviour and higher fertility;

3) the kind of leadership, that is political leader/business leader (the latter as reference category);

4) the country of residence, representing the institutional, economic and social/cultural context in which respondents live and synthesizing the collective resources available to them. The countries have been classified in three groups:

1) North-West Europe and North America, where the new models of family behaviour are more widespread, women's status is higher and women's political participation has increased more than in the other countries at national or local level;

2) South Europe, where women's status and development are more backward, fertility has fallen to the point of becoming the lowest in the world and the family has remained traditional (stable marriage or no union);

3) Central-Eastern Europe, where nuptiality and fertility used to be and are still relatively precocious, the level of development is inferior and women's status is contradictory: high rates of participation on the part of women in the workforce and greater

gender equality in education compared to in other countries, but a lower overall level of education and, since the fall of Communism, a distinct loss of political power by women.

Within the first area it is possible to distinguish the Scandinavian countries from those of West/Central Europe and from North America, in order to highlight the cultural, institutional and historical differences existing between the countries (the Scandinavian countries can boast of an institutional framework more favourable to the reconciling of women's work with maternity). Ireland has been included among the countries of South Europe, given the persistence of a strictly traditional family model and, at the same time, a strong decline in fertility which has been emerging over the last years (a decline which, given the previous high rate of fertility, has however failed to reach the low levels of South Europe).

This classification derives from 1) trends analysis of various indicators of partnership and fertility behaviour; 2) static and dynamic factorial analyses connecting demographic indicators to indicators of women's position, post-industrial development and institutional arrangements for reconciling work and family (Pinnelli 1999 and 2000).

To sum up, we have utilized the following classification:

- *South Europe and Ireland*: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain;
- *former communist countries*: Poland, Czech Republic, Russia, Slovenia and Hungary;
- *West and Central Europe*: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland;
- *non-European countries*: Australia, Canada, Japan, Israel, New Zealand and the USA;
- *Scandinavian countries*: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The Scandinavian countries were taken as category of reference so that we compare the other groups of countries to the countries which have the most modern situation;

5) the degree of responsibility entailed by the father's job, for synthesizing family background and resources of the respondent's family of origin (that of the father and not the mother, because it is that of the father which determines the status of the family). The modalities considered were:

- a) father not employed;
- b) father with job which does not involve supervisory functions;
- c) father team-leader or low-level manager;
- d) father middle- or high-level manager.

The last category was taken as reference in order to compare the others to the best father's position.

6) the respondents' partnering history, added to the models for children. The modalities are:

- a) not in a union;
- b) in a union with previous partnerships in the past;
- c) in a union which began with a marriage which has never been interrupted, this latter being the category of reference in order to compare the others to the more stable and traditional situation.

We shall use as dependent variables (Tab. 6):

- 1) having been in a stable union with a partner at some point;
- 2) having had at least one child;
- 3) being in a new union after a separation;
- 4) not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union (ie marriage) up to now;
- 5) having had 0 or 1 child or having had 2 children, as opposed to having had 3 or more children.

In order to evaluate the dependence of every dependent variable on the set of explanatory variables, we constructed logistic models with dichotomic dependent variables (dependent variables 1, 3 and 4) and polytomic dependent variables (dependent variables 2 and 5).

The results were presented in the form of odds ratios (henceforth referred to as ORs), representing the ratio between the probability that a given result will occur for a category and that of the category taken as reference.

10 - Determinants of partnering

The probability of *having been in at least one stable union* in the course of one's life varies with gender and generation (Tab. 7).

Men are much more likely to have been in at least one union than women (over four times as likely, OR=4.40), while generations born more recently are much less likely to form part of this category than those born prior to the 40s (OR=0.33 for those generations born in 1950 and after). This means not only that the forms of union have diversified over time (marriage and cohabitation), but also that there has been a large increase in the probability of not being in any stable union during the course of one's life. The other variables did not enter the model.

If we consider the probability of *having been in more than one union*, ie a more complex partnering history, instead of just one union (marriage) which is still ongoing, gender and generation are once again the only influential variables: it is rarer for men to have a complex partnering history than for women (OR=0.64), and the probability of having a complex partnering history is significantly higher for the more recent generations born in 1950 or after (OR=1.73). If we consider men and women separately, generation is no longer significant for men, while it is for women (OR=2.40). The increase in the instability of the leaders interviewed is therefore due to the behaviour of women and not to that of their male colleagues. Country of residence also becomes significant for men: leaders in countries outside of Europe are less likely to have complex partnering histories than those in Scandinavian countries (taken as reference category), while the leaders in all the other countries do not differ significantly from those in Scandinavian countries.

The probability of *not being in a union at the time of the interview* is much lower for men than for women (OR=0.15) and no other variable is significant. In the gender-specific models, only country of residence was significant, showing that men in West/Central European countries are less likely to be in a union, but women more so, compared to the Scandinavian countries.

Finally, if a union comes to an end, men are much more likely than women to *form a new union* (OR=5.12), as are the most recent generations (OR=2.21). While the gender-specific models show that no variable enters the model for men, generation and family resources are significant in the case of women (the probability of forming a new family is higher for the most recent generations, OR=3.37, and if family resources are scarce, then the probability of forming a new union is lower). The initial advantage which enabled women leaders to overcome discrimination in their career also helps them to overcome the trauma of separation.

In conclusion, it is confirmed that women leaders are less often willing or able to have a steady partnership than their male colleagues, that they are more likely to have complex partnering histories and that they are less often willing or able to enter into a new union after a separation, even when the other variables considered are held constant.

11 - Determinants of having children

The logistic model confirms the influence of gender and shows that several other variables significantly influence the probability of *having had at least one child*: generation, country of residence and type of union (Tab. 8).

The hypothesis of a more favourable situation for men is confirmed in this case too: indeed, they are much more likely than women to have at least one child (more than three times, OR=3.55).

The ORs regarding respondents' generation of birth clearly illustrate the strong fall in fertility over time. The younger respondents, belonging to the generation born in/after 1950, are much less likely to have at least one child compared to the oldest generation (OR=0.16), which is also due to

the fact that their reproductive history is still incomplete; the generation born between 1940 and 1949, on the other hand, which has already completed its fertility at least as far as the women are concerned, entered its period of reproduction during the baby-bust and is about half as likely (OR=0.44) to have at least one child than the oldest generation, born before 1940, which spent its period of reproductive life during the baby boom and therefore had a higher rate of fertility. The influence of the country of residence is also significant: compared to the leaders of Scandinavian countries, which we have taken as a reference category, those of the countries of West/Central Europe and South Europe are less likely to have at least one child (OR=0.50 and 0.55). The fertility of leaders only partially reflects the new geography of the phenomenon. Indeed, low fertility is reflected in South Europe, but not in the countries of the former Communist area, where it is the most recent and unexpected consequence of the dramatic changes caused by the collapse of the Communist political system. The latter is too recent to appraise its consequences on the reproductive behaviour of respondents, whose fertility manifested itself well before these changes.

The last significant variable in explaining fertility is partnering history: the probability of having had at least one child is much lower if the respondent is not currently in a union (OR=0.33) or if there has been a complex partnering history (OR=0.44), compared to those respondents who have been in one union only (marriage) which is still ongoing. This is further confirmation that gender differences in the fertility of leaders do not depend on the fact that women are more likely to have discontinuous partnering histories than men. But if we consider males and females separately, the interesting thing is that only in the case of males does the generation of birth remain significant, and the type of leadership becomes significant (political leaders are less likely to have at least one child). In the case of women, the same variables remain significant as in the model for the sample as a whole, but only female leaders in the countries of West/Central Europe are significantly less likely to have a child.

Two children per woman are needed in order to ensure generational replacement. Not having children, or having only one, does not ensure generational replacement, while having three means larger generations than the current ones in the future. From a demographic point of view, these figures are very important for the future of the population. Of course the elites per se can not have a great influence on the future of the population, because they are a very limited part of the whole population. But their behaviour is a model of reference for many and can have a great influence on the behaviour of other people. This is the reason why their fertility preferences and behaviours are so important.

All the variables which we have considered have an effect on the probability of *having 0-1 child as opposed to three children*: gender (men are much less likely than women to have 0-1 child as opposed to three children, OR=0.33), generation (the most recent generations are much more likely to have 0-1 child, OR=6.61 for generations born 1950 onwards), country of residence (more likelihood of having 0-1 child as opposed to three children in the former Communist countries), type of leadership (politicians are less likely to have 0-1 child than business leaders, confirming the hypothesis that a political career is less incompatible with family life than a business career), resources of family of origin (the fewer the resources, the fewer the children) and partnering history (those not currently in a union are more likely to have 0-1 child as opposed to three, both as an effect of separation and because couples with 0-1 child separate more easily). The gender-specific models demonstrate two significant changes, but only in the model for men: the type of leadership and the resources of the family of origin are no longer influential. By contrast, the likelihood of *having two children as opposed to three* does not vary with gender, but the effects of the other variables are close to those in the previous model. In particular, the more recent generations and leaders in former Communist countries are more likely to have two children as opposed to three, while leaders in South Europe, politicians and those who have been in more than one union are less likely to do so. The gender-specific models generate results for women which are similar to those of general model, but the effect of the type of leadership disappears in the case of men.

12 - Conclusions

Let us return to the questions which we posed at the beginning, in order to outline the answers provided by the analysis performed.

The first question was: in order to have got to the top, have women enjoyed family conditions on average more favourable than those of their male colleagues? The answer is: yes. Gender equality between leaders is limited to the work position which they have. In order to achieve the same career as men, women have made use of more favourable family conditions (greater resources in the family of origin), which have made it possible for them to overcome the usual discrimination. As we have seen, however, the advantage ceases here.

Indeed, the answer to the next question, "Do women leaders set up egalitarian families?", is negative. When they set up a family, these privileged women do not do so on an egalitarian basis: in the couples formed by women leaders, the partner is more often superior to the woman as regards education and profession, despite the fact that the women too are at a very high level, while in the couples formed by men leaders, their partner is often of an inferior status. In other words, traditional models of couple-matching persist. Housework and childcare are not shared, but are much more often shouldered by women than by their partners: women leaders are unable to avoid the problem of the double workload. This is probably one of the reasons why women's family life emerges as more discontinuous than that of men.

Indeed, the answer to the third question, "Is it possible for women leaders to have a family life like that of men?", is also negative. Women leaders find it more difficult to have a family life than their male colleagues: they are more likely than men to have been unwilling/unable to form a union or have children, to have remained on their own after a separation or to have been in more than one union. This shows that women have, to a certain extent, sacrificed their family life in order to pursue a career. If power and a top job bring advantages (eg economic) which might favour the formation of a family and fertility, these are reserved for men, especially for those with a partner not working outside the home.

The results which we have obtained confirm the hypotheses that we advanced in the light of the various theoretical positions. The theory of the woman's economic independence and of opportunity costs explains the greater difficulty experienced by women leaders in terms of lack of economic interest in having a stable union and greater opportunity costs of having children.

The theory of gender relations finds confirmation in the different role of personal resources in the cases of men and women; while resources tend to have a stabilizing effect on the family life of men, encouraging their fertility, they render that of women more unstable, leading them to opt against or limit fertility.

Structural theories are also confirmed by the behaviour of the leaders interviewed: the matching of couples takes place in the traditional fashion and inevitably condemns more women than men to single status, probably leaving the woman unsatisfied with her choices (her options are probably more limited) much more often than the man might ever be, and thus leading her to separate more often. Moreover, the conflict between career and fertility can be resolved more often in favour of the former than the latter by women leaders, given that their earning capacity and attachment to the career itself may be preferred to fertility both by the women and by their partners.

The ideational theory is also confirmed by our findings: we presumed that women leaders were selected from an ideational point of view, and less eager to take on traditional roles. Alternative unions to marriage, separation and even living alone, not having children or having just one, are all patterns of behaviour which accord with this ideational aspect, and they could therefore be a consequence of women's choice, at least in part. In order not to take on traditional roles, women deliberately avoid a situation which would inevitably induce them to take them on. The rigidity of role division, even in the families of women leaders, helps to explain why women opt against setting up a family.

Finally, we hypothesized that institutional frameworks more favourable to reconciling work and maternity and more protective of women and the family might attenuate the conflict of roles and create conditions more favourable to the formation of unions, even if they are not traditional ones, and to fertility. Our findings show that the country of residence has no influence on the family behaviour of leaders, but that it does influence their fertility, and gender-specific models have confirmed that it affects that of women in particular, and not that of men: leaders living in the countries of West Europe and South Europe are less likely to have at least one child compared to leaders in Scandinavian countries, and gender-specific models confirm this finding for women in the countries of West Europe. There is an increasing tendency in developed countries towards couples spitting in two groups: couples remaining childless and those with at least one child. Couples which have the first child, tend to go on. Our findings show that this tendency is strongest for women leaders in the countries of West/Central Europe, ie in those where institutional support and/or informal support is the weakest.

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Tables

TABLE 1: Respondent's family of origin: percent values and valid cases.

CHARACTERISTICS		gender	
		men	women
birth order	first / second born child	75.5	79.7
	third / fourth born child or more	24.5	20.3
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	751	798
sign. (p=0.05)			
number of children in the family	1 / 2 children	39.6	41.5
	3 / 4 children or more	60.4	58.5
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	762	807
sign. (p=0.45)			
mother's education	elementary or less	25.7	18.1
	junior secondary	23.9	21.6
	senior secondary	21.7	22.1
	vocational	10.9	15.9
	higher education	17.9	22.4
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	728	769
sign. (p=0.00)			
father's education	elementary or less	18.4	10.6
	junior secondary	19.5	14.5
	senior secondary	15.7	15.2
	vocational	12.6	16.8
	higher education	33.9	42.9
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	740	785
sign. (p=0.00)			
mother's primary work status	extra-domestic work	40.7	46.3
	unpaid work at home	59.3	53.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	744	791
sign. (p=0.03)			
mother's job supervisory functions	yes	32.1	41.8
	no	67.9	58.2
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	274	330
sign. (p=0.01)			
father's job supervisory functions	yes	68.9	76.4
	no	31.1	23.6
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	668	707
sign. (p=0.00)			
family's economic position	very comfortable	5.1	8.8
	comfortable	19.5	20.6
	intermediate	41.1	42.0
	poor	22.7	19.2
	very poor	11.7	9.3
	Total	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	771	814	
sign. (p=0.01)			

Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is <0.05.

TABLE 2: Partnering history: percent values and valid cases.

CHARACTERISTICS		gender	
		men	women
"have you ever been married?"	yes	92.4	82.3
	no	7.6	17.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	779	817
sign. (p=0.00)			
"have you ever been divorced?"	yes	16.0	23.8
	no	84.0	76.2
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	761	797
sign. (p=0.00)			
"have you ever been separated?"	yes	7.0	10.3
	no	93.0	89.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	761	790
sign. (p=0.02)			
"have you ever been widowed?"	yes	2.5	4.6
	no	97.5	95.4
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	760	790
sign. (p=0.03)			
"have you ever been a cohabitant?"	yes	23.9	30.3
	no	76.1	69.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	732	766
sign. (p=0.00)			
"are you currently in a stable relationship?"	yes	93.9	75.4
	no	6.1	24.6
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	784	826
sign. (p=0.00)			
partnering history	never been in a stable union / currently not in a union	5.8	24.3
	currently in a union, having had various unions in the past	17.1	20.0
	having married only once	77.1	55.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	776	819
sign. (p=0.00)			

Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is <0.05.

TABLE 3: Information about partner's education: percent values and valid cases.

CHARACTERISTICS		gender	
		men	women
partner's education	elementary or less	1.3	0.7
	junior secondary	6.7	2.7
	senior secondary / vocational	30.0	16.2
	college	33.7	30.9
	master	21.0	31.4
	doctorate	7.3	18.1
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	700	592
sign. (p=0.00)			
gap between the respondent's and their partner's education	partner more educated	13.2	26.1
	partners have same education	34.9	48.0
	respondent more educated	38.4	20.0
	respondent much more educated	13.6	6.0
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	691	586
	sign. (p=0.00)		

Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is <0.05.

TABLE 4: Partner's job and attitude: percent values and valid cases.

CHARACTERISTICS		gender	
		men	women
partner's work status	employee	46.6	61.5
	unpaid work in the home	34.3	2.0
	unemployed	3.9	7.0
	owner of the firm	4.7	13.1
	self-employed	10.5	16.4
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	717	610
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's job: full/part-time	part-time	35.5	10.7
	full-time	64.5	89.3
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	437	541
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's job: supervisory functions	yes	49.2	76.3
	no	50.8	23.7
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	425	520
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's job: level of supervisory functions	foreman/woman	14.0	4.5
	lower manager	16.4	6.3
	middle manager	37.2	31.2
	top manager	32.4	58.1
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	207	382
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's social class	employer, more than 9 dependents	5.2	12.8
	employer, less than 9 dependents	16.2	14.6
	manager	29.2	50.1
	dependent without supervisory functions	49.4	22.5
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	407	485
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's occupational prestige	0-54	33.3	22.9
	55-60	25.6	21.0
	61-70	23.3	30.8
	71-86	17.8	25.2
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	433	523
sign. (p=0.00)			
partner's attitude	very positive	33.6	56.9
	positive	38.5	27.9
	neutral	21.7	10.5
	negative	5.5	4.3
	very negative	0.7	0.5
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	723	610
sign. (p=0.00)			

Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is <0.05.

TABLE 5: Children, childcare and housework: percent values and valid cases.

CHARACTERISTICS		gender	
		men	women
number of children	1 child	12.4	17.2
	2 children	43.2	32.1
	3 children	22.8	13.8
	4 or more children	13.4	9.2
	childless	8.2	27.8
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	777	807
sign. (p=0.00)			
number of children living with respondent	1 child	28.1	27.8
	2 children	41.4	27.5
	3 children	13.8	7.0
	4 or more children	6.0	2.1
	0 children living with respondent	10.6	35.6
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	601	629
sign. (p=0.00)			
children interfered with respondent's work	often	19.0	23.0
	occasionally	44.5	47.5
	never	36.4	29.4
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	667	530
sign. (p=0.03)			
childcare	by the respondent	4.7	19.6
	by the respondent's partner	56.6	3.8
	by other family members	4.8	10.6
	in private paid care	10.5	25.4
	in publicly financed care	8.3	13.8
	by a baby-sitter	2.1	8.0
	by more than one help	9.8	13.3
	other arrangements	3.1	5.5
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	703	578
sign. (p=0.00)			
extent of the housework done in the household (of what there is to do)	none	23.7	8.8
	less than half	64.7	40.1
	about half	7.9	19.9
	more than half	2.3	20.7
	all or nearly all	1.4	10.5
	Total	100.0	100.0
	Valid cases	733	793
sign. (p=0.00)			

Chi-square test significance values for gender differences are reported. Gender differences are significant when p value is <0.05

TABLE 6: Dependent variables in the logistic models

VARIABLES	percent
"having been in a stable union with a partner at some point"	
never been in a stable union	4.0
having been in at least one stable union	96.0
Total	100.0
Valid cases: 1595	
Partnering history ("not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union (ie marriage) up to now")	
never been in a stable union / not currently in a union	15.3
currently in a union (having had various experiences in the past)	18.6
having only married once	66.1
Total	100.0
Valid cases: 1595	
"being in a new union after a separation"	
currently not in a union	43.3
currently in a union with previous partnerships in the past	56.7
Total	100.0
Valid cases: 416	
"having had at least one child"	
childless	15.1
at least 1 child	84.9
Total	100.0
Valid cases: 1525	
Number of children ("having had 0 or 1 child or having had 2 children, as opposed to having had 3 or more children")	
0-1 child	30.5
2 children	39.0
3 or more children	30.6
Total	100.0
Valid cases:1525	

TABLE 7: Determinants of union formation. Results of the logistic models (ODDS RATIO).

VARIABLES ¹	Having been in at least one stable union / Never been in a stable union			Currently in a union with previous partnerships in the past / Currently not in a union			Not currently in a union / Having only married once			Currently in a union with various experiences in the past/ Having only married once		
	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.
GENDER (Females)												
Males	4.40*			5.12*			0.15*			0.64*		
GENERATION (Born before 1940)												
Born in/after 1950	0.33*	0.00	—	2.21*		3.37*	1.03	2.37	0.86	1.73*	1.21	2.40*
Born between 1940 and 1949	0.55	0.00		1.14		1.38	1.25	1.80	1.19	1.24	1.08	1.59
COUNTRY (Scandinavian Countries)												
South Europe	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.15	0.46	1.69	0.64	0.48	0.85
Former Communist Countries							0.95	0.55	1.13	0.70	1.40	0.69
West and Central Europe							0.74	0.23*	1.10*	0.65	0.60	0.67
Non-European Countries							1.15	0.30	1.85	0.77	0.45*	1.14
LEADERSHIP (Business Leader)												
Political Leader	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.93	1.19	0.81	0.84	0.95	0.78
FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (Middle/high level manager)												
Not employed	—	—	—	—	—							
With job which does not involve supervisory functions						0.45	1.02	0.00	1.55	0.75	0.73	0.89
Team-leader or low level manager						0.49*	0.99	0.55	1.14	1.09	1.28	0.94
						1.57	0.81	1.01	0.75	1.29	1.53	1.10
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODELS²												
	"having been in a stable union with a partner at some point"			"being in a new union after a separation"			Partnering history ("not being in a union currently or having been in various unions as opposed to having been in a single union (ie marriage) up to now")					
	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.
Number of cases	1369	667	702	347	120	227	1369	667	702			
Chi-Square test (model with dichotomic dependent variables)	Chi-Square	27.99	10.28	—	45.66	—	20.09					
	Df	3	2	—	3	—	5					
	Significance	0.00	0.01	—	0.00	—	0.00					
Goodness of Fit Statistic: Likelihood Ratio (model with polytomic dependent variables)	Chi-Square						435.59		172.62		232.35	
	Df						456		218		218	
	Significance						0.75		0.99		0.24	

(*): Values not statistically significant.

(_): The variable did not enter the model (Forward Inclusion method).

(¹): Reference categories in brackets in the first column.

(²): The Chi-square test has to give very small levels of significance in the case of models with dichotomic dependent variables, but levels close to one in the case of polytomic dependent variables.

TABLE 8: Determinants of childbearing. Results of the logistic models (ODDS RATIO)¹.

VARIABLES ²	At least 1 child / Childless)			0-1 child / 3 or more children			2 children / 3 or more children		
	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.
GENDER (Females)									
Males	3.55*			0.33*			0.79		
GENERATION (Born before 1940)									
Born in/after 1950	0.16*	0.18*	0.15*	6.61*	5.58*	7.19*	1.92*	1.98*	1.80
Born between 1940 and 1949	0.44*	1.16	0.32*	2.61*	1.53	4.57*	1.60*	1.26	2.43*
COUNTRY (Scandinavian Countries)									
South Europe	0.55	–	0.73	1.44	2.04	1.03	0.47*	0.45*	0.46*
Former Communist Countries	1.11		1.07	4.46*	4.31*	4.98*	3.30*	3.11*	3.17*
West and Central Europe	0.50*		0.43*	1.53	2.00	1.31	0.76	0.79	0.74
Non-European Countries	0.90		0.93	1.08	0.92	1.03	0.78	0.90	0.65
PARTNERING HISTORY (Having only married once)									
Currently not in a union	0.33*		0.32*	2.78*	3.22*	2.67*	1.07	1.75	0.91
Currently in a union (having had various experiences in the past)	0.44*		0.42*	0.87	0.86	0.83	0.37*	0.38*	0.34*
LEADERSHIP (Business Leader)									
Political Leader		0.42*		0.65*	1.26	0.33*	0.66*	0.90	0.38*
FATHER'S OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (Middle/high level manager)									
Not employed	–	–	–						
With job which does not involve supervisory functions				1.12	1.11	1.41	1.03	1.04	1.26
Team-leader or low level manager				1.65*	1.59	1.56	1.21	1.34	1.03
				1.48	0.85	2.12*	1.29	1.29	1.31
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODELS³									
				"having had at least 1 child"			Number of children ("having had 0-1 child or having had 2 children as opposed to having had 3 or more children")		
				TOT.	M.	F.	TOT.	M.	F.
Number of cases				1299	651	648	1299	651	648
Chi-Square test (model with dichotomic dependent variables)	Chi-Square	176.74		34.17	73.74				
	Df	9		3	8				
	Significance	0.00		0.00	0.00				
Goodness of Fit Statistic: Likelihood Ratio (model with polytomic dependent variables)	Chi-Square					837.67	353.12	443.00	
	Df					1412	694	694	
	Significance					1.00	1.00	1.00	

(*): Values not statistically significant.

(_): The variable did not enter the model (Forward Inclusion method).

(¹): Interviewed with at least one child (including own children, step children and adopted)

(²): Reference categories in brackets in the first column.

(³): The Chi-square test has to give very small levels of significance in the case of models with dichotomic dependent variables, but levels close to one in the case of polytomic dependent variables.