Abstract
This paper adds to the intrahousehold allocation literature by incorporating migration and remittances using datasets from the Philippines. I examine whether the individual’s bargaining power within the household affects how remittances are allocated or spent. I use gender and education of household head as proxies for bargaining power, taking into consideration the moral hazard problem. I estimate a generalized linear model with logit link function and the binomial distribution since the outcome variables are expenditure share on nine categories of goods. The results suggest that female heads with absent spouse allocate remittances more on education and health, and less on alcohol and tobacco. These are consistent with the general findings of empirical tests on income pooling. Male heads with migrant spouse devote more on alcohol, tobacco, and education; less on food. The allocations of male heads on education and food are consistent with the presence of the wife. Educational attainment of the head also captures heterogeneity in the allocation of remittances among male- and among female-headed households. It appears that it is the less-formally educated heads who value and allocate more remittances on education, this is true for all female-headed households and male-headed households whose wives are present.
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Event ID
17
Paper presenter
56 217
Type of Submissions
Regular session presentation, if not selected I agree to present my paper as a poster
Language of Presentation
English
Initial Second Choice
Weight in Programme
1 000
Status in Programme
1
Submitted by marjorie.pajaron on