Low fertility: theories and empirical evidence

Although it is well documented that the correlation between female labor participation rate (FLPR) and total fertility rate (TFR) among the OECD countries changed from negative (where countries with higher FLPR had lower TFR) to positive during the 1980s, it has not been well known whether this implies a change in the causal relationship between the two variables and, if it does, what the mechanism behind this change is. This article shows that the average effect of FLPR on TFR is still negative when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the TFR level, but this effect has been weakened through two mechanisms that involve the role of work-life balance: (1) an interaction effect of FLPR and work-life balance on TFR and (2) a positive indirect effect of FLPR on TFR through the attainment of work-life balance. It also shows that two aspects of work-life balance, namely, compatibility between work and childrearing and the flexibility of workplace and employment, play distinct roles in realizing those two mechanisms.

Viewing comparative fertility trends through a prism of World War II (WWII) alliances, an odd pattern emerges. The members of the Tripartite Pact—Italy, Germany, and Japan—have among the lowest fertility rates in the world, while the countries that led the Allies at the end of World War II—Great Britain, the USA, and France—are outliers for their high fertility. This paper first argues that the association is not mere coincidence, but the product of specific cultural and institutional formations that emerged after the war. How could wartime alliances half a century ago influence contemporary fertility? What social, cultural, and institutional forces and processes account for these remarkable differences? And what do those forces and processes imply for theories of fertility more generally? This paper uses long-term national fertility trends to address these broader questions. We argue that many of the economic and cultural factors most critical to fertility rates have deep political roots. A coherent model of low fertility must be embedded in a comprehensive theory of social action. Social action, in turn, entails allegiances and alliances, both individual and collective.

While rapid fertility decline in India in the last two decades has received considerable attention, much of the discourse has focused on a decline in high parity births. However, this paper finds that, almost hidden from the public gaze, a small segment of the Indian population has begun the transition to extremely low fertility. Among the urban middle classes, it is no longer unusual to find families stopping at one child, even when this child is a girl. Using data from the India Human Development Survey of 2004-2005, this paper examines the factors that may lead some families to stop at a single child. Better understanding of the correlates of this small but distinct segment of society also provides a window into the role of demographic behaviour in shaping the future of social inequality in a society undergoing rapid transition.

This paper aims to investigate whether friends’ and peers’ behaviour influence an individual’s entry into marriage and parenthood during the transition to adulthood of young, U.S. adults. After first studying entry into marriage and parenthood as two independent events, we then examine them as interrelated processes, thereby considering them as two joint outcomes of an individual’s unique, underlying family-formation strategy. Using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we engage in a series of discrete time event history models to test whether the larger the number of friends and peers who get married (or have a child), the sooner the individual gets married (or has a child). Results show strong cross-friend effects on entry into parenthood, whereas entry into marriage is only affected by peer effects. Estimates of a multiprocess model show that cross-friend effects on entry into parenthood remain strongly significant even when we control for cross-process unobserved heterogeneity.

Total fertility rate as a social parameter affects by different economic, social, cultural and institutional factors. Inglehart’s theory of cultural change explains and theorizes social changes sourced economically within a time process.
The main goal of this study is to examine Inglehart’s theory of cultural change in terms of rising trance material values, adopted by effect of economic indices on total fertility rate, by modeling and expecting total fertility rate up to 2025, based on four economic variables: GDP growth, gross saving, consumption price index and GDP per capita growth, and four social indices including: life expectancy at birth, total fertility rate, literacy level of total population and +25. Within three economic scenarios: continuing current trend, subsidize law and achieving 2025 vision goals.
The used data of socio-economic indices were worked out from Statistics of World Bank and Statistical Center of Iran.
Methodology of this study was based on Neurotic Net Work ( that named GMDH algorithm).In this study, we put selected variables affected on fertility change in Iran in the model and then predicted total fertility rate for 5 years periods up to 2025.
Based on three scenarios total fertility rate will reach to 1.34, 1.33 and 1.29 in 2025.

Since late 1980s Russia has experienced a steep decline of fertility. The nadir of it was reached in 1999, right after the default, with the total fertility rate reaching the low of 1.17. In academic community there is a debate of what this trend is attributed to. Some scholars link it with the postponed effect of the population policy that was implemented in the former USSR in the 1980s. Others make a claim that Russia is currently on the modernization path and, similarly to the countries of Western Europe, is undergoing the second demographic transition.
Both explanations are related to the tempo compound of the fertility process. In the paper I provide a detailed analysis of why these two explanations account for only a small part of the phenomenon of the steep decline of fertility.
The analysis led to conclusion that tempo effect on the decline of fertility in Russia is very limited. I elaborate on the reason that, most likely, is the major cause of the low fertility in the country. That is deterioration of the standards of living, collapse of national currency, irregularity in paying salary that was typical for the 1990’s and other economic factors. In this analysis I made an attempt to divorce the purely economic factor from the factor described as the deterioration of the “greenhouse effect”.

Using panel survey data with comparable variables, this study tests whether certain sets of hypotheses that are related to rational-choice and purposive-action theories of birth behavior hold in Korea as well as in Japan. We found many commonalities although the magnitude of the effects of the determinants of fertility differs. First, the negative interaction effect between parity and income on fertility rate predicted by Gary Becker’s theory exists for both Japan and Korea. The theory is supported more strongly for Korea than for Japan, however. This indicates that policies to reduce the costs of attaining “high-quality children,” such as the expenses of high-quality education and daycare, will be effective in raising fertility, but more efficiently so in Korea than in Japan.

Second, we found that the availability of childcare leave increases the rate of marital fertility in both Japan and Korea. This tendency, however, holds more strongly in Japan than in Korea and indicates that childcare leave policies in Japan have been more successful than their Korean counterparts in raising fertility.

This paper investigates patterns of fertility decline in the four Asian Tiger countries with newly industrialized economies (NIEs) - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan; and empirically test the relative importance of fertility decline and immigration on population aging. This paper contributes to the understanding of fertility decline in these four countries in the context of prominent demographic theoretical frameworks of fertility decline. Furthermore, drawing from emerging literature on the cause and consequences of “ultra-low” fertility in these countries, I aim to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework to better understand the fertility decline in these four countries in region-specific context rather than through convergence to the West paradigm. In addition, using the cohort-component population projection method, I test the effects of fertility decline and immigration on population aging. Findings suggest fertility decline in these four countries is a complex process that requires a comprehensive theoretical framework. In addition, fertility decline has a greater impact than immigration on population aging; and there is the need to focus on public policy to address the low fertility rather than immigration in these countries.

The decline in fertility is more prominent in the southern regions in comparison to other regions of India. In this regard how much change in fertility in lowest fertility states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu (mean children ever born is less than 2.5) could be attributed because of household wealth index apart from other explanatory factors is remains unanswered. The research hypothesis is that economic status of the household is the main factor of fertility decline although there is still debate about which are the predominant factors? With the help of decomposition analysis by using data from National Family Health Survey, 1992-93 and 2005-06 we will quantify the role of each independent covariate. So, an attempt has been made to examine the contribution of each selected covariate to the overall decline in fertility of Kerala and Tamil Nadu states, with the help of Poisson regression decomposition analysis. Analysis reveals that in both the states propensity component explained more than 50% of the total change in fertility. Number of living sons and daughters, women’s education and contraceptive use contributed significantly in overall declining the fertility. More specifically, women belong to medium and upper wealth quintiles, educated women contributed more in overall declining the fertility.

Research that explores the influence of mental health on fertility is limited. Mental health is a factor in the formation of relationships and may influence fertility related behavior. This analysis presents findings of an initial effort to assess the relationship between psychiatric disorders and fertility of women aged 40 years and older. The initial focus for this analysis is on childlessness.
Data for the analysis are from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R), a nationally representative face-to-face household survey of adults in the United States conducted from 2001 to 2003. NCS-R retrospectively assessed predictors and prevalence of mental health disorders, substance use disorders. We examined childlessness as related to each of the major DSM-IV psychiatric disorders. A separate model was constructed for each psychiatric disorder and education and marital status were controlled.
Among the sample of women, those who had been diagnosed with conduct disorder were 2.6 times more likely to be childless compared women without conduct disorder, controlling for the covariates. Those diagnosed with drug abuse disorder were 2.1 times more likely to be childless. While the crude odds of childlessness was significantly higher among those with alcohol abuse disorder, the adjusted odds were not significant.