The youth bulge: What are its socio-economic and political consequences?

While a number of studies have examined the demographic processes behind Indonesia’s youth bulge, or have noted the potential consequences at a macro level, there have been no large scale studies of the political and religious views and attitudes of Indonesia’s youth bulge. In this paper we aim to shed some light on this issue using data from a recent survey of 3,006 Indonesian young adults aged 20-34 living in Greater Jakarta. The data collected a wide range of information on the religious and political views, and digital connectedness of young adults, as well as their life time aspirations and satisfaction with various aspects of their current lives. Such study is timely given the current political situation in Indonesia, a country with the largest Muslim population in the world. About twelve years following the onset of the Reform in 1998, forces of democracy continue to compete with a plethora of conservative movements promoting traditional customary laws and religious sentiments, including at one extreme, a call for an Islamic state.

Despite the high consideration given to the youth issues in the national population policies, including building their capacity and absorbing them in the labor market, few studies have analyzed the economic and political impacts of youth bulge in Sudan. Those under the age of 25 and the young people aged 15- 24 represent 60% and 20% of the total population respectively. As the result of the transition of the huge masses of age group 0-15 over decades and the prevailing total fertility rate of 3.9, population will continue to grow and more youth bulges will be experienced. Countries with large numbers of working age youth can achieve demographic dividends, given that the youth are well educated and employed, otherwise may suffer political instability and conflicts. This paper, using quantitative data, analyzes the impact of youth bulge on economic growth and the on going armed conflicts in Sudan as well as the opportunities and threats associated with it. The experience of other countries with youth bulges such as the Arab spring will also be considered. Understanding the role of the youth bulge enables policy makers to formulate evidence-based policies conducive to mitigate the negative impacts of demographics. The prevailing unemployment among highly educated youth, besides health and educational problems support the hypothesis

The purpose of this paper is to examine more closely the relationship between youth bulges and conflict as it pertains to the popular uprisings that have come to be known as the Arab Spring. Due to its demographic significance as the most populated country in the Middle East and host to the region’s largest youth population, Egypt was chosen as the starting point for the study of this relationship. Using Bhrolchain and Dyson’s (2007) framework for determining causation, this paper attempts to uncover whether there is a casual relationship between the youth bulge and the popular uprising in Egypt. It concludes that while there is a causal link, it must be viewed within the wider political and socio-economic context in the country and that the youth bulge only accounts for a portion of the frustrations that led to the uprising. Most importantly, it calls for a critical reexamination of some of the underlying theories and assumptions about youth bulges and their political and socio-economic consequences.

Youth constitutes about one fifth of total population of India. Among many challenges they face, unemployment and education are the most critical. This paper reviews the age structure over the decade and examines the growth of young age groups and also analyzes the changing pattern of education and how does it affect the entry in on labour market entry. National Sample Survey data during last one decade i.e. 1993/94 to 2004/05 has been used for the study. The age structure of the population indicates larger addition to the labour force in coming decades. Over the years, youth inactivity in terms of economic activity has increased, though there have been large differentials at state level in India. Among major activity taken by young population instead of being economically active is education. On the other hand, percentage of youth inactivity is approximately 5 percent during this period while share of youth neither in education nor in employment (NEET) in total youth population has increased by 8 percent. However, female inactivity comes out as the major issues as they are neither in education nor in employment and largely go to out of labour force and engaged in household duties. Education system of country is not capable to supply as per the demand of tertiary sector which results into higher unemployment.

There is much talk of the youth bulge in Pakistan with over 20 per cent of the population, equalling around 40 million, aged 15-24 years. This discourse, however, in most cases misses the inequality in opportunities available to youth that can hinder their successful transition to adulthood. This can have consequences, economic, social and political, not only for the individual but also for the country. An analysis of the HIES shows that 39 per cent of the youth in Pakistan are disconnected from both employment and educational opportunities, with the rates being higher for females and rural areas than for males and urban areas, respectively. Regional differences are also evident among the four provinces, as are those shown by varying household income levels. Educational disconnect seem to mire both, working and non-working youth, with one-third having never been to school. Low end jobs adopted by the working youth are a clear manifestation of this trend. Youth’s own future and that of the country, which aims to achieve the ‘demographic dividend’, are at stake with such high levels of disconnect. Serious steps need to be taken to engage these youth and consequently help manage the negative socio-political and economic impact the country might have to face otherwise.

The world has been amazed by social movements taking place in the Muslim Middle East and North African (MMENA) countries since 2010, particularly a large presence of young men and women in street demonstrations. These social movements have in part been attributed to high unemployment rates and poverty among young people who constitute a large share of the population. Some countries in East Asia and South America have made substantial socio-economic progress by particularly investing in education, reproductive health and economic activity of young women. This paper uses a range of data sources to investigate the extent to which women's status is associated with the level of socio-economic development in the MMENA countries in the year 2009, just before the recent social unrests began. There is a considerable diversity in development and women's status in the region, yet the level of development is found to be associated with women's higher access to education, better reproductive health and labour force participation. This suggests that the demographic changes taking place in the region and the power created by the current age structure of women can be guided and used to speed up the process of development within a favourable socio-political environment.

The relationship between population change and economic growth logically creates a key link between youth budge and labor market entry distress, resulting from labor supply-demand mismatch, necessitating diverse policy interventions. The paper seeks to understand the phenomenon of Cameroon youth bulge as a stress factor in labor market entry, and the link between policy efforts and labor market entry behaviors of prospective young entrants. A sample of 739 young graduates (51.8% males) was drawn from higher education policy intervention programme for information gathering. An instrument was validated to measure education policy efforts, self-efficacy, optimism, attitudes and intention levels, and qualitative and quantitative approaches employed in data analysis. Significant positive associations were observed among core variables; validating the proposed model of youth bulge and labor market outcome behaviors, and confirming the facilitating role of policy in entry behaviors. The predictive powers of behavior states on venture intent of youth cohort were confirmed and a gendered analysis of policy impact showed significant difference in favor of males except for optimism. Although policy intervention revealed hopeful results, qualitative analysis showed conspicuous gaps in policy formulation and implementation.

As globally 2.5 billion more people are going to be added by 2075 to current population and as 85% of these additions will be from developing countries with a very high proportion young population, it raises the concern that in future the destabilising effects of demographic changes could have a profound impact not only on national security but also global security. This concern has been echoed by United Nations in its report which mentions that societies currently in conflict or in post conflict transition, are facing a demographic challenge of extremely high proportion of young population at a time when people in these societies are still recovering from the scars of occupation, an economic slump, and periodic outbreaks of political violence. Timor-Leste, Asia’s newest nation characterised by exceptionally high fertility rates, extremely low formal sector employment and very limited international migration options, will generate very high proportions of excess labour. Analysis based on a combination of primary and secondary data this paper predicts that the unmet aspirations and building frustration of the youths may lead to re-emerging civil conflict as evident in the recent past unless the country utilise the widow of opportunity for a demographic dividend.

In this paper I ask three questions:
1. Are recent rises in the age at marriage in India being correctly attributed to positive changes in attitudes and aspirations?
2. Can we learn more about the impetus behind the rising age at marriage by looking at changes in the age at marriage of men rather than in women?
3. Just because raising the age at marriage has historically been advocated to lower fertility and population growth, does it follow that later marriage and childbearing are good for women and children too?
An exploration of the nuptiality transition in India suggests that it may not be as definitive as the term implies and that it may at least partly reflect an inability of men to marry for several reasons. The result – rising numbers of young unattached males – while good for population size, might not be so good for social and political stability.

ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY AND FERTILITY
Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the highest levels of teenage pregnancies in the world. In spite of that, there is paucity of empirical research on causes of teenage pregnancies in African countries. This paper investigates the determinants of teenage pregnancies based on a case study of Busia District in Kenya. The data are from a household survey conducted in 1998/1999. Empirical results indicate that girls’ education level has significant influence on the probability of teenage birth, with non-schooling adolescents and those with primary school level education being more vulnerable. Among the variables used as proxies for access to sex education, availability of church forums that educate adolescents about sex and family life issues reduce probability of teenage pregnancy. Age is positively related to teenage pregnancies, with older adolescents being more predisposed to pregnancies.