Socioeconomic differentials in fertility and family formation

The aim of this paper is to identify effecting factors on the gap between actual and preferred fertility in different levels of fertility in Iran. This research is conducted by survey method. The statistical population covered ever-married women aged 35-45 belonging to one of the household’s resident in two provinces. The total sample size was 800 household. A combination of sampling techniques including multistage clustering and systematic random sampling were employed. According to this study in Semnan province with below replacement fertility, the actual number of children is lower than of ideal family size and also the intended number of children. In Hormozgan province with above replacement fertility, 40% of women report that their actual number is higher than preferred number. High overachieved preferred parity can be attributed to some of an “unmet need” for contraception. We argue that the reasons for the gap are both individual and familial. The finding study identifies that cost of having children, tendency of women for higher education, unequal role in family life affecting the gap between actual and preferred number of children.
Keywords: actual, intended and preferred fertility, unmet intentions, value of childbearing, Iran

The current study examines the role of educational expansion and son preference in the Korean fertility transition. Educational expansion contributes to fertility decline. The implication of son preference on fertility transition, however, is complicated. Son preference would delay fertility transition because strong son preference would lead to additional births among the sonless women. Induced abortion of female fetus due to son preference, instead, may reduce fertility. I examine how educational differentials in fertility changed, how the son preference effect on fertility changed over time, and how the son preference effect depended on women’s educational attainment. Using the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging (KLoSA), I estimate logistic regression models and Cox proportional hazard models. Preliminary results point to the followings. First, negative relationship between schooling and parity progression became stronger across birth cohorts. Second, positive relationship between sonlessness and parity progression also became stronger. Finally, son preference effect does not depend upon schooling. The significant interaction between sonlessness and cohort suggests that spread of effective contraceptive methods strengthened the effect of son preference on fertility, contributing to fertility decline.

Out of any expectation, fertility fell down very rapidly in the last three decades of the past century. From 8.1 children per women in 1970 TFR reached 2.2 in 2001, almost exactly the replacement level. However, marital fertility reduced less (from 11.1 children per women in 1970 to 5.9 in 2001) and remained quite high.
While general fertility was strongly associated to indicators of the modernization like, urbanisation, level of education, women’ occupational activity, etc., marital fertility was not or very few. It seems clear that the influence of these pieces of modernization on fertility is mainly the result of their influence on age at marriage, which determines the beginning of the actual period of reproductive activity open to women, and much less that of contraception, which determines childbearing during the marriage.
We got the opportunity of accessing an extract of individual data from the 1998 census. Togather with aggregate data from all other available surveys (ENSP 1970, ENAF 1986, Papchild 1992, Pamfam 2001, MICS-3 2006) and censuses (1966, 1977, 1987, 1998, 2008), it helps to understand the factors of the Algerian fertility transition, especially, the link between socioeconomic characteristics, levels of fertility and marriage practices.