

Q&A

Toward a Demography of Crisis and Resilience

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Rolando Gonzales Martinez (r.m.gonzales.martinez@rug.nl)

For Roman:

What population projection models or datasets exist that explicitly account for the impacts of multiple climate change-related disruptions? I am looking for forecasts that move beyond traditional demographic factors (like fertility and mortality) to incorporate dynamic feedback from various climate impacts.

Rolando Gonzales Martinez (r.m.gonzales.martinez@rug.nl)

For Orsola:

Can you provide links to the datasets about the population impacts of wars and conflicts?

Jan Van Bavel (jan.vanbavel@kuleuven.be)

For Orsola:

Is it adequate to calculate a measure like life expectancy at birth in times of war? Or is it one of the ethical questions we should ask ourselves: maybe such a measure is hiding more than it shows?

- *Janine Charnley: "Just what I was thinking too."*

Rolando Gonzales Martinez (r.m.gonzales.martinez@rug.nl)

For Natalie:

What specific tools can be used to link crisis types, e.g. climate change and pandemics?

Jan Van Bavel (jan.vanbavel@kuleuven.be)

For Natalie:

What is the short- and longer term impact of the budget cuts of USAID on the research programme you propose, i.e. a more concerted, connected kind of global data collection. What are realistic options to find alternative sources of funding?

Fernando Duvane (duvane@gmail.com)

To who it can concern:

I have a research project about resilience, that I would like to progress with, in a Mozambican district. Is there among you interested in joining me to do it?

duvane@gmail.com

Rolando Gonzales Martinez (r.m.gonzales.martinez@rug.nl)

For Arnstein:

The simulation is an agent-based simulation? If it is, in which software was the simulation performed?

- *Arnstein: "Python"*

Jan Van Bavel (jan.vanbavel@kuleuven.be)

For Arnstein:

I keep on hearing calls from demographers that we should try to raise fertility "to save the welfare state". Shouldn't we as demographers indeed point out that solutions will not come from demography but that we should rather fundamentally adjust our social welfare state to new demographic realities?

- *Arnstein: "One aspect we have been thinking about a lot is to what extent the concept of resilience can be used when rethinking the welfare state. If we do not think we can uphold the public sector welfare state, then what is the alternative? Should we perhaps think about the welfare state as helping out people becoming more resilient? Again, the answer is down to a value assessment."*

Aparajita Chattopadhyay (apachat@rediffmail.com)

For Roman:

How r u measuring conflict frequency? Interestingly, several countries globally recognized as conflict-affected appear to show comparatively fewer conflict zones in this visualization.

Layla Grigorio Seabra (laylagrigorioseabra@gmail.com)

For Cassio:

Regarding the feedback loops between demography and policy: How can middle-income countries, like Brazil, build 'demographic resilience' when the aging process itself is already straining the fiscal buffers (like pensions and healthcare) needed to mitigate future crises?

Emmanuel Juakaly (emmanueljuakaly@gmail.com)

For Arnstein:

Demographic resilience is it different to demographic dividend? More on educational dividend consideration? Some of African countries have young population (a potential of demographic dividend), What can we take as solution or moderation seeing the lack of education?

- *Arnstein: "Yes, it is different. With the demographic dividend, educational expansion is argued to boost the dividend. But resilience is more general. This is more about how you navigate adverse events, both at the individual level and the institutional level".*

Philipp Ueffing (philipp.ueffing@ec.europa.eu)

For Arnstein:

Two related questions on fertility in long-run projections: First, how do we best communicate that even modest near-term changes in fertility — say, a shift of 0.1 to 0.3 in the TFR — compound into substantially different long-term demographic trajectories? What's the right framing to convey both the sensitivity of projections to these shifts and the genuine uncertainty around them? Second, and perhaps more critically: should demographers even be making the case for higher fertility rates at all? Given that coercive measures are reentering debates — is there a risk that our work will get instrumentalised? And if we do engage, can we do so honestly without hiding behind the argument of a gap between stated fertility intentions and actual outcomes?

- *Arnstein: "Let me start with the latter: I think we are no longer arguing for fertility policies. It is also the case that there is very limited evidence to suggest that they are effective. But in the longer term, it may necessarily matter. Second, keep in mind that we are going through a transition. We are struggling now because we have a large x-generation who will soon retire, yet fertility is low. But in 40 to 60 years' time, age pyramids will look very different from what they look like now".*