

# IRREGULAR MIGRATION:

*Causes and Consequences of Young Adult Migration from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa*



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## Abstract

**Aim:** to investigate the socioeconomic and demographic causes and consequences of irregular migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to South Africa (RSA).

**Sampling & Design:** a quantitative cross-sectional study was carried out in February 2010. The sample includes 658 eligible adults aged 15 to 50 years belonging to three migrant categories in relation to migration status to RSA: *out migrants* (n=226), *returnees* (n=193) and *non-migrants* (n=239). The data is gathered in four randomly selected *woredas* (local districts) and then households from two densely populated zones of southern Ethiopia—*Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya*. All the data are gathered from departure area (southern Ethiopia) and information regarding out migrants is collected from proxy respondents.

**Data & Methods:** include questionnaire, interviews and focus group. Quantitative data are analyzed using both descriptive and the binary logistic regression model while qualitative data are analyzed using *NUD\*IST* computer program after coding and processing it.

**Results:** the irregular migration is dominated by young, single male aged 20 to 34. The majority of the smuggled migrants are first or second born children. The multivariate analysis showed that age, residence and employment have a significant positive association with the outcome variable (migration) while sex, marital status, education, duration of residence and birth order have a significant positive association. Over 44% of the respondents view that the main cause for the irregular migration is perceived better opportunities in RSA, and only 8% claimed poverty related reasons. The movement of youth from southern Ethiopia to RSA is facilitated by a network of human smugglers found in the capital *Addis Ababa*, *Hossana* and other town in Ethiopia and they work in cooperation with smugglers from Kenya and Somalia. Return migrants are better off now than before their migration. Many of the returnees said their journeys were harsh with unexpected negative consequences.

**Key words:** irregular migration, smuggling, South Africa, Ethiopia, returnees

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 The Problem

Estimates show that around 214 million individuals are international migrants, representing some 3.1% of the world's population a number almost equivalent to the fourth most populous country in the world, Indonesia (ICHRC, 2010). Migrants are now to be found in every part of the globe, some of them moving within their own region and others travelling from one part of the world to another. The form of migration often capturing news headlines is that from developing countries into the developed world (UN, 1998). One tends to ignore the fact that the developing world is not homogenous that some states are more developed than others. As such, the relatively more developed states in the developing world experience many of the same problems that more developed counterparts in the Western world experience.

The growth and persistence of irregular migrations worldwide fundamentally stems from those social, political, economic and demographic phenomena which have created ever increasing global interdependence. Irregular migrations arise from a numerous of labor market, institutional and socio-political forces, often thereby creating ambivalence (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Jordan & Düvel (2002) underline that irregular migration is dynamic, undergoing constant change.

Ethiopia is challenged by different migration patterns and dynamics, which have significant political and socio-economic ramifications for the country (IOM, 2008a). Several things have been said about the migration of Ethiopian females to the Middle East countries (Abdu, 2009; Girum, 2010), but very little about the irregular migration of young adult Ethiopians to the “dream of land”—the Republic of South Africa (RSA). Most of the young adults who migrate to the RSA are economically active and are heading in pursuit of dream of capturing the green pasture there. In Ethiopia, the problem is widely observed in two zones of the southern parts, namely in *Hadya* and *Kambata-Tambaro* Zones (Messay, 2005, Sinedu, 2009). Most of the young adults who move irregularly to RSA had suffered several problems—among them are being smuggled, physical abuse, human right violation (in some cases even death) as well as robbery (Messay, 2005)—though returnees are better off.

The present study focuses on investigating the socioeconomic and demographic causes and consequences of irregular migration of young adults from *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* areas of southern Ethiopia to South Africa. It also explains the smuggling networks, financing of the migration and routes of moving

## 1.2 Objectives and Research Questions

This study is mainly aimed to investigate the socioeconomic and demographic causes and consequences of irregular migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to the Republic of South Africa. In doing so, it tries to address the following research questions:

- (i) Are there differences in the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics between out migrants, returnees and non-migrants?
- (ii) What factors initiate young adults to migrate irregularly?
- (iii) How can the role of smuggling and finances be explained in the irregular migration?
- (iv) What are the socioeconomic and demographic consequences of this irregular migration on the migrants, their families and the community at large?

## **2. LITERATURE, THEORY AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL**

### **2.1 Literature**

The term irregular migration is defined as the movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries (IOM, 2004). From the perspective of destination countries, irregular migration is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside in or work in a given country. From the perspective of the source country, the irregularity is seen, for example, in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country (UN, 2000)

Although differences in the economic, political and social contexts limit generalizations, certain features of irregular migration are more or less universal. There is general agreement that economic factors are paramount in inducing persons to migrate irregularly. Such irregular flows are often from relatively poor countries to countries with high gross national product (GNP) per capita. Widespread poverty and income inequality exist in the context of a global communications revolution, with international telephone and internet networks, global television channels and so forth, as Lohrmann (1989) argues. Furthermore, Widgren (1994) argues that these new technical possibilities to link up with far-away countries provide better opportunities for potential migrants to take departure decisions. Moreover, although migrants continue to cross national borders by foot, improved transportation networks, including cheap and rapid air travel, now mean that irregular migrants have additional means to cross borders, and no longer move mainly from neighboring countries.

There is a widespread belief in the public that most migrants are tricked by traffickers and smugglers as Friebel and Guriev (2002) argue. Skeldon (2000) also points that most smuggled irregular migrants know quite well what to expect. This concerns not only the costs and non-monetary risks involved with illegal migration, but also the oftentimes very poor living conditions in the host countries. Chin's book (1999), for instance, shows that most Chinese migrants come from the same few provinces. They benefit from the fact that relatives and friends may have migrated before them providing them with useful information.

Irregular migration is of diverse social and economic consequences not only on the areas of origin, transit and destination, but also on the migrant themselves. GCIM (2009) reported that irregular migration endangers the lives of the migrants concerned where large but unknown numbers of people die each year trying to cross land and sea borders without being detected by the authorities. Smugglers may extract a high price from migrants, sometimes charging thousands of dollars. The means of transport used by migrant smugglers are often unsafe, and migrants who are travelling in this way may find themselves abandoned by their smuggler and unable to complete the journey they have paid for (GCIM, 2009).

More generally, people who enter or remain in a country without authorization can be at risk of exploitation by employers and land lords GCIM (2009). IOM (2009) and GCIM (2009) reports also argue that because of their irregularity, migrants are often unable to make full use of their skills and experience once they have arrived in a country of destination. IOM (2009) further notes the various physical and psychological violence that the irregular migrants are suffering from.

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

Two theories are discussed to support the understanding of the problem under investigation: the three stylized levels of migration analysis (which is a theory forwarded to migration in general) and differentiation theory (explains about irregular migration).

The three stylized levels of migration is summarized by Table 2.1 below. Level one is about the degree of freedom or autonomy of a potential migrant, the individual or micro-level. This is the degree to which an individual has the ability to decide on moving or staying. In level two, the political-economic-cultural structures on the level of the nation-states, the country of origin and the country of destination, and the world system constitute the macro-level. Here, the discussion turns to the inter and transnational structures and the relations between nation-states. The set of social and symbolic ties among movers and groups and the resources inherent constitute the *meso* or third level. It refers to the structure, strength, and density of social ties, on the one hand, and their content, on the other. Faist (2010) argues that the relational dimension of level three concerns the social and symbolic ties among stayers and migrants with units and networks in the areas of origin and destination, and relations between relevant collective actors; kin groups, households, religious groups, ethnic communities, and nations.

The second model used is differentiation theory where Cvajner and Sciortino (2008) have tried to theorize irregular migration mainly from the boarder and political aspects. They explain it through discussing differentiation theory though it has a very limited recognition in migration studies as they argue. The basic idea of differentiation approach is that contemporary society has

no head, no base and no center, but is articulated in a plurality of specialized subsystems and regulative means (Cvajner and Sciortino, 2008).

**Table 2.1 The Three Stylized Levels of Migration Analysis**


<b>MICRO</b> values or desires & expectancies	<b>MESO</b> collective and social networks	<b>MACRO</b> macro-level opportunity structures
<i>Individual values and expectancies</i> -improving and securing survival, wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation & morality	<i>Social ties</i> -strong ties families & households - weak ties of networks of potential movers, brokers & stayers. <i>Symbolic ties</i> - kin, ethnic, national, political, & religious organizations; symbolic communities. <i>Content of ties-transactions</i> - obligations, reciprocity& solidarity; information, control & access to resources of others.	<i>Economies</i> -income & unemployment differentials <i>Politics</i> -regulation of spatial mobility through nation states & international regimes; -political repression, ethnic, national, & religious conflicts <i>Cultural setting</i> -dominant norms and discourse <i>Demography and ecology</i> -population growth & distribution -availability of arable land -level of technology

Source: Faist (2000)

The development of irregular migration is rooted in the structural mismatch between the social and political conditions for migration. For an irregular migration flow to develop there must be a mismatch between the demand for entry, embedded in the international labor market, and the supply of entry slots, determined by the political systems. They argue that in the sending country context, there must be a mismatch between widespread social expectations (usually called ‘push’ factors) and the capacity of local government to satisfy or repress them. In the receiving context on the other hand, there must be a mismatch between the internal preconditions for migration (usually called ‘pull’ factors) and their interpretation within the political system. Transnationally, there must be a mismatch between the carrying capacity of the migration infrastructure and the monitoring and repressive capacity of states. Cvajner & Sciortino (2008) further underline that irregular migration systems may be in fact defined as an adaptive answer to these mismatches.

## 2.3 Conceptual Model

Figure 2.1 The Conceptual Model



Source: Done by the authors based on literatures

## 3. STUDY AREA, DATA AND METHODS

### 3.1 The Study Area and Target Population

This study encompasses both urban and rural areas of two zones from the southern parts of Ethiopia, namely *Kembata-Tembaro*, and *Hadiya* zones (see Appendix I). The total population of the SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region) is 15,042,531 where the level of urbanization is only 10.3% (CSA, 2008). The two zones selected for this study account for about 13% of the SNNPR's population. No data were directly collected neither from South Africa nor any transit country. The target populations of this study were young adults of both sex aged between 15 and 50 years. They are contacted in households where there are people moved irregularly to the RSA [*out-migrants*], *return migrants* from South Africa; and *non-migrants* who has no migration experience to South Africa. Information about out-migrants was gathered using proxy respondents, mainly from their families/parents at home. The rest—returnees and non-migrants—were contacted directly.

### 3.2 Sampling

A total of four *Kebeles*<sup>4</sup> are selected from the four *Woredas*<sup>5</sup> and towns in the study area, and from each of these *Kebeles*, 690 households were chosen. The selected Kebeles/Towns are the following: *Hossana Town & Soro Woreda* from *Hadiya Zone* and *Angacha & Doyo Gena Woredas* from *Kembata-Tembaro Zone*. A stratified random sampling was employed to select 226 out migrants, 193 returnees and 239 non-migrants (a total of 658 respondents) from these 690 households for collection of the quantitative data.

### 3.3 Data Sources

The main data sources for the present study are quantitative data that are gathered through questionnaire. Qualitative data are also part of this research that are collected through key informant interviews and focused group discussions. Available secondary data were also reviewed thoroughly whenever necessary. The main purpose of doing a qualitative data in this study is that most of the challenges and harsh experiences encountered by both out migrants and returnees are better addressed. Furthermore, the opinions of government leaders, police officials and others are better captured using qualitative methods. In this regard, six key informant interviews (KII) were made: two with smugglers, two with government officials (one at local and one at national level) and two with return migrants. On the other hand, a total of four focus group discussions (FGD)—two with non-migrants and two with returnees were made. In each of the FGD, five to eight people participated. To initiate the discussion, questions were prepared and forwarded one by one to the participants.

### 3.4 Methods of Data Analysis

*Quantitative Data Analysis:* data from questionnaires were entered into computer using SPSS 19 (statistical package for social science) software. The analysis includes descriptive models, univariate and multivariate analysis. The *binary logistic regression model*<sup>6</sup> employed to see how much the independent variables affect the dependent one. The dependent variable is migration status (1 = migrant and 0 = non-migrant). The independent variables included in the main regression model are age, sex, marital status, residence, duration of continuous residence in the current place, education status, employment status, household size, birth order and ethnicity. The model applies the maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable in to a *logit* variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). Moreover, this

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<sup>4</sup> *Kebele* is the smallest administration classification in Ethiopia next to *Woreda*.

<sup>5</sup> *Woreda* is an administration classification (local districts) after Zone. In decreasing order: country-region-zone-woreda-kebele.

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix II for operationalization of variables in the binary logistic regression model.



model is chosen for its ability to show the role of each independent variable in affecting the dependent variable, determine the percent of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independents, rank the relative importance of independents. One of the objectives of this study is to assess the motives of migration from the area of departure and hence the main causes for migration are found to be almost similar for both out migrants and returnees as qualitative data substantiate. For this reason, both out migrants and returnees are merged to be named as migrants.

*Qualitative data* set gathered through FGD and KII were analyzed using description, narration as well as cross-checking their validity and reliability with the quantitative data. Coding was done in two main categories: the first one is smuggled migrants, the smugglers and officials. The second coding include amount of money paid for smuggling, money source, documents necessary for travelling, networking, the journey and transport used (car, plane, boat, foot), benefits of the migration and challenges encountered. The data are then entered into computer by using *NUD\*IST* (Nonnumeric Unstructured Data, Index Searching, and Theorizing) computer software, which is common in analyzing qualitative data (Babbie, 2010). Summarization and looking their similarity and/or differences among each of the selected *Kebeles* (local districts) are also part of both quantitative and qualitative data analysis.

## **4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS**

### **4.1 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents<sup>7</sup>**

#### **4.1.1 Age-Sex Composition**

The data on Table 4.1 show that 82.5% of the respondents are males and only 17.5% of them are females. The distribution among the three types of respondents also shows slight variation. The percentage difference of males to females is larger among the return migrants (96.4% to 3.6%) where it is small among non-migrants (66.5% to 33.5%).

The information gained from returnees reveals that during their stay in South Africa most of them were engaged in small scale trading that involves travelling to the remote rural localities. The difficulty of the journey from Ethiopia to South Africa, which is dominated by foot and car taking a couple of months, is imperative in the male dominancy of the irregular migration to South Africa.

Looking at the respondents' age composition is necessary in understanding at what age migrants become more vulnerable to irregular migration. The data on Table 4.1 shows that in all of the three types of respondents economically actives (aged 20-39) take up the largest share. The very young and the very old adults found to be less likely to migrate. For the very young—such as age group 15-19—this is because of the difficulty of the journey to South Africa, which is involves

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<sup>7</sup>Throughout Chapter 4 & 5, the reference time for *Out Migrants* and *Returnees* is at their migration down to South Africa while that of *Non-Migrants* is at the survey time.

walking long distances by foot and car. Moreover, the large sum of money (up to 60,000 ETB<sup>8</sup> or around €2608) required for the migration which is required by the smugglers where the very young ones seem unable to afford since most of them are unemployed in-school children. On the other hand, people found to have less intention to migrate as their age increases because they are engaged in some socio-economic ties—such as marriage and occupation. The absence of any people in the last age group (45+) among out migrants could strongly be associated with such ties.

**Table 4.1 Age-Sex Composition of Respondents**

Characteristic	Migration Status						Total	
	Out Migrants		Return Migrants		Non-Migrants		%	N
	%	N	%	N	%	N		
Sex								
Male	87.6	198	96.4	186	66.5	159	82.5	543
Female	12.4	28	3.6	7	33.5	80	17.5	115
Total	100	226	100	193	100	239	100	658
Age								
15-19	1.3	3	3.1	6	18.0	43	7.0	46
20-24	19.5	44	13.0	25	17.6	42	14.0	92
25-29	33.2	75	20.2	39	25.9	62	24.6	162
30-34	16.8	38	29.5	57	19.7	47	18.8	124
35-39	18.6	42	21.8	42	6.3	15	17.3	114
40-44	10.6	24	5.2	10	8.8	21	13.2	87
45+	0	0	7.3	14	3.8	9	5.0	33
Total	100	226	100	193	100	239	100	658

Source: field survey (February 2010)<sup>9</sup>

Generally, the very young adults (aged 15-19) and the relatively old adults (aged 40+) less likely migrate while propensity of irregular migration is higher among age group 25-29.


#### 4.1.2 Marital Status

The data on marital status of the respondents indicates that nearly 48% of out migrants, 63% of returnees and 54% of the non-migrants were single (Figure 4.1). Abdu (2009), in his study of the migration of females from Ethiopia to the Middle East found that the demand for employing women workers who are currently married is very low at the place of destinations, and hence most of the migrants are single. Furthermore, Nivalainen (2004) in his study of the determinants of family migration in Finland found that most eager migrants are unmarried, educated and young adults. He also noted that family status and children affect migration propensities.

<sup>8</sup> Ethiopian Birr (one ETB is around 0.04 euro)

<sup>9</sup> All the descriptive tables, figures & other data in this study are based on the survey conducted in February 2010.

**Figure 4.1 Marital Status of Respondents (%)**



#### 4.1.3 Current Place of Residence

The level of urbanization in Ethiopia was 16% in 2007 and regionally SNNPR has lower (10%) than the country total (CSA, 2009). The level of urbanization was 11% in *Hadiya* and 14% in *Kembata-Tembaro* Zone. Migrants' place of origin could be rural or urban or they might come from regions having both characteristics. As of Table 4.2, 72% of all the respondents are from rural areas. With the rapid rate of urbanization, the proportion of migrants from urban areas is expected to increase in the future.

**Table 4.2 Migration Status by Current Place of Residence (%)**

Current Residence	Migration Status			Total	
	<i>Out Migrants</i>	<i>Returnees</i>	<i>Non-Migrants</i>	%	<i>N</i>
Urban	27.4	17.6	36.8	28	184
Rural	72.6	82.4	63.2	72	474
Total %	100	100	100	100	658
N	226	193	239	658	


In many developing countries the largest proportions of migrants come from rural areas (Caldwell, 1969). This fact coincides with the rural-agrarian dominated nature of these developing countries, where the majority of the people reside in rural localities. Ravenstein also argues that migration is common from rural agrarian economy to urban industrialized ones (Lewis, 1982).

#### 4.1.4 Birth Order

The data on the distribution of birth order indicates that in out migrants and returnees, the percentage values decreases suddenly from first born child to the next birth orders. The share of first born is 51 % among out migrants and 71% among returnees while it is only 7% among non-

migrants (Figure 4.2). This is true because it is the first born child which usually holds household responsibilities, for example, economically helping their families. The other thing is that after migration, the first born children provide experiential information to their youngsters about the opportunities in South Africa (this is more discussed in later sections).

**Figure 4.2 Birth Order by Migration Status (%)**



Some of the out migrants, via their families at their homeland reported that they went to South Africa by the money sent them from their brothers (mainly older brothers) in South Africa. As to the non-migrants, the proportion of first born child is only 7%. First born children are out migrants and/or they are now returned, and hence the remaining (non-migrants) are mainly second and later born children.

#### **4.1.5 Household Structure and Size**

Examination of household composition—relationship of respondents with the household head—shows that nearly half (47%) of the respondents were sons followed by household heads (18.6%) and spouse (17.4%). Daughters account for 14.2% while other relatives have the smallest share (2.8%). Household size ranges from 2 to 13 with an average of 6.26. Though the household size is high implying the presence of population pressure, this couldn't be a main factor for migration as this is tested by the multivariate analysis under section 5.


### **4.2 Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents**

#### **4.2.1 Literacy Level and Education**

Figure 4.3 shows the majority of the respondents are literates (86%). The education status of respondents indicates that 51% of them attended secondary education and only 10.5% of them have college diploma or above. The highest percentage of secondary education are found among out migrants (68.2%) compared to 54% of returnees and 37.8% among non-migrants. The most educated groups are found among non-migrants (14% of them earned diploma or above). The

non-migrant groups are represented by the somehow balanced distribution in educational attainment, reflecting their diversity both as day laborers as well as university graduates.

**Figure 4.3 Migration Status by Education Level (%)**



#### 4.2.2 Employment, Occupation and Income

Table 4.3 depicts that the largest percentage (66.4%) of out migrants are employed before their migration and this figure is 42% for the return migrants. The unemployed-employed difference among the non-migrants is less compared to the other two migrant categories.

**Table 4.3 Employment by Migration Status (%)**

Employment Status	Migration Status			
	<i>Out Migrants</i>	<i>Return Migrants</i>	<i>Non-Migrants</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Unemployed</b>	33.6	58	54.4	48.3
<b>Employed</b>	66.4	42	45.6	51.7

As it is indicated above, only 42% of returnees were employed before their move. Comparing the percentages of employment status of out migrants with returnees (before their move) shows that earlier respondents (returnees) were more unemployed (58%) than recent out migrants (34%).

Table 4.4 shows the occupational distribution of respondents where the largest percentages were engaged in trade (59% of the total) followed by agriculture (15%). Higher proportions of both out migrants and returnees (82.3% and 65.4%, respectively)—before their move to South Africa—were engaged in trade while it is agriculture that dominates among the non-migrants (39.4%). Trading and related service activities usually involve frequent communication compared to other occupations, and people engaged in such kind of work could get much information and for this reason are highly exposed to migration. The trading activities include small shops, track & taxi driving, small garage works and cloth suiting. In addition to occupation type, income has its own role to migrate or not. Available literatures show that merchants found to earn higher than others in the study area and thus seem to afford the big sum of money

requested by the smugglers. Government employees have a substantial proportion among the non-migrants than others occupation types implying being government employee (its relative low payment compared to merchants) partly proscribe them from migration.

**Table 4.4 Occupation by Migration Status of Employed Respondents**

Occupation	Migration Status							
	<i>Out Migrants</i>		<i>Returnees</i>		<i>Non-Migrants</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>Agriculture</b>	3	1.7	8	7.6	61	39.4	72	15
<b>Trade</b>	149	82.3	73	65.4	37	23.9	259	59
<b>Government</b>	9	5.0	8	7.6	36	23.2	53	11
<b>Other Private Jobs</b>	20	11.0	22	19.4	21	13.5	63	15
<b>Total</b>	181	100	111	100	155	100	447	100

The distribution of employed respondents by average monthly income shows that the majority (70%) of them earn €39.13 or less (Table 4.5). The majority of low earning respondents are non-migrants (79.2% of them earning less than €39.13). As it is discussed in section 5, though poverty is cited by a small number of respondents as a major cause for migration, the low monthly income of non-migrants could possibly be a driven force for potential migration in the future seeking for better income.

**Table 4.5 Average Monthly Income by Migration Status of Employed Respondents**

Income Group (in €)	Migration Status							
	<i>Out Migrants</i>		<i>Returnees</i>		<i>Non-Migrants</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>2.17—13.04</b>	8	5.2	2	2.0	38	24.7	48	9.8
<b>13.05—26.09</b>	57	36.8	36	32.2	38	24.7	131	31.3
<b>26.10—39.13</b>	46	29.7	29	26.1	46	29.9	121	28.3
<b>39.13—52.17</b>	39	25.2	38	34.2	31	20.1	108	27.2
<b>52.18+</b>	5	3.2	6	5.5	1	0.6	12	3.3
<b>Total</b>	155	100	111	100	154	100	420	100

### 4.2.3 Ethnicity

It is instrumental to see the role of ethnicity on migration since the current irregular migration is dominated by the two ethnic groups—*Hadiya* and *Kembata-Tembaro*. In the study area, these two ethnic groups account the highest share among the three migrant types. Fifty two percent of the respondents belong to *Hadiya* ethnic group followed by *Kembata-Tembaro* (41%). The rest are *Amhara* (2.8%), *Guraghe* (2.5%), *Siltie* (1.1%), *Wolaita* and *Oromo* (each sharing less than 1%). As it is explained in section 2.1 Faist (2010) notes that kin, ethnic, national, political and religious organizations are crucial symbolic ties and collective social networks to facilitate migration.

## 5. CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION

### 5.1 Review of the Irregular Migration

A number of frameworks for explaining irregular or undocumented international migration have emerged in recent years. It has been argued that growing developmental, demographic and democratic disparities provide powerful reasons for migration (GCIM, 2005). Such things are further compounded by a global crisis of unemployment and underemployment affecting large parts of the less developed world.

Available literatures share that the flow of Ethiopians to RSA became noticeable beginning from 1991 after the fall of the *Dergue*<sup>10</sup> regime (Messay, 2005; Sinedu, 2009; IOM, 2009). The change in government and the end of apartheid in early 1990s in RSA increased the migration of youth as the IOM (2009) report states. The IOM report further underlines that approximately 65,000 to 70,000 of Ethiopians make their home in RSA. These numbers are increasing every week due to the influx of new arrivals, mainly from large-scale, successful smuggling operations in Ethiopia and over 95% of them enter South Africa through irregular means and regularize their situations rapidly through its asylum policies (IOM, 2009; Sinedu, 2009).

### 5.2 Multivariate Analysis: Model Building

To assess the main causes behind the irregular migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to South Africa, a binary logistic regression model was built and the outputs are presented in Table 5.1. The role of smuggling and financing is found to be instrumental in irregular migration and is discussed in the subsequent sections. The dependent variable is migration status—coded as *migrant* (which includes both out migrants and returnees) and *non-migrant*. Migrant is coded by 1 (pass) and non-migrant is coded by 0 (fail). Out migrants and returnees are merged into one category as ‘migrant’ because the motives for migration are found to be similar both for out migrants and returnees (see Section III for details). The categorical independent variables are age, sex, marital status, residence, education status, employment status, ethnicity and the continuous independent variables are household size, duration of continuous residence in the current place and birth order. Any potential interaction between the independents was assessed and none of the interactions are significant. In all of categorical independent variables, the first category is taken as a reference category. The *p* values are taken to be significant if they are less than 0.05 ( $\alpha = 5\%$ ).

### 5.3 Discussion

*Age* is found to be significantly associated with migration status. All respondents aged 25 and above have higher risks of migration as compared to respondents in the reference category (age 15-24). For example, the risk of migration for respondents aged 25-34 is nearly 8 times higher than respondents aged 15-24. Among the four age groups, respondents in the age group 25-34

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<sup>10</sup>*Dergue* is a military government that stayed on power in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991.

have higher beta values, implying the propensity of migration among them is higher than other age groups. Contrary to this, respondents aged above 44 years found to have insignificant association.

Sex is also found to have a significant negative association with the irregular migration. The risk of migration for females is 0.332 times lower than males. This negative association supports the descriptive analysis in Section 4 where over 82% of the respondents are males.

**Table 5.1 Multivariate Model for Causes of Irregular Migration**

Variables	Coefficients			
	$\beta$ ( $\exp \beta$ )	S.E.	Wald	Sig.
<b>Age</b>				
15-24 (RC)*			28.611	0.000
25-34	2.057 (7.823)	0.446	21.314	0.000
35-44	1.506 (4.510)	0.574	6.888	0.009
45+	-0.053 (0.948)	0.836	0.004	0.949
<b>Sex</b>				
Male (RC)				
Female	-1.104 (0.332)	0.397	7.736	0.005
<b>Marital Status</b>				
Single (RC)			20.497	0.000
Married	-2.034 (0.131)	0.461	19.494	0.000
Divorced/Widowed	-3.818 (0.022)	4.013	0.905	0.341
Cohabited	-0.028 (0.973)	0.559	0.002	0.960
<b>Residence</b>				
Urban (RC)				
Rural	1.191 (3.292)	0.378	9.936	0.002
<b>Continuous Duration</b>	-0.095 (0.910)	0.017	29.852	0.000
<b>Education Status</b>				
Illiterate (RC)			32.885	0.000
Primary education	-1.205 (0.300)	0.602	4.011	0.045
Secondary education	-0.995 (0.370)	0.560	3.161	0.075
Diploma & above	-3.691 (0.025)	0.713	26.815	0.000
<b>Employment</b>				
Unemployed (RC)				
Employed	1.729 (5.632)	0.404	18.292	0.000
<b>Household Size</b>	0.019 (1.019)	0.079	0.058	0.809
<b>Birth Order</b>	-0.962 (0.382)	0.089	116.839	0.000
<b>Ethnicity</b>				
Hadiya (RC)			14.719	0.005
Kembata-Tembaro	-0.485 (0.615)	0.398	1.486	0.225
Amhara	-1.902 (0.149)	0.884	4.625	0.032
Guraghe	-2.394 (0.091)	0.752	10.133	0.001
Others	-2.377 (0.093)	1.761	1.821	0.177
<b>Constant</b>	4.949 (140.982)	0.909	29.615	0.000

\*RC = Reference Category



*Marital status* has a negative association with migration status but with varied significance levels. Married respondents have 86.9% lower risk of migration compared to single respondents. It is also described under Section IV that the majority (55%) of the respondents are singles. Respondents in the remaining two marital groups (divorced/widowed and cohabited) have insignificant negative association with the outcome variable.

*Place of current residence* and *duration of continuous residence* at the current place are two important variables which help us to see how residence is associated with the irregular migration. Both variables are found to have a significant association with migration status. Respondents living in rural areas during the survey period have 3.292 times higher risk of migration than respondents living in urban areas. Rural residents have higher odds of migration than urban dwellers. Similarly, duration of continuous residence in the current place (measured in number of years) have a negative significant link with the outcome variable: a unit increase in the number of years of continuous residence in the current place decreases the log odds of the outcome variable (migration) by -0.095. In other words, as people live continuously for longer time in their current residence, their risk of migration to South Africa decreases.

*Education* and *employment status* are also assessed and both have significant association. The risk of migration for respondents with primary education is 0.3 times lower than respondents in the reference category (illiterates). Similarly, for respondents with at least diploma education the log odds of migration decrease by -3.691 units. Unlike this, there is no significant association between migration and respondents with secondary education. Overall, education status of respondents has negative association with migration: with an increase in the education status, the risk of migration decreases. That means, as people get educated, their risk of migration to South Africa decreases. This is attributable to type of job available in South Africa (as the FGD with returnees revealed) and partly because the educated are better informed about the risks of the irregular movement so that they prefer to remain non-migrant.

Like education, *employment status* has a strong positive association with migration. As of Table 5.1, the propensity of migration for employed respondents is 5.6 times higher than the unemployed ones. This is also supported by Table 5.3 where only a fifth of the respondents view unemployment as a main cause for migration. The majority (over 44%) of respondents view the main reason for migration to be perceived better opportunities in South Africa. The data in Table 4.3 (employment by migration) also shows that substantial percentages of respondents (66.4% of out migrants and 42% of returnees) were employed before their migration to South Africa.

*Household size* is found to have insignificant link with migration since *p* values are greater than 0.05. There is no significant association between household size and migration. Therefore, household size is not a significant cause for migration. Contrary to this, *birth order* has a strong negative association with migration status. A unit increase in the birth order of respondents decreases the log odds of the outcome variable (migration) by 0.962, i.e. the risk of migration is higher for first born children and decreases for later children.

Regarding *ethnicity*, except for *Kembata-Tembaro* ethnic groups, *Amhara* and *Guraghe* have a significant negative association with migration. The risk of migration for *Amhara* respondent is 0.149 times lower than *Hadiya* (reference category) and that of *Guraghe* is 0.091 times lower than *Hadiya*. The *Kembata-Tembaro* ethnic group has insignificant association with migration as compared to the *Hadiya* ethnic group because the propensity of migration is also higher among them. Noticeably, the irregular migration to South Africa is dominated by the two ethnic groups—*Hadiya* and *Kembata-Tembaro*. For this reason, both have higher risk of migration thus we can't find significant association when taking any of the two as a reference category.

When a separate binary logistic regression model is built to assess the association between income and occupation of the employed respondents, a different result has been found. All the necessary model fitting and goodness of test are checked and is presented below in Table 5.2. The dependent variable is as it is (migration status: 1 for *migrant* and 0 for *non-migrant*) and occupation is categorical independent (the first group is still taken as a reference category) where as income is set to be continuous covariate. The *p* value is taken to be significant still if it is less than 0.05. Accordingly, both income and occupation of employed respondents are found to have significant association with migration—keeping all other independent variables constant. A unit increase in income of the respondents increases the log odds of the outcome variable (migration) by a factor of 0.001. That is, as respondents' income increases, so does their risk of migration.

**Table 5.2 Migration, Income & Occupation of Employed Respondents**

Variable	Coefficients			
	$\beta$ ( <i>exp</i> $\beta$ )	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<b>Income</b>	0.001 (1.001)	0.000	5.279	0.022
<b>Occupation</b>				
<b>Agriculture (RC)*</b>			99.734	0.000
<b>Trade</b>	2.776 (16.055)	0.331	70.545	0.000
<b>Government</b>	0.436 (1.547)	0.397	1.205	0.272
<b>Otherpytjobs</b>	1.803 (6.067)	0.386	21.794	0.000
<b>Constant</b>	-1.533 (0.216)	0.322	22.709	0.000

Similarly, respondents engaged in trading have positive association with migration as compared to respondents engaged in agriculture: the risk of migration for people in trade is 16 times higher than people engaged in agriculture. However, government employees are found to have insignificant association with migration compared to the reference groups. Respondents engaged in other private jobs have 6.067 times higher risk of migration than respondents engaged in agriculture.

## 5.4 Respondents' View on Main Causes for Migration

In addition to the multivariate analysis discussed above, respondents were asked on the main reasons for the irregular migration of the youth and young adults to South Africa and this is presented in Table 5.3. Over 44% of the respondents claimed that their main reason they left their homeland are of perceived better opportunities found in South Africa. A fifth of them cited unemployment as their main reason of move where as only 8.1% of them claimed poverty. The main reasons of migration vary by sex, residence, zone and age. Unemployment is reported to be a greater cause of movement among male respondents (21.9%) than females (8.6%), and this is higher in *Kembata-Tembaro* Zone (27.6%) than *Hadiya* (19.4%) and also for adults aged above 45 (33.3%). Over a quarter of the females claim they moved due to causes related to family and marriage, but this is not a main cause for males.

**Table 5.3 Main Reasons for Migration to South Africa: Respondents' View**

Characteristic	Main Reason for Move (%)							Total	
	Unemployment	Poverty	Land Shortage	Meet Relatives in RSA	Lack of Opportunities Home	Presence of Opportunities in RSA	Family/Peer Pressure	%	N
<b>Sex</b>									
Male	21.9	8.9	1.6	0	16.1	47.7	3.9	100	384
Female	8.6	0	0	25.7	45.7	8.6	11.4	100	35
<b>Residence</b>									
Urban	20.8	6.3	3.1	6.3	17.7	38.5	7.3	100	96
Rural	20.7	8.7	0.9	0.9	18.9	46.1	3.7	100	323
<b>Zone</b>									
K.T*	27.6	15.8	0	3.9	13.2	30.3	9.2	100	76
Hadiya	19.4	6.5	1.8	1.8	20.0	47.1	3.6	100	340
<b>Age</b>									
15-24	11.3	11.3	5.7	11.3	7.5	47.2	5.7	100	53
25-34	26.6	8.5	1.7	1.7	13.6	40.7	7.3	100	177
35-44	15.8	7.9	0	0	24.2	50.3	1.8	100	165
45+	33.3	0	0	0	41.7	25.0	0	100	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>18.6</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>419</b>

\*K.T = Kembata-Tembaro

## 5.5 Why mainly *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* Ethnic Groups?

Although migration—just like other demographic variables—is selective by nature, the case of the present study is of great research interest. There are more than 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia but the irregular migration to South Africa is dominated by *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* ethnic groups from the southern part of the country. In these areas, and especially around *Hossana*, knowledge and personal experience of smuggling, smugglers, external travel and the opportunities South Africa can afford are widespread. Everybody seemed to know someone who

had tried to leave or succeeded in reaching South Africa and everyone seemed want to go. Contrary to this, in the villages and towns surrounding these zones, such as *Wolaita*, *Guraghe* and *Siltie* there was widespread ignorance of the same issues. Information gained from these areas showed that people had neither heard of South Africa nor heard of someone leaving the area to work abroad, let alone in South Africa. They knew of no brokers and had no smuggling stories.

We have assessed this issue by contacting people at various places both in the study and outside the study area on why the two ethnic groups dominate the irregular migration to South Africa. All of them pointed their finger at one person—who was once Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa. They noted that this person, whose origin is from *Kembata-Tembaro* area, created job opportunities for some youth from his birth place when he was in his office in the Ethiopian Embassy in South Africa. These youth have got jobs around major cities of South Africa such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Pretoria, worked there for some years and some of them returned back home with the money they saved. Then after, they were engaged on investments, such as building hotels and malls, buying cars, mini-buses, etc. (this is discussed in detail in Section VII). This situation has motivated the rest youth in the area to migrate to South Africa.

Following this, the Ambassador of Ethiopia in RSA—now retired and lives in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa—was contacted and interviewed. He almost agreed to the above things that other people have mentioned. He was ambassador of Ethiopia in South Africa for two years (2000 and 2001) and as many people suggested above, he created opportunities to his fellow youths from *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* areas. He disagrees that he should be considered himself as the main cause for the massive irregular migration that is prevailing now.

To sum up ethnicity issue, it can be generalized from the information gained from many people and the ambassador himself that the he was the triggering cause for the irregular movement of youths from *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* areas. Ignorance of the issue at hand in the villages and towns surrounding these zones could be good evidence that the ambassador had a significant role on the launch of the movement of youth to South Africa. The role and importance of kinship and ethnicity is also explained under Section II in the three stylized migration model. It needs detailed further anthropological/sociologic research since there could be other channels flourished and facilitated the irregular migration (following the retirement of the Ambassador).

## **6. SMUGGLING, CHOICES OF PASSAGE AND FINANCING MIGRATION**

### **6.1 The Smuggling Network and Profiles**

From southern Ethiopia, the movement of young adults to South Africa is facilitated by a network of human smugglers (Sinedu, 2009; Messay, 2005). An in-depth interview done with the federal and regional police officials underlined that the age of those involved in smuggling from Ethiopia to RSA is not different from those they smuggle. As the IOM (2009) report notes, the

smugglers are predominantly male and their age ranges between 18 to 40 years and in most cases these Ethiopian smugglers work in association with several smugglers from Kenya and Somalia. The smuggling chains reported from the Ethiopian federal police and IOM (2009) pointed that different Somali and Kenyan top ‘managers’ reside in major capitals and at key nodes in the journey. In most cases, these managers work independently and with the chief smugglers rather than to have assistant facilitators drawn from localities at *woreda* or zonal level.

The interview done with the smugglers and return migrants revealed that migrants who have made their own way to Nairobi or Maputo, for example, can rejoin the network and continue their journey. They further noticed that every service has its price and all roads lead to South Africa. The smuggling chains are infinitely flexible because of the availability of different local agents and managers: if one contract faces a challenge, another can be activated. Absence of accountability is observed among the smugglers as it is reported by return migrants, and is one basic behavior of the smuggling chains. An abused migrant, for example, is unable to seek recompense from his/her smuggler for robbery, abuse or deception. And within the chain itself, the chief smuggler has limited control of how his clients are treated once they are beyond his control as underlined by returnees.

Regarding the type of organized crime and human smuggling networks, the model observed in human smuggling between southern Ethiopia down to South Africa is close to the supermarket model described by Shelly (2011). It is characterized by relatively low costs, a high failure rate at border crossings (requiring repeated attempts) and multiple actors acting independently or in loose affiliation, without a strong hierarchy or violent organizational discipline. Here, costs increase with increased border security.

The two interviewed smugglers understand that they are acting outside the law. The following are quotes from smugglers justifying their work:

For Ethiopian youth to gain a better life in South Africa, I was facilitating their migration. Before I was caught by a police, I had a secure connection at the Ethio-Kenya and Ethio-Somalia boarder.

*[A smuggler in detention, Addis Ababa]*

For God’s sake, I help people move to their chosen destination. Such people who would otherwise not be able to. I’m trying them to secure a better livelihood.

*[Chief smuggler in Hossana, Hadiya zone]*

Contrary to this, the view of those smuggled was quite different when considering the merits of the smugglers as pointed during an interview with return migrants. At the journey, smuggled migrants are trapped in the problem of wanting to rely on the smuggler for a lot of important

services, such as conversion, conciliation with police and immigration administrators and actual route direction.

Seventy percent of the sampled migrants (out migrants and returnees) report that smugglers have facilitated their movement. A fifth of them said that they have got their way to South Africa through their nearest friends acting like smugglers. Only 2% of the respondents went without having any contacts with the smugglers—moved with the direct supervision and help of their relatives found in South Africa. Regarding the way the migrants get the smuggler, over 74% of the respondents reported that they found the smuggler by themselves.

Information on having the necessary legal documents required for international travel such as passport and valid visa was obtained from return migrants. Accordingly, the majority of them (83%) pointed that they had a legal passport but no (valid) visa. Nearly 9% of them said they had neither legal passport nor valid visa. Only 8.4% of them had a legal passport and a valid visa before their movement. They further noticed that they have got either a forged passport and/or a forged visa on their way, which is mainly arranged by the smuggler found in countries south of Ethiopia. A higher proportion of the return migrants acquired South Africa visas for between €230 and €560 through facilitators in Nairobi as it is noted during the interview done with returnees. The following is an excerpt from the chief smuggler in Hossana:

In most cases, all the money is paid in advance. The smuggled migrants must have passports but not visas. By using the various money transfer systems, I usually send the share payments to the smuggler in Nairobi.

*[Chief smuggler, Hossana, Hadiya Zone]*

The following is also echoed by a return migrant during a discussion:


I took track to travel from Addis Ababa to Nairobi and then from Nairobi to Lilongwe (Malawi) and I flew directly. For the smuggler in Nairobi, I have paid 8200 ETB (around €360) for the Malawi visa.

*[A returnee, Hossana, Hadiya Zone]*

## **6.2 Typical Routes Used by Smuggled Migrants**

In terms of type of travel and routes, there are many choices for young adults looking to move to South Africa—depending mainly not only on their economic status but also on the choices offered by smugglers at any particular time. Flying is the most direct entry into RSA but as noted by returnees during the discussion, this is a costly option for most migrants since it needs having necessary paperwork, including obtaining a passport, visas and ticket. A combination of boat and road travel, or the overland travel entirely (over 56% of the interviewed traveled overland) are used as an alternate to direct air travel (see Map below). Almost all of the returnees reported that they have to walk certain distances and in some cases for days.

## ROUTES TAKEN BY SMUGGLED MIGRANTS



Young adults from southern Ethiopia move to South Africa as irregular migrants are usually organized straight from Addis Ababa or from Nairobi. The interview done with returnees revealed that Nairobi is a major hub in the smuggling business, where smuggled migrants who make it from their home area or Addis Ababa into Kenya via *Moyale* and *Mandera* (and much less through *Dilla*) make contact with the major smuggling organizers. Some irregular migrants make it to Nairobi alone and then search for a smuggler to take them down to RSA or another destination. The most common countries of transit include Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Some return migrants reported that they use boats to travel some distances over the Indian Ocean when the overland route is unsafe. They also told that most migrants have already agreed with smugglers/brokers in *Addis Ababa* or provincial towns like *Hossana* or *Dilla* to handle the whole journey, and the majority travel overland (over 74%). The smuggled migrants are required to pay bribes at the border immigration officers (mostly in *Moyale*—a town located just on the Ethio-Kenya border) through their brokers though the two countries have a bilateral agreement to allow each others' citizens free passage in each others' countries.

Nowadays, the pattern of smuggling is being changed from overland route via Nairobi (Addis, 2012) to an alternate direct flight route from *Addis Ababa* to *Maputo* (Mozambique). In the capital *Addis Ababa*, it is becoming easy to get Mozambican (tourist) visa than South African visa. Then the smuggled migrants fly directly from *Addis Ababa* to *Maputo* and take the overland route to South Africa as it is noted by Addis (2012). Further research is needed on the current status of the smuggling business and the ease of getting a Mozambican tourist visa.

### **6.3 Financing the Movement: Money Source and Amount**

In order to deal with the financing of the irregular migration to South Africa, the number of people moved between 1999 and 2010 has been estimated based on the information mainly from returnees and out migrants. The costs of smuggling are flexible due to the changing nature of the smuggling business in using different combinations of types of transport and taking different routes, where unexpected delays, obstacles and additional payment requirements are common. The following is an excerpt from the smuggler in *Hossana*:


In most cases, all the money is paid in advance. Despite stories desertion, the migrants will always agree to terms. They usually agree for not complaining when something goes wrong during the migration.

[A smuggler in *Hossana*]

A significant proportion of the smuggled migrants (48% of those involved in this study) funded their journey through the sale of private assets and livestock or with donations/loans from relatives within Ethiopia (Figure 6.1). The decision for a young adult, therefore, is not just a personal decision but a strategic, economic and investment decision by other family members.




**Figure 6.1 Money Source for Migration (%)**



Several returnees and out migrants (via proxy respondents) interviewed for this study spoke of different amounts paid for the entire journey, as well as different charges demanded for different legs of the journey. Figure 6.2 shows the initial amount of money paid for the chief smuggler by the individual migrant and does not include any additional money paid during the journey.

**Figure 6.2 Amount of Money Paid by Smuggled Migrants, 1999-2009**



The overall average amount of money paid is around €1436: the minimum one is €565 and the maximum one being €2609. The most common amount paid (the modal money) is €957. It can

easily be observed from the figure that the amount of money paid for the movement is increasing overtime. In 1999, for example, the mean amount of money paid was €643 and this has increased significantly over the coming years to reach (€1957) in 2009. The maximum money paid was around €957 in 1999, but increased with fluctuations, reaching a maximum of €2609 in 2006. A recent report by Addis (2012) noted that the highest amount of money needed for the smuggling from southern Ethiopia to South Africa reached around €5217.

The period between 2004 and 2006 was significant in all the values described by Figure 6.2, in which almost all of the values have recorded maximum over the trend years 1999 to 2009. This is the time when the majority of the smuggled migrants left their homeland (the data shows that half of the smuggled migrants left their homeland in these three years: 2004, 2005 and 2006). In this time, Ethiopia conducted the third-round national election (in 2004) and the elections with consequent associated political instabilities seem to create favorable conditions for the young adults to migrate irregularly. This in turn has become a suitable ground for the smuggling business to expand, which supports the demand-price theory of economics: as demand increases, price increases. Hence, as the number of youths seeking to migrate irregularly to RSA increases, the amount of money the smugglers ask also increases. In the following years (after 2006), the instabilities of the election has decreased and a relative political stability was observed, playing an opposite role for youths to migrate to South Africa.

In a discussion done with returnees, many of them reported robbery and incurred extraneous costs to pay police, prison officials, thieves and immigration officers along the way. The following is echoed by a young return migrant in *Doyo Gena*:

In many of our ways to South Africa, we were robbed several times. The police robbed us in Tanzania. In Zimbabwe, thieves stripped us on the boarder and beat up some of our friends including me. I can say the police and the thieves were too threatening and whenever they think you are hiding money, they use physical violence.

[A return migrant, *Doyo Gena*, *Kembata-Tembaro Zone*]

Therefore, the final amount of money to the smuggled person may be much more than the sum that was originally agreed upon or presented on Figure 6.2. The amount of money paid initially for the chief smuggler is not the only thing changed over the period indicated above. The type of people who participate in financing the money has also showed substantial difference in recent years. In late 1990s and early 2000s only one or two parties have involved in financing. In these early periods of migration, for example, families contributed (from their own source) for 68% the smuggled migrants and the rest (32%) covered by themselves. In the coming years, however, other parties began to involve in financing, such as the diasporas, the families by borrowing/selling their assets and the smuggled migrants by borrowing it from someone else or selling their assets. The irregular migration is becoming a family/group decision rather than personal one.

## 7. CONSEQUENCES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Migration, especially the irregular one, has its own effects in the area of departure, destination and transit places and on the migrant themselves. The type of irregularity may also change its form depending on situations. This section presents the consequences of the irregular movement of young adults to South Africa: economic and socio-demographic impacts mainly on the area of departure and on the migrants themselves. The main data sources to deal with the consequences of the irregular migration are information gained from return migrants.

### 7.1 Economic Impacts

Under the economic consequences, impacts on employment status, occupation, income, remittances, living standards, asset ownership and investment are assessed. Information on the employment status of return migrants before their movement and during the survey period shows that well over half of them (58%) were unemployed before their migration while this is only 7.3% during the survey period (February 2010). The majority of the return migrants (92.7%) reported that they are currently employed.

**Figure 7.1 Main Occupation of Returnees, before move & at survey (%)**





Figure 7.1 presents main occupation types of returnees before their migration to South Africa and during the survey. Trading is reported by the majority (54.3%) followed by private jobs (23.5%) and agriculture (14.8%) as the main livelihood occupations (before their migration). Government employees account for only 7.3% of the sample return migrants as their occupation type before move. After returning back to their homeland, trading is still the main occupation as reported by the majority of the returnees; however, its proportion has increased dramatically to 89.5%. All the rest occupations' share has decreased: both government jobs and agriculture account each for only 2.3% and that of other private jobs reduced to 8.2%. These figures clearly indicate how return migrants change their occupation type from agrarian and government employment to a service sector dominated by trading.

Similar to employment status and occupation type, the irregular migration to South Africa has also significantly affected the amount of money migrants earn. Figure 7.2 below shows the percentage distribution of average monthly income of return migrants before their migration and during the survey period.

**Figure 7.2 Average Monthly Income of Returnees, before move & at survey (%)**



Over 44% of the returnees (before their move) earned between €23 and €44 per month followed by those earning between €45 and €130 (38.3%). During the survey, returnees were also asked about their monthly income. The distribution is skewed towards the higher income groups. Two-third of the sample returnees earn above €434 monthly—no one found in this income group before migration. During the survey, no one reported to earn less than €22 per month among the sample returnees. The irregular migration is found to be economically advantageous for returnees earn better now than before their migration to South Africa.

One of the issues that should be dealt in migration studies is remittances. Data were collected on the amount and frequency of sending remittances by the smuggled migrants to their relatives at home. The majority (61.1%) of them send money regularly while 9.8% of them do not send at all. The average amount of money they send home is ETB 2,500 (€109) and the most commonly sent amount is ETB 3,000 (€130). The frequency of sending money varies from every month (8.5%) to more than a year (6.9%). Most of the smuggled migrants noted that they send money home once in every six month (28.6%) or once in three month (28.3%). The majority of the return migrants (87%) said that their present living standard is much better than before their movement to South Africa. Only 6.2% of them reported that there is little improvement and 6.7% of them noted their previous life was much better than the present one. These return migrants that claim their present life is worse are entirely (100%) came to homeland by deportation from transit countries (mainly Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique).

Regarding asset ownership and investment, the highest proportion (87%) of returnees reported that they had accumulated assets and wealth after return than before (only 18% of them had asset of any kind before their movement). Thirteen percent of them had no asset at all during the

survey, and among these 88% are again deported returnees. The assets include ownership of movable and non-movable items, such as farm land, house, business centers (hotels, shops, garages, etc.), vehicles, livestock, etc. The followed is echoed by a return migrant:

“Life is so better now than before. I have built a hotel & a supermarket after my return. I have also two buses. I have built a nice house to my parents, sponsored also two of my brothers to travel to RSA. There are over 20 workers under my company.”


*[A return migrant, Hossana]*

In addition to asset ownership, information is gathered on whether the returnees are engaged in some business and investment as well as on creating employment opportunities. Nearly 90% of them pointed that they have business firms and/or investments which created jobs for other people as well. The majority of them (88%) own their investment and 10.2% of them work in cooperation with others. About two-third (64%) of them reported that they have recruited employees under them and 17% of them created jobs for their relatives. The numbers of employees/relatives working under these returnees investments vary from 2 to 24, with an average of 9.

## 7.2 Social and Demographic Impacts

The distribution of the impact of migration on educational status of returnees is presented by Figure 7.3. The percentage change in education status before migration and during the survey period of returnees is not substantial. The main reason for this is that the majority of them (over 93%) claim their job type in South Africa is not appropriate to upgrade their education. Some 17% of them put they cannot afford the school fee there in RSA, in addition to their work type.

**Figure 7.3 Education Status of Returnees, before move & at survey (%)**



In a focus group discussion with non-migrants, many of them prefer to go to RSA—by whatever means—than attending schools at homeland. They argue that education is not their destiny, but

migration to South Africa. Having these feelings of non-migrants, the researchers have looked at SNNPR's education quality, mainly school dropout rates. SNNPR's education abstract of 2007/08 (SNNPR Education Bureau, 2009) pointed that school dropout rate is 13.8% in *Kembata-Tembaro* and 13.8% in *Hadiya*, which is the highest from all zones in the region and is well above the regional average (10%). The following is an excerpt from a non-migrant secondary school student in *Doyo Gena*:


Below God, we have only South Africa. I prefer to migrate to RSA than attending my lessons, but I don't have enough money for the migration. I can see my friends becoming rich after migration to RSA while those educated people are not as such.

[A non-migrant, *DoyoGena, Kembata-Tembaro*]

These figures support the idea that non-migrants are giving less attention to education, which leads commonly to school dropouts. However, it needs further detail research to what extent the migration to RSA affected education and schooling of the two zones.

Unlike education, the marital status of return migrants has showed significant change. Figure 7.4 below shows that the percentage of married migrants increased significantly after they came back to home. Only 29.2% of them were married before their movement; however, this figure increased by over two fold (64%). Contrary to that, the share of singles decreased from 62% to 26 %. This implies that the irregular migration to RSA increases the propensity of marriages of young adults when they return back to their homeland.

**Figure 7.4 Marital Status of Returnees, before move and & at survey (%)**



Looking at the dependency burden of the return migrants gives also another insight in to the demographic impacts of the irregular migration of youths. Among sample return migrants taken for this study, only 32.6% of them were household heads before their movement; however, 58% of them became head of their households during the survey time. That means, they had more dependents now than before. The dependents include spouse, children, brothers and sisters as well as fathers and mothers.

### 7.3 Harsh Consequences

For most smuggled young adults migrating down to RSA from the southern parts of Ethiopia, the conditions of travel are harsh and much more difficult than what they expect. Information gained from discussion with returnees depicts that they usually travel in groups of 15 to 20, although at different stages of the journey they may be put in groups of 50 or more. It usually takes weeks or even months to reach RSA, although the average length of journey amongst those interviewed was ten weeks. A substantial portion of the smuggled migrants (38%) reached RSA very late from what they expected while 23% of them reported that they reached South Africa on time. The majority (69%) of those who reached RSA on time are used air plane transport for most of their journey where as the vast majority (over 92%) of those that reached RSA far from their expectations are used foot, car and/or boat as their main transportation system.

Many of the returnees pointed that the movement to RSA is characterized by travel in dark, cramped staying/journey spaces, hiding in woods or so-called safe houses, robberies, beatings from an arrest by local police and multiple shakedowns for bribes from the countries officials they encounter. The discussants also mentioned the use of sealed, airless containers and overloaded boats adds to the travelers' vulnerability and abuse. Provision of basic needs such as food and water as well as health and sanitation amenities are often minimal, and migrants are frequently forced to travel on foot with night guides to avoid police, military and immigration officers. The majority (68%) of return migrants participated in this study get no or very little basic needs on their way down to South Africa. Stories of death, disappearances and rape are uncommon, but they do exist (2.5% reported sexual violence and 29.5% of them observed death). Beatings are more common and linked to police and robbers encountered. Problems are common for those who travel some of their journey via boats, as the following accounts indicate during a focus group discussion with returnees:

When we bordered in a boat to a coastal town in Tanzania, the boat lost power after some time and drifted into the sea. There in the sea, we spent for almost a month. We nearly ate each other out of hunger as our supplies ran out after the first week. Finally, we were rescued by a European vessel moving over the Indian Ocean.

*[A young return migrant, DoyoGena, Kembata-Tembaro]*

In a forest place in Malawi, we stayed for 15 days without food or water. We are almost dying and tried to eat leaves and grass. Many of my friends there in the forest fainted and two of them disappeared.

*[A return migrant, Angacha, Kembata-Tembaro]*

Almost all of the returnees reported that the smugglers appear to observe shelter and food as insignificant to the migrants during the journey. They also appear to be led through hazardous

areas, such as national parks and other inaccessible areas where food and shelter are not available for lengthy periods. The following is echoed by a return migrant in *Hossana*:

In one night, we were attacked by a lion. One of our friends is eaten by the lion and it was really sad. We slept in the open cold for days. I was also beaten up by robbers and Tanzanian police.

[A return migrant, *Hossana*]

The information gained from return migrants also showed that they are frequently arrested, detained and imprisoned in mainstream prisons—mainly in prisons of Tanzania and Mozambique. They have mentioned suffering during their stay at these prisons, as the following return migrant in *Doyo Gena* town noted:

When we were caught in Tanzania, we were sentenced to six months in prison. There, I spent almost six months in jail. I can say this prison was my worst experience. They give a very small amount of food once in a day.

[A returnee, *Doyo Gena*]

During the focus group discussion, many of the returnees expressed a sense of anger and human right violations at their treatment. The following extract is an example of human right abuses, supposedly committed by government authorities:

In many of our journeys, I was physically and emotionally abused by the smugglers, police and transport operators. In one night in a house in a small town in Malawi, we heard the scream of the girls with us raped by smugglers and their friends.

[A return migrant, *Doyo Gena, Kembata-Tembaro*]

A substantial number of smuggled migrants were transported inside a closed container. In addition to the space containers afford, they are also very anonymous and easy to move around without raising suspicion. As noted by the majority of return migrants during discussion, the containers are simple for authorities to turn a shade, obviously with some inducement and support from the smuggler. The following is an extract from a returnee in *Hossana*:

Once in Malawi, we were loaded into another container between three and four in the morning. By sunrise we were suffocating. We tried to stop the driver by banging on the walls. I don't think he heard us...he just wouldn't stop the truck. About ten people started fainting. When the police opened the container later I was already unconscious. I then found myself with many other sick people at a camp. I was told five people had died.

[A young return migrant, *Hossana, Hadiya*]



Overall, the consequences of irregular migration are so diverse and the above discussed impacts are only some of them. A further detail research on the consequences during the journey and the transit countries, at South Africa, and at family/community and society at large is essential as well as on its current situations.

## **8. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **8.1 Summary and Conclusion**

This study investigates the socio-economic and demographic causes and consequences of the irregular migration of young adults from selected areas in southern Ethiopia—*Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* Zones—to the Republic of South Africa. Emphasis has been given to the area of departure and the migrant themselves and very little has been done on the area of destination (RSA) and transit countries. The investigation was done mainly on the quantitative data collected via questionnaire from 658 randomly selected migrants (226 out migrants, 193 returnees and 239 non-migrants) between February and May 2010. Information about out migrants is gained from their families at homeland. Additional data are also collected using key informant interview as well as focused group discussions. In doing so, the key research questions set to be answered were: (i) Are there differences in the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics between migrants and non-migrants? (ii) What factors initiate young adults to migrate irregularly? (iii) What is the role of smuggling and finance in the irregular movement of the young adults? (iv) What are the socioeconomic and demographic consequences of such migration on the migrants and their families?

The analysis of respondents' demographic characteristics indicate the majority of them are male (over 82%). This sex selectivity of migration of youth is mainly attributable to the type of work available in RSA as well as the difficulty of the journey, which on the average takes over two months. Moreover, the migration of youth to South Africa is age selective. About a quarter of them were found in 25-29 age groups and over 57% of them lie between ages 20 to 34. The volume of migrants became lowest below age 20 and above 45. The study also indicated that the irregular movement of young adults to RSA is marital status selective: the majority of the sampled migrants (over 54%) were found to be single during the survey period and only a little above a third of them (36.9%) were currently married. The presence of family burden was attributable to the marital selectivity of migration.

The majority (72%) of the respondents' current residence is found largely to be rural, and this is true for both *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* Zones. Substantial percentages of respondents (37%) are first born child and over half (52%) of them are either first or second born. Most of the non-migrants are late born children (64% of them six and above birth order). The majority of the respondents belong to households of size between 5 and 9. Fifty-two percent of the sample respondents are from *Hadiya* ethnic groups followed by *Kembata-Tembaro* (41%).

When education is analyzed as one of the socio-economic characteristics of respondents, the majorities of them (95%) are literate, and among them 51.4% completed secondary education followed by primary education completion (29.3%) during the survey. The respondents' age, as stated earlier, is largely found in early to mid 20s, and this is the time when they could finish a secondary education. That is why youth that completed secondary education completers dominate among others.

Employment status, occupation type and income of both household heads' and that of the respondents are also assessed in this study. Nearly half (48.3%) of the respondents are unemployed during the survey period where the wide variation between unemployed-employed is observed among out migrants (33.6% of them unemployed while 66.4% of them employed) at the survey. The majority the sample respondents (59%) were engaged in trading activities followed by agriculture (15%). The distribution of income for the employed respondents gives varied figures among the three migrant types.

The multivariate analysis showed that age, residence and employment status are found to have a significant positive association with the outcome variable (migration) while sex, marital status, education status, duration of continuous residence in the current place and birth order have a significant negative association. Unlike these, ethnicity and household size found insignificantly related with migration. Over 44% of respondents view that the main cause for the irregular migration of young adults to be *perceived better opportunities* in South Africa and only 8% of them claimed poverty as the main cause. What drives the migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to RSA is not absolute deprivation or poverty, but relative deprivation—the sense that one would be better off. The role of an Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa is assumed to be a trigger for the current vast migration of young adults as noted by many peoples in the study area and to some extent by the ambassador himself.

The study found that the movement of young adults from southern Ethiopia to RSA is facilitated by a network of human smugglers found in *Addis Ababa, Hossana, Dilla* or other major Capitals here in Ethiopia, and they work in association with several smugglers from Kenya and Somalia. Concerning the documents required for international movement, the over whelming percentages of them smuggled migrants (over 83%) reported they had a legal passport but no valid/legal visa, and nearly 9% of them had neither legal passport nor visa. They pointed that forged forms of such documents are arranged by smugglers or other facilitators here in Addis Ababa and/or Nairobi. This by itself indicates the intensity of illegal documentation/forgery and how it facilitates the irregular movement of youths. The movement is typically organized directly from Ethiopia or Nairobi. It has also noticed that the mode of transport and routes used can be altered on short notice, depending on circumstances.

Several smuggled migrants (out migrants and returnees) spoke of different amounts paid for the main smuggler and this varied from €565 to €2609 with an average of €1436. Recent literatures put the highest amount at over €5217. The money is paid usually in advance. They also pay other

unexpected money as well as different charges demanded during their journey. Nearly half of the smuggled migrants funded their journey through the sale of private assets or borrowed from other people. A fifth of them said that their journey was financed by relatives abroad. The study also found that more people now than earlier participate in financing the movement, i.e. migration is becoming a family rather than a personal decision.

As to the effects of the irregular movement of young adults to RSA, where the main data is based on the information gained from returnees, the study had the following findings. Trading is still found to be a dominant occupation and the percentage increased from 54.3 to nearly 90%. They found to have better employed during the survey than before their move to RSA. More returnees earn better at survey time than before: 40% of them earn above €2173 at survey while 44.4% of them earn between €23 and €44 before their move. The marital status of returnees also changed significantly: most of them (64%) are married at the survey time while it was only 29% before their migration.

Remittance sending frequency and amount has been assessed in this study and accordingly over 61% of the smuggled migrants regularly send money to their relatives at home. The average amount of remittance sent by these migrants was found to be €109. The vast majority (87%) of returnees reported that their present living standard is much better than before moving to RSA. All of the deported returnees found to say that their present life is worse than the previous one. On the other hand, return migrants have showed little or no improvement in their education status before move and at the survey. The type of job they are doing there in RSA is not convenient to attend schools is cited by most of them as the main reason followed by having no interest to education at all.

The highest proportion of the smuggled migrants said that their journeys were harsh with unexpected negative consequences. Thirty eight percent of them reported that they were beaten or physically robbed at least once and thirty percent of them spoke of death during the journey. Most of them (45%) noted that they did not reached RSA on time, and it usually takes weeks or even months/years to reach RSA. Those that reported to reach on time are mainly those that used air plane as their major transport. A substantial percentage of smuggled migrants were transported inside a closed container, which are easy for officials to turn a blind eye; however, it was much disastrous as reported by the majority of returnees.

To sum up, the youth, not only in *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* areas, but also in other part of Ethiopia, are progressively seeing the merits of the remaining of the world as exposed to film/TV and the internet, in addition to knowing the earning probable in a culture of remittance that has developed in recent periods. With today's simplicity of communication and returning migrants that aspiring in the source communities at homeland, it is likely that the vibrant of departing Ethiopia to get work and chance will continue, any probable brutality they many encounter during the journey and/or in RSA. As South Africa continues to present better survival chances, it will keep on attracting thousands of young Ethiopians. Smuggling these Ethiopians to South

Africa will similarly persist provided that the demand is soaring even if it could modify its structure.

## **8.2 Policy Recommendations**

In dealing with irregular and undocumented movement of people the major challenge for policy makers and national governments is how to address the problem that from the points of view of the migrant, the smuggling network, families of migrants as well as the profiteering officials. Therefore, the following recommendations are forwarded as a policy options for government officials and other concerned bodies to minimize smuggled migrants' suffering as well as to maximize the advantages that could be obtained from it:

1. This study is done based on data only from area of departure. There should be better data and research, both qualitative and quantitative, on the number of people being smuggled, their motivations, where they end up and how they are smuggled as well as the consequences of the migration both at micro and macro level. Understanding their liability and the level of the problem will support in avoidance as well as securing the life of the migrants. Moreover, the Ethiopian government should have legal review to establish where accord and discord occur in relation to addressing the problem of smuggling and irregular migrants.
2. The economic advantage of those succesful migrants is higher in remittance sending and creating employment opportunities at homeland. The living standard of the majority of returnees is better at the survey time than before their migration. The Ethiopian government should have some legal foundation that supports formal transfer of private employment agencies, just like transferring Ethiopian women to the Middles East countries, which facilitate legal emigration of youth from Ethiopia to RSA. Having restrictive policies by themselves may not stop the smuggling business and the problems the smuggled migrants are suffering, rather it further expands to have more irregular migration and smuggling.
3. Most of the non-migrants strongly associate their destiny with migration to RSA. Such irregular movement of youth will possibly expand to other surrounding areas. There should be information campaigns to promote public awareness of the dangers of being smuggled, human rights and who to contact if their personal safety is compromised, etc. by using different medias such as radios, newspapers, schools and religious institutions.
4. The problem under study is mainly observed in the southern region of the country and more specifically in the very densely populated *Kembata-Tembaro* and *Hadiya* zones. SNNPR's Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs, Police Commission, Bureau of Youth and Sports, all should have communication, cooperation and information-sharing concerning the movement and monitoring of smuggling and the smuggled migrants. They should also cooperate and share practices with the federal government aimed at harmonizing their collective governmental policies and laws in relation to smugglers and smuggled migrants.

5. School dropouts are found to be high in the study areas, which is partly associated with the irregular migration of youths to RSA. Both the regional and respective zonal education departments should work hard as how to minimize school dropouts. Unless otherwise, more students will chose to terminate schooling intended to migrate to South Africa.
6. Poverty and unemployment together are cited by substantial percentages (28.9%) of the smuggled migrants as main cause for migration. For this reason, all efforts to reduce poverty, increase arable land access, and create employment opportunities to the youth should be expected to have an impact on the flow of migrants seeking a new life in RSA. Both the local and regional/national government should give emphasis for the youth through poverty reduction and employment creation. The youth should be promoted to work and live in their homeland, by providing them credits, organizing them in micro enterprises, etc. This will help in reducing the role of push factors.
7. South Africa has to explore, as the attracting country, whether it can develop a policy of permitting quota of migrants to officially enter RSA to work in some capacity if the current flow of irregular migrants signifies a real filling of employment positions unmet by local workers. This goes with recommendation 2 above, since it requires official brokers' office in RSA to facilitate the legal move between the two countries.
8. Many smuggled migrants face harsh and unexpected violations. Smuggled migrants must not be prone to criminal action and they must not endure violations and abuse of any kind. They should not be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment as ordinary criminals. Irregular migrants filling prisons make an intolerable burden for host country. The Ethiopian government should work hard with countries where these imprisoned migrants are there, to return in an organized way with appropriate consideration for the safety and dignity of the smuggled migrants to their homeland.

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
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## Appendix I

### MAP OF THE STUDY AREA



## Appendix II

### Operational Definition of Variables for the Binary Logistic Regression Model

S. N	Variable	Categories	Definition
<i>The dependent variable</i>			
1.	Migration Status	Migrant (OM+RM <sup>11</sup> ): coded = 1 Non-migrant: coded = 0	The classification of respondents based on their migration to RSA
<i>Independent Variables</i>			
1.	Age	15-24 (RC <sup>12</sup> ) 25-34 35-44 45+	The length of time that a person has lived, measured in number of years defined in terms of the last birthday.
2.	Sex	Male (RC) Female	The biological classification of a person as male or female
3.	Marital Status	Single (RC) Married Divorced/Widowed/Separated Cohabited	The classification of the marriage situation of people.
4.	Residence	Urban (RC) Rural	The place where one usually eats and sleeps (related to <i>dejure</i> )
5.	Continuous Duration	Continuous variable , measured in number of years lived	Duration of continuous residence in the current place.
6.	Education Status	Illiterate (RC) Primary Secondary Diploma and above	The educational attainment status and/or the highest grade completed by a person.
7.	Employment	Unemployed (RC) Employed	The work status of a respondent (paid work).
8.	Household size	Continuous variable	The number of people living in the sample households (including OM).
9.	Birth Order	Continuous, measured by the first, second...birth children	The sequential order of birth of a child.
10.	Ethnicity	Hadiya (RC) Kembata-Tembaro Amhara Guraghe Others	A common cultural heritage that sets a group apart on the basis of national origin, ancestry, language, religion, and similar characteristics.

<sup>11</sup> OM+RM = Out Migrant and Return Migrant

<sup>12</sup> RC = Reference Category