Public policies and low fertility

In the period 1995-2005, Slovenia was the country with the lowest low total fertility rate (TFR), the lowest level being 1.20 in 2003. The TFR was below 1.5 in the 18-year period from 1990 to 2007. In 2010 and 2011 it was 1.57 and 1.56, respectively, since women have been recuperating the postponed births.

For decades, Slovenia has had a well-developed family policy, aimed at enabling the reconciliation of professional and family obligations, providing equal opportunities to both sexes and a horizontal redistribution of income in favour of families with children. This is particularly true for parental leave and pre-school childcare. Notwithstanding, almost no impact of family policy on fertility has ever been observed.

This paper focuses on the factors (including family policy measures) that had influenced people’s decisions to have their first, second and third child. The evaluation of family policy measures and preferences is dealt with, too. The main data source is the Slovenian survey on the impact of family policy measures, conducted in June 2010 on a representative sample of 1,013 persons aged 20-49 years. Reference is made to the results of the 2000 International Population Policy and Attitudes Survey and the 1995 Fertility and Family Survey.

Impact of societal instability and crisis on fertility intentions, attitudes and behavior is yet to be analyzed and researched. Its effect on fertility is obvious, however the direction and scope of the impact largely remains unknown. The existing empirical evidence suggests different and often times mutually exclusive interpretations. For instance, the lowest post-war fertility rated was observed in Russia at 1999, the year that followed the huge monetary default. On the other hand, recent increase in fertility has been observed in Iceland, the country that suffered the most during current economic crisis. Increased fertility in some areas of New York after September, 11, 2001 was not accidental, too.
Most of researchers have studied the impact of economic instabilities or natural or man-made catastrophes on political and social instability. In this paper I present the results of the study of mostly social and political instabilities on fertility intentions, attitudes and behavior. I incorporate the advanced version of uncertainty reduction theory and apply it to analysis of fertility dynamics in USSR/Russia at the periods of both stability and various types of social and political instability.

The first decade of this century represented the entry of Brazil in the group of below replacement fertility countries, about 40 years after the onset of the fertility transition in the country. The country's average does not reflect the differentials in reproductive behavior of the Brazilian women. Considering the example of the extremes educational levels (women less than 4 years versus women higher than 10 years of schooling), one can observe that although the differentials decreases over time, they are still considerable. The main objective of this paper is to present fertility scenarios for 2015, 2020 and 2025 based on the projection of the educational level of women. Projecting schooling one may ask: what will happen to fertility if women adopt the reproductive behavior observed in 2010? And if the differentials among different schooling levels women decrease? Will Brazil reach lowest low levels?

Population has always been an important consideration in determining the wealth and progress of a nation. As part of the population, the family, being the basic unit, is developed, cared for and protected by the government. The study looked into family planning campaigns in Korea from the year 1962 onto the present and evaluated the efficacy of these. Statistics regarding the population distribution, labor force, and committed crimes were obtained and analyzed. These figures were associated with the family program campaign and were deemed to be reflective of latent problems in the society. Results revealed that
the objectives of these programs were clear and reachable and that they have indeed succeeded in reducing fertility rates. However, effects of these efforts that may possibly affect the society negatively have not been considered or foreseen. Low birth rates were associated to an aging population, a shrinking labor force, xenophobia within the Korean consciousness and increased crime rates among foreign nationals. The research delved into these underlying concerns and further
recommended that these ought to be studied in light of macro-level societal programs. Governmental programs may have been developed with the best intentions but unintended impacts to the society must also be anticipated.

Although Korea has successfully experienced a demographic transition, its super-low fertility (1.08 in 2005) has become its serious public issue. To encourage couples to have additional children, since 2003 district-level local governments have begun providing financial incentives (FIN) to the parents who have registered the birth of their child with their local government, with FIN generally higher for children of second or higher order births. The objective of this study is to assess the effects of these FIN programs on the household decision to have an additional child. We used four datasets: 1) data for FIN programs of local governments for the birth registration; 2) birth registry data over 1999-2009; 3) district-level resident registration statistics; and 4) Census data for 2005. The method of this study is panel time-series analysis. Having any FIN increases the crude rate of 2nd-order births by 2.92% (p<0.01) and 3rd-order births by 8.45% (p<0.01). A FIN of one million Korean Won (US$887) is significantly associated with a 3.0% (p<0.01) increase in crude rate of second or higher order births, and is also associated with 2.3% (p<0.01) increase in crude rate of third or higher order births. This study suggests that FIN programs for the birth registration was effective in encouraging parents who have a second or more child.

Over the last couple of years South Korea has exhibited a lowest fertility rate of slightly less than 1.2 birth per woman. Daegu, one of the provinces of South Korea is lower than the national level- 0.99 birth per woman in 2005 and 1.15 birth per women in 2011. Health, gender and childcare policy decisions undoubtedly play a major role in the trend of birth rate in the region. While the government has raised budgets for low birth, the birth rate has improved including Daegu region. However, other important factors rear their heads as the desire to have children. This paper explores a closer look at the case of Daegu focusing on prevailing attitudes on marriage, childbearing, and gender role are examined to reflect on the demographic problem of few children. The policy development and implementation are analysed to uncover how they promote birth rate in terms of gender roles between men and women in particular.

Cutting the number of hours people work might contribute to boosting fertility by reducing work-family conflict. However, the causal impact of the number of hours worked on fertility is largely unknown mainly due to the possibility of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Notably, this study adds valuable evidence to the literature by utilizing a unique natural experiment in Korea, reduction in legal work week from 44 to 40 hours since 2004. The law eliminated work on Saturdays for most workers. I assess whether, and, if so, to what extent the policy had an effect on fertility in Korea, and draws implications for other countries with low fertility rates.
This paper uses a difference-in-difference research design, which compares changes in the numbers of newborns before and after the law between two groups, families whose work hours declined due to the law, and other families. Data come from the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study, an annual longitudinal survey which contains information both before and after the policy intervention. To investigate broader impact on the well-being of the family, I examine additional outcome variables including workers’ and their spouses’ health and self-reported satisfaction at home and at work.

Abstract Upon the data from the two surveys which conducted in 2006 and 2011 in Beijing, China by Beijing Population Research Institute, this study examined the change of fertility desire and relationship between fertility desire and fertility behavior. In 2006 Survey, 1025 respondents aged 20-34 were interviewed and 610 of them were followed up in 2011. The study found that the fertility desire is changeable and unstable; meanwhile the change is regular. It is shown the fertility desire has been rising in past five years that the mean number of the ideal children raised from 1.21 in 2006 to 1.30 in 2011. However it is still kept at an ex-low level. The study examined that fertility behavior is lower than fertility desire in developed areas in Beijing, like many post-industrial societies in the West and newly industrialized countries in Asia.
Keywords: fertility desire; fertility behavior; longitudinal research

This paper studies the effect on fertility of a series of three regional reforms, implemented 1988-1990, that changed the budget constraints of families in the northernmost parts of Norway compared to similar families in the rest of the country. The quasi-experimental nature of this policy change allows us to examine how exogenous variation in disposable income and the cost of childbearing affects fertility rates. In other words, we will compare the difference in fertility-related outcomes before and after the policy change (reform) in the affected regions with the same outcomes before and after 1989 for unaffected regions of the country. Individual-level multivariate analysis suggests that the reform did not have a causal effect on fertility.

Over the past few decades, South Korea has received considerable attention for its lowest fertility rate. Korea’s fertility has been steadily decreasing since the early 1960s; and in 2009, its fertility rate of 1.14 was recoded as the world’s lowest fertility rate. This remarkable fertility decline in Korea is especially notable in that there was a considerable lag in adopting effective policy in order to inhibit the fertility decline in Korea. That is, while there is strong evidence that the steep decline of fertility level below the replacement level within two and half decades is largely due to government policies and family planning programs to reduce family size (Cho, 2000); these types of policies were not repelled until the mid-1990s. As direct cash payment and indirect transfer policies to promote higher fertility has been largely ineffective, how improving work-family compatibility would affect women's fertility intention has important implications. Using the Korea Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families (KLoWF), we investigate the effect of work-family compatibility on women's fertility intention. Preliminary results suggest that while some policies are effective, some are not; and further investigation of which policy works is called for.